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This dissertation examines the identity crisis that the city of San Francisco
experienced in the decade following the 1906 earthquake and fire and how the Great War
intensified the debate over what urban characteristics should define the city in the future. 
The dual disasters of 1906, coupled with the economic and demographic growth of other
cities along the Pacific Coast, compelled San Franciscans to search for ways to maintain
their status as residents of the central metropolis of the Far West.  However, by the time
the United States declared war in April 1917 it was apparent that no city on the West
Coast could reign supreme.  As San Franciscans created a public image of patriotism and
support for the Great War, they also continued to battle with each other over how to
develop a modern metropolis that paid homage to its storied past while promoting future
progress.  The diversity of the San Francisco populace, the cornerstone of the city’s
development and identity since the Gold Rush days, fostered ideological conflict as
individuals sought to define themselves, in part, by the city in which they lived.  While
labeling individual residents as members of a particular subset based on categories such
as occupation, political party, neighborhood, or religion is impossible, this dissertation
seeks to explain the divergent thoughts within the populace regarding urban identity by
focusing on key institutions and groups whose views stood in starkest contrast.  The Great
War created an opportunity for residents to promote San Francisco as the “City that
Knows How,” but the war also exposed fears that, beyond helping the nation win a war,
San Franciscans did not know what else their city could do.    
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Introduction
When it came time to select a topic for my dissertation, I knew I wanted to
examine the effects of World War I on the American people.  In searching through
resources for my master’s thesis on masculine rhetoric and the Great War, I came across
the diary of an Oklahoman, Harry Brill, who enlisted in the army in 1917.  In his journal,
he detailed the months he spent at a training camp in Louisiana, particularly the
monotony of camp life and the entertainment found in the nearby town of Alexandria.  1
When I began thinking about my dissertation, my thoughts returned to Brill’s experience
in Louisiana and the wartime intersection of civilian life and military expansion.  Many of
Brill’s contemporaries suggested, and at times bemoaned the fact, that their peers paid
scant attention to the war in Europe.  However, it seems unlikely that residents living near
military encampments could ignore the war.  On any given day of the week, such
communities would have witnessed men dressed in military uniforms parading through
their streets or mingling among them in public spaces, like stores and theaters.  Residents
brought these men into their homes, engaged them in wholesome activities, and hosted
farewell festivities before they were shipped to the front.
As the United States entered World War I, residents of American cities grappled
with their nation’s entrance into the war, yet most American histories of the Great War
focus on federal, military, and international issues.  While these topics warrant such
attention, this federal focus neglects the impact of the war on the average citizen or
Harry Elmore Brill Collection, Box 1, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
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1
implies that Americans only felt the effects of the war through federal agencies and
federal legislation.  The most oft-cited work on American involvement in the Great War
is David Kennedy’s Over Here.  In it, Kennedy detailed the efforts by the Wilson
administration to mold (or coerce through the Espionage and Sedition Acts) civilian
support for the war, to mobilize industries and consumers, to foster greater production,
and to conscript a military for wartime service.  Kennedy’s title suggests an examination
of the American homefront, but the work is limited to a few anecdotal examples of ways
in which federal decisions affected certain people in certain places.  Robert Zieger’s
recent study of the war provides a clearer understanding of how Americans lived during
the war years, but he examines them through the lens of national progressivism and the
development of a “National Security State.”  Approaching a discussion of the war as an
event dictated by national leadership denies the real importance of the war to residents of
various states, cities, and rural counties.  Such analysis of America during the Great War
leaves readers with the impression that the war was simply too short to inflict any
appreciable social, economic or political burdens on the average citizen.    2
A few historians have rejected the above approach and have emphasized the ways
in which the war compelled changes on the homefront.  Neil Wynn’s From Progressivism
David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford
2
University Press, 1980); Robert H. Zieger’s America’s Great War: World War I and the American
Experience (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000).  For other works that take a
federalist approach to their survey of the war see Meirion and Susie Harries, The Last Days of Innocence:
America at War, 1917-1918 (New York: Random House, 1997); Edward Ellis, Echoes of Distant Thunder:
Life in the United States, 1914-1918 (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1975); Nancy K.
Bristow, Making Men Moral: Social Engineering during the Great War (New York: New York University
Press, 1996); Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee
on Public Information (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); W. J. Breen, Uncle Sam at
Home: Civilian Mobilization, Wartime Federalism and the Council of National Defense, 1917-1919
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984).
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to Prosperity examines minority groups who became a part of the mainstream by
participating in the national war effort.  In examining the stories of groups previously
analyzed in separate case studies, Wynn concluded that “there can be little doubt that the
war did bring change to the United States, some permanent, some temporary, but all of
consequence.”  Wynn created a synthesis that expands on Kennedy’s assessment of the
war’s impact on American society.  However, like Kennedy before him, Wynn produced
a study of the Great War that provides far more generalities than specific illustrations.  3
Western historians also overlook the Great War, preferring to focus on the region-
altering effect World War II had on the American West.  In their rush to explain the
explosion of industry, urbanization, and the resulting contests between racial and ethnic
communities during the Second World War, they have neglected the impact of World
War I on the early twentieth-century West.   Western historians have looked at the
intensification of labor unrest, hostility toward immigrants, and the Spanish flu epidemic
during the war, but other areas more vital to a complete interpretation of the role of
Western peoples remain virtually untouched.   As with the works of Kennedy, Zieger, and4
Neil A. Wynn, From Progressivism to Prosperity: World War I and American Society (New
3
York: Homes and Meier, 1986), xiv-xix.
For examples of the discussion of labor in the West during the war see James Byrkit, Forging the
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Copper Collar: Arizona’s Labor Management War of 1901-1921 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1982), 325-328; Richard Melzer, “Exiled in the Desert: The Bisbee Deportees’ Reception in Mexico,
1917,” New Mexico Historical Review, 67 (July 1992), 269-284; Arnon Gutfeld, Montana’s Agony: Years
of War and Hysteria, 1917-1921 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1979).  For attacks on
immigrant communities see David Emmons, The Butte Irish: Class and Ethnicity in an American Mining
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in Germany: Utah’s German American Community and World War I,” Utah Historical Quarterly, 58 (Fall
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Wynn, historians studying the West have provided little more than generalizations about
the war’s impact on the American people.  Michael Malone and Richard Etulain believed
the era of the Great War saw a continuation of Eastern colonialism and little lasting
economic change in the West.  In contrast, Gerald Nash saw significant economic growth
in the West during World War I, leading to new sources of prosperity and a
corresponding decrease in dependency.  Nash went so far as to claim that the war had a
profound impact on the region, yet few have tested the validity of Nash’s assertion.    5
Nash’s assessment led me to focus my attention on developing a case study of a
western community.  Since I also wanted to examine a place tied to one of the nation’s
thirty-three military cantonments, the choices for study were limited.  There were only
four military encampments west of the Great Plains.  These four camps, and the
communities in their geographic proximity, demonstrate the varied atmosphere
experienced by men training for war.   Deming, New Mexico, home to Camp Cody, had a
population of only 1,864 in 1910 and there were no communities larger than that for more
than fifty miles in any direction.  Government officials placed Camp Kearny in San
Diego, a city stifled by the growing power of Los Angeles and home to only 39,578
residents in 1910.  Seattle, a young but growing city, was forty-three miles from Camp
Lewis and boasted a population of 237,194.   Despite Seattle’s rapid growth since the turn
of the century, I decided that San Francisco, located 32 miles from Camp Fremont, would
55.
Michael Malone and Richard Etulain, The American West: A Twentieth-Century History (Lincoln:
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University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 46-78; Gerald Nash, The American West in the Twentieth Century: A
Short History of an Urban Oasis, 2  ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977), 63-71.nd
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be the optimal case study.  San Francisco was the only city in the Far West ranked in the
top fifteen largest urban places in the nation.    The large and diversified population of6
San Francisco made it the perfect place for me to examine the intersection of urban life
and military expansion.  
For decades, San Francisco had been developing institutions that, I believe,
ultimately gave it a unique perspective when it came time to expand the military’s
presence in the West.   Besides its size, a number of other factors made San Francisco an7
appealing choice for a case study of the impact of World War I on a city and its residents. 
The Spanish had established the Presidio on the site of what became San Francisco
because of its position at the opening of a large, natural harbor.  With the gold rush, it
became known as the City by the Golden Gate, the gateway to Pacific trade, servicing an
entire region with the goods that came in and out of its harbor.  The wealth amassed in
this trade, and the subsequent investments in real estate, led the city to be home to many
of the West Coast’s most influential investors and financial centers.  When the
government created the Federal Reserve system in 1913, San Francisco became home to
the Twelfth Federal Reserve District, the fourth largest in the country by 1930.   The War8
Willis J. Abbot, The United States in the Great War (New York: Leslie-Judge Co., 1919), 42;
6
United States, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1912-1914).
In his analysis of city and regional development in the United States, Carl Abbott could have
7
easily been describing San Francisco specifically when he stated that, “city people and city-based
institutions have spear-headed successive frontiers, organized production, centralized rural resources, linked
local to the national or international economic system, channeled flows of information, and provided focal
points for regional culture and identity.” Carl Abbott, “Frontiers and Sections: Cities and Regions in
American Growth,” in American Urbanism: A Historiographical Review, ed. Howard Gillette, Jr. and Zane
L. Miller (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 271.
Lewis Francis Byington and Oscar Lewis, eds., The History of San Francisco (Chicago:  S.J.
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Clarke Publishing Company, 1931), 522.
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Department maintained the Presidio, which became the embarkation point for men
stationed in the Phillippines during and after the Spanish American War.  The city also
served as the Pacific, or Western Division headquarters of the army, overseeing military
bases in ten western states and territories.   Beyond its economic and military importance,9
San Francisco was a more heterogenous city than others in the Far West.  As late as 1930
those with foreign parents made up over half the city’s population and more people
defined themselves as Catholic than any other religious tradition.  Tolerance of this
diversity and the fluidity of economic progress empowered the city’s laborers to organize. 
These unions successfully dominated important industries such as construction and the
waterfront trades and used their strength to win political office for themselves and their
supporters.  10
Although histories of San Francisco frequently point out the unique elements of
the city’s past, they rarely, if ever, mention the Great War.  Lewis Byington and Oscar
Lewis dedicated one page to the war in their voluminous The History of San Francisco,
even though the authors had lived through the war just a decade earlier.  Byington and
Lewis did little more than note the large number of soldiers on the city’s streets, the flu
epidemic, and the celebration commemorating the end of the war.  They mentioned
nothing about how the war affected the community.  They, like several others, focused
more of their study on the events that occurred around the time of the war, such as the
Erwin N. Thompson and Sally B. Woodbridge, Special History Study:  Presidio of San
9
Francisco:  An Outline of Its Evolution as a U.S. Army Post, 1847-1990 (Denver:  U.S. Department of the
Interior, National Park Service, 1992).
William Issel and Robert W. Cherny, San Francisco, 1865-1932:  Politics, Power, and Urban
10
Development (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1986).
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construction of the Civic Center complex, the Panama Pacific International Exposition,
and Hetch Hetchy.  Generally, when authors included the Great War in their histories of
the city they did little more than blame it for disrupting the flow of visitors to the PPIE or
causing a reduction in civic projects.   They interpreted the war as an event that did little11
more than delay urban progress and, therefore, did not warrant intense analysis.  
William Issel and Robert Cherny argued that the wartime event that had the most
significant impact on the city’s residents occurred before the United States declared war
in April 1917.  The debate over preparedness had encouraged supporters to organize a
parade down Market Street on July 22, 1916.  A bomb exploded on Steuart Street, near
the parade route, killing nine and inuring forty.  This bombing, and the subsequent birth
of the Chamber of Commerce’s Law and Order Committee (that insisted the bombing
was the work of unionists), reopened class divisions and political conflicts that had
remained relatively in check since the election of Mayor James Rolph in 1911.  The
bombing helped the Chamber of Commerce organize the business community behind the
common goal of weakening the economic and political strength of the city’s labor unions. 
The actions of San Franciscans during the war were little more than a passing thought as
Issel and Cherny traced the constant clashes between labor and business that resulted in a
“paralysis of city government” in the 1920s.  The two historians argued that in the decade
Lewis Francis Byington and Oscar Lewis, eds., The History of San Francisco (Chicago:  S.J.
11
Clarke Publishing Company, 1931), 463.  Other histories of San Francisco that briefly refer to the war are
Charles Caldwell Dobie, San Francisco:  A Pageant (New York:  D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939);
Mel Scott, The San Francisco  Bay Area, 2nd ed. (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1985);  Gray
Brechin, Imperial San Francisco:  Urban Power, Earthly Ruin (Berkeley:  University of California Press,
1999);  John Bernard McGloin, S.J., San Francisco: The Story of a City (San Frafael: Presidio Press,
1978).
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after the Great War this inability to create compromises generally “produced outcomes
acceptable to the business community” by giving them the opportunity to set an agenda
relatively unconstrained by other interest groups.  For Issel and Cherny the preparedness
day bombing, and not the war, initiated a new era in San Francisco, one in which the
city’s businessmen increased their political strength in a traditionally pluralistic political
environment.  12
The 1920s not only signaled political changes in San Francisco.  Roger Lotchin, in
studying the connections between the military and western cities in the interwar years,
noted a shift in the way urban Californians perceived their cities after the Great War.  The
postwar labor conflicts in the region, combined with the fear of radicalism, and economic
disruption, compelled coastal communities to intensify efforts to accumulate as much of
the military-industrial complex for their city as possible.  Being able to identify their city
as the military headquarters of the Pacific would mean steady revenue for municipal
government, low unemployment for residents, increased economic investments, and a
boost in tourism.   While they do not agree on what caused the change, Issel, Cherny,13
and Lotchin concluded that San Francisco in the inter-war years was not the same city it
had been at the turn of the century.  While the dynamics of all cities change over time,
how the Great War affected this transition in San Francisco is the focus of the current
study.
My research demonstrates that San Francisco was going through a transitional
Issel and Cherny, San Francisco, 1865-1932, 177-178; 200-212.
12
Roger W. Lotchin, Fortress California, 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New York:
13
Oxford University Press, 1992), xiii-xviii.
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phase during the 1910s that was, on the one hand, common to cities across the nation and,
on the other, unique to San Francisco and the development of the West Coast.  Several
historians have noted a general trend among urban residents at this time to reevaluate
what it meant to live in an American city.  Alan Marcus believed prewar urbanites saw
their city as a social system, consisting of diverse groups that each had proper,
hierarchical tasks.  The city was run efficiently when all its groups did their part correctly. 
Marcus concluded that after 1920 residents defined their cities as concentric
communities, each equally responsible for the success or failure of the city.  Rather than
identifying the city as a corrupting influence that required the middle class to push for
more social and/or moral control to prevent competing thoughts and practices, urban
Americans began to see their city, and the diversity it harbored, as having positive
attributes.  If they could channel diverse opinions into common goals, the city would
succeed.   14
Gunther Barth also recognized a shift in the way people defined themselves and
their city by the 1920s.  While Marcus focused on political and social structures, Barth
concentrated on the elements that comprised urban culture.   He argued that by the 1910s
what residents perceived as “modern” city culture – based on apartment house living, the
dissemination of common ideas in local papers, consumption in department stores, and
public entertainment venues like ball parks and vaudeville houses – had begun to
decrease in significance.  These unifying institutions had previously “answered the
Alan I. Marcus, “Back to the Present: Historians’ Treatment of the City as a Social System
14
During the Reign of the Idea of Community,” in American Urbanism: A Historiographical Review, ed.
Howard Gillette, Jr. and Zane L. Miller (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 16-20.
9
mounting need of diverse people for a common urban identity that also left enough room
for each individual’s dreams and aspirations.”  Barth concluded that the new urban
culture – based on the automobile, tabloids, shopping centers and movies – compelled
changes in urban identity throughout the nation by the 1920s.   In most cities, traditional15
cultural icons slowly failed to satisfy individual and communal needs, but San Francisco
experienced an almost instantaneous collapse of cultural institutions.   The earthquake
and fire in April 1906 disrupted the balance between self and community as treasured
establishments went up in flames.  While residents quickly rebuilt their homes and
business, the new buildings could not simply replicate the old urban culture.   San
Franciscans, like their counterparts in other America cities, searched for new ways to
define their City by the Golden Gate as they moved through the 1910s and 1920s.  The
destruction in 1906 left the city with fewer architectural reminders of its past from which
to construct the new urban culture. 
San Francisco faced another unique crisis as it struggled to rebuild after the 1906
disasters – loss of its position as the premiere city of the West Coast.  Since the Gold
Rush it had been the city through which trade flowed.  Trade had led to its dominance as
the West’s financial center and its population was not only the largest on the coast but
ranked among the top ten in the nation from 1870-1900.   The 1906 earthquake and fire,16
however, made San Franciscans more aware that their supremacy in these areas was not
Gunther Barth, City People: The Rise of Modern City Culture in Nineteenth-Century America
15
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 229-234.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of the
16
100 Largest Urban Places in the United States: 1790-1990 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1998).
10
permanently secure.  There is ample evidence that San Franciscans were well aware of the
rapid growth of their Pacific Coast urban competitors before the beginning of WWI.  To
the north, Portland and Seattle had been competing with each other for economic control
of the Pacific Northwest since the 1880s.  Like San Francisco, Seattle had a good, natural
harbor.  As a result of the Alaskan gold rush in the 1890s, and the completion of the Great
Northern Railroad in 1893, Seattle began developing a variety of small industries to meet
regional demands, thus creating relative economic stability and a subsequent population
explosion.  By 1910, Seattle boasted a population of more than 237,000 – 30,000 more
than its regional rival, Portland.  17
The Alaskan gold rush also infused life into the economy of Portland thanks to the
Northern Pacific.  The railroad linked the city to markets in the interior a full decade
earlier than Seattle.  Portland provided all the needs of prospective miners:  food crops
from the Willamette Valley, lumber, mining supplies and tents.  Portland experienced
massive growth between 1905 and 1912 as shown in the 150 percent increase in banking
transactions and the 400 percent rise in building permits.  By 1912, 20 percent of the
nation’s timber supply came from the Cascade Mountains, adding to the wealth in
Portland’s trade and financial sectors.  The growth of Seattle and Portland in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century meant the Pacific Northwest could claim economic
independence from San Francisco, which had provided the manufactured goods and crop
Mansel G. Blackford, The Lost Dream: Business and City Planning on the Pacific Coast, 1890-
17
1920 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993), 14-25; Roger Sale, Seattle: Past to Present (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1976), 50-86; Gerald B. Nelson, Seattle: The Life and Times of an
American City (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 28-29.
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markets for the region before the additional transcontinental lines.  Such independence
not only thwarted previous economic advantages for San Francisco, it also meant the City
by the Golden Gate would in the future have to compete for regional and possible
international markets with these two cities.18
Seattle and Portland were not the only coastal cities that grew to become San
Francisco’s rivals for natural resources, financial investments, new residents, and
international commerce.  Los Angles, long dependent on the Southern Pacific Railroad,
was also a developing threat.   In 1876, Los Angeles voters elected to give Southern
Pacific a $602,000 bond subsidy and much of the public land around San Pedro Harbor. 
As long as the San Francisco-based Big Five controlled Los Angeles, San Francisco’s
dominance prevailed.   However, in the early twentieth century, members of the Los19
Angeles Chamber of Commerce began efforts to whittle away at Southern Pacific’s
power base.  Through bond elections and court litigation, Los Angeles won control of its
water system in 1902 from the privately-owned Los Angeles City Water Company (a
political ally of SP).  Four years later the Chamber successfully campaigned to remove
the SP machine from local politics, winning seventeen of twenty-three offices.  In 1911,
Los Angeles and Oakland pressured the state legislature to pass the Tidelands Trust Act,
Blackford, The Lost Dream , 14-25; Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 1851-
18
2001 (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2003), 225-266; Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics,
and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 35-52.
Los Angeles’ deals with Southern Pacific prevented San Diego from establishing a similar deal
19
with the company, hampering the development of San Diego as a major urban center until the 1920s.  San
Diego did not make the U.S. Census Bureau’s top 100 cities list until 1920 when it ranked ninety-third with
74,683 residents.  For more on San Diego’s early history see the seven volumes of Richard Pourade’s The
History of San Diego written between 1960 and 1977, published by Union-Tribune Publishing Company.
12
giving California cities control of their harbors.  After the city consolidated San Pedro
into the greater city of Los Angeles, the Chamber initiated bond elections that, by 1932,
netted $30 million in local funds for harbor improvements.  Los Angeles was thus able to
dredge its harbor, widen the channel, and increase the size of the protective breakwater. 
While most of the harbor’s prewar traffic was in domestic imports, the harbor
improvements prepared the way for greater exportation of natural resources in the
decades to come.  The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce combined these political
actions with one of the most wide-reaching advertising campaigns of the time.  They sent
produce from the farms around Los Angeles to expositions across the country, distributed
Los Angeles newspapers to every region, and advertised the warm climate and suburban-
like environment of their sprawling city.  The result was a massive increase in the number
of migrants, many retiring farmers from the Midwest.  By 1910, Los Angeles was the
seventeenth largest city in the nation – only six spots behind San Francisco.20
The 1910 census noted more than San Francisco’s inability to keep up with the
previous decade’s national urban growth.  It also marked the U.S. Census Bureau’s
creation of twenty-five “metropolitan districts.”  For the first time, the U.S. Census
Bureau examined the population of the largest American cities not just by the number of
people living within the city proper, but also those inhabitants of what the Bureau called
the “adjacent territory.”  Behind this change was a belief in the growing “importance of
Robert M. Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930 (Berkeley:
20
University of California Press, 1967), 43-78; Steven P. Erie, Globalizing Los Angeles: Trade,
Infrastructure, and Regional Development (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 45-63; Blackford,
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the suburbs of great cities.”  In creating the metropolitan district for the Bay Area, Census
Bureau officials determined that there was not one central city, but two – San Francisco
and Oakland.  Thanks in part to the 1906 disasters, San Francisco’s population had
increased by approximately 22 percent (to 416,912), while Oakland had grown by 124
percent (to 150,174).  Census officials considered the increase to be significant enough to
create a co-metropolitan district for the Bay Area.    Urban sociologists considered the21
Census’s creation of the metropolitan district system a strong indicator that Americans
were beginning to accept the economic, political, and cultural control of the central city
on the growing suburbs surrounding it.  However, the opposite appears to be the case in
San Francisco.  The Census Bureau, in perceiving San Francisco to be part of a
metropolitan district that included a second influential city, denoted in charts rather than
words that no one city dominated the Bay.  Meanwhile, the lack of co-central cities for
Los Angeles, Seattle, or Portland meant they did not face significant competition for
metropolitan dominance.  They were, therefore, able to develop control over their districts
while San Francisco had to worry about fending off the political and economic
encroachment of neighboring communities.  San Francisco Bay cities, unwilling to
support consolidation with San Francisco, became its competitors, providing potential
residents and businesses less expensive and crowded housing conditions and land for
industrial development.22
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States, volume 1, (Washington,
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For San Franciscans, the rising competition from other west coast cities threatened
the economic viability of their community and in part the way they defined themselves. 
According to Sharon Zukin, urban residents create new public spaces that reflect their
vision of a city when traditional institutions fail to provide meaningful expressions of
identity.  For San Franciscans, the old city of political bosses, limited law and order, and a
frontier town of single, transient men looking to get rich quick had been purged by the
fire. By the 1910s residents were searching for ways to define the city that they claimed as
their home in a way that reflected their personal values and visions of the future.   23
During a lecture on the city of Boston in the early 1990s, David McCullough stated that
“What face to put on one’s city . . . has been a great concern to town and city leaders
since before the American Revolution.  Particularly in trying economic times or moments
of social unrest, leaders and everyday people alike have wondered aloud about what the
future held and what their role in it would be.”   In 1917, San Francisco was a city facing24
a whole host of potential future problems.  The start of the war in Europe had led to rising
inflation, resulting in labor unrest in 1916.  Meanwhile, many residents were increasingly
aware of the growing trade, population, and business competition they faced from other
cities on the coast.  Then, the war itself drafted men and resources away from the city. 
The question became, what would San Francisco look like in the future?  How would its
Bay area, is found in Mel Scott, The San Francisco  Bay Area, 2nd ed. (Berkeley:  University of California
Press, 1985), 133-148; 183.
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residents define the city, and by extension, themselves?
In making the argument that urban residents actively construct an identity based in
part on their perceived connections to the larger community, I am following the
contention made by urban sociologists who emphasize the importance of agency rather
than structure.  These social theorists reject the general tenets of the Chicago School of
sociologists, who argued that residents of urban environments react to, rather than choose
to define their lives by, the attributes of the city.  According to these sociologists,
residents seek out bonds, both real and perceived, with other urbanites, leading each to a
personal identification with the city.   War-related functions, like bond drives, became25
intertwined with routine daily associations, such as club functions and business
transactions, to give San Franciscans multiple opportunities for social interaction.  These
interpersonal associations strengthened community identification, and in turn personal
attachments to San Francisco.  These residents jockeyed with each other for their share of
the urban power structure, even as they fought to maintain San Francisco’s identity as the
economic, political, and cultural supremacy on the West Coast.  The war led to additional
federal support from government shipbuilding contracts and military bases. This
significant infusion of federal dollars showed San Franciscans that one way to secure the
city’s economic future was to keep the military in San Francisco after the war.  Even if
they were unable to maintain dominance in regional or Pacific rim trade, the strong
presence of the military in the decades to come would enable residents to redefine their
David A. Karp, Gregory P. Stone and William C. Yoels, Being Urban: A Sociology of City Life,
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city.  Instead of being residents of the Jewel of the Pacific, they could help to make their
city the Defender of the Pacific.26
As historians Robert Fairbanks and Patricia Mooney-Melvin explain, residents of
any city have at any given time some basic, shared assumptions that serve as the basis for
debate on current issues.   During the 1910s, San Franciscans shared the conviction that27
their city should defend its economic supremacy on the West Coast.  The war gave
residents the opportunity to prove to the entire nation that San Francisco knew how to
win a war.  Through patriotic efforts, San Franciscans hoped to win federal recognition
for their abilities, recognition that would in turn lead to military contracts, attract new
businesses and residents, and lure visitors from across the nation to see for themselves
why San Francisco was special. In San Francisco this shared, urban goal could also stir up
conflict as various groups contributed their interpretations about how to meet the city’s
goal of showing the nation that they were “The City That Knows How.”
In times of great crisis or change, civic pride brought residents together to work
for a common cause, such as rebuilding after the 1906 earthquake and fire, winning and
hosting the PPIE, and patriotically serving their nation’s needs in the Great War.  These
goals, and the civic unity they evoked, masked underlying tensions within the city.  While
In his study of urban American from 1915-1945 William H. Wilson points out the significant
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residents in part identified themselves as members of the greater San Francisco
community, there were many other ways they chose to define themselves.  Mark
Abrahamson noted in his work on urban enclaves that “most people occupy numerous
roles, are involved in many different relationships, and have multiple identities.”  They
might identify themselves at various times and in different situations within such
categories as kinship networks, occupational roles, religious beliefs, or political views.  In
a large city like San Francisco, people did not feel pressured to choose a dominant
identity but could combine multiple characteristics into a pluralistic identity.   A single28
individual could, for example, define himself as a resident of San Francisco, a member of
the Building Trades Union, a member of the Board of Supervisors, and an ethnic
Irishman.  Such pluralism makes it nearly impossible to explain how all residents felt on
any specific issue during the Great War.  Though no one person might fall into any one
category, I decided that the best way to organize the dissertation was to have the chapters
focus on some of the most dominant, and potentially conflicting, characteristics – local
politicians, members of the Chamber of Commerce, labor unionists, and European
immigrants.  While residents might identify themselves as members of several of these
groups, one can examine some of the most significant conflicts that appeared in San
Francisco during the Great War with such categorizations.    
Before one can explain the crisis of identity facing San Francisco by the time of
the Great War, one must explain how San Franciscans had previously defined their city. 




Chapter One contains a brief history of the city before the war.  It examines the growth of
San Francisco after the Gold Rush and how the earthquake and fire in 1906 destroyed the
last vestiges of the city’s frontier origins.  How residents chose to rebuild after the twin
disasters and the importance of hosting the Panama International Exposition help explain
the developing identity of the new San Francisco.  With the closing of the PPIE, residents
struggled to find another common goal to unify the city’s disparate parts just as the
United States entered World War I.  
The Great War provided San Franciscans with an opportunity to show their
devotion to the cause of democracy as they demonstrated the values of the “City That
Knows How.”  Chapter Two examines the ways in which soldiers and sailors preparing
for imminent deployment commingled with civilians in greater numbers than San
Franciscans had seen since the Philippine Insurrection.   It also analyzes how the
expansion of military installations in the Bay Area altered the activities of the city's
residents and affected temporary military residents.  An evening or weekend furlough
brought soldiers from the Presidio, and later Camp Fremont, into contact with civilians
who treated each man as potential future residents (or at the very least frequent visitors). 
Defensive bases, like Fort Baker, and the soldiers stationed at Fort McDowell added to
the martial spirit that permeated the city.  Contingents of new recruits like Charles
Swope, the central figure in Chapter Two, marched down Market Street alongside
shoppers, workers, and businessmen.  City residents could not ignore the fact that the
United States was at war, nor could they afford to waste the opportunity to win favor with
military leaders who might be able to grant the city government contracts in the future.  
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Such constant reminders of the war prevented San Franciscans from conducting
business as usual and provided new opportunities to prove one’s patriotism and civic
zeal.  Leading most of these public displays of patriotism was Mayor James Rolph, and
Chapter Three studies the important role of municipal government in fighting the war. 
Mayor Rolph spent the war publicizing the city's efforts and promoting the advantages the
city offered to the military and others entering the city due to wartime endeavors, while
also uniting the citizenry in public displays of loyalty and unity.  Local political leaders
oversaw state and national defense edicts that, if ignored, could jeopardize the city's
reputation and future economic gains. 
The growing economic strength of other Pacific Coast cities particularly worried
San Francisco’s businessmen who, during the war, looked anxiously to the future.  While
the PPIE had shown that the city could rebound from the fiery ashes, its position as the
preeminent Pacific Coast city was no longer certain.  The astounding growth of Los
Angeles, the boosterism of San Diego, and the expansion of international trade with the
Pacific Northwest prompted San Francisco to compete for federal attention, international
recognition, and tourism.  The efforts of the Chamber of Commerce to promote San
Francisco as the premier city of the Pacific Coast and the efforts of individual
businessmen to win the war, and profit from it, are the crux of Chapter Four.  The war
gave San Francisco businessmen the opportunity to advertise the best their city had to
offer – wrapped in an American flag. At the same time, the war provided the city’s
organized laborers the chance to thwart the Chamber of Commerce’s prewar attempts to
reduce union power.   The unions consistently emphasized the loyalty of their actions,
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whether by strategic use of strikes, supporting the defendants in the bombing trials, or
contributing to wartime drives.  Chapter Five addresses the ways in which the city's labor
unions invoked patriotic rhetoric while fighting for workers' rights.  It also examines
labor's vision of San Francisco's identity, one in which, as in the past, labor had access to
political power.  Combining civic pride, patriotism, and personal advancement, San
Francisco's labor unions and ethnic groups  showed the nation that the “City that Knows
How” could not only rebuild a city but help to win a war. 
San Francisco's diverse urban populace serves as a microcosm of the nation’s
debate over the need for “100 percent Americanism.”  San Francisco's designation as a
city of immigrants allows for the study of varying reactions to American entrance into
World War I and the war's impact on ethnic groups.  In San Francisco, a majority of
residents could identify themselves as members of an ethnic group, but the focus of
Chapter Six is on the city’s three largest contingents  – the Irish, Germans, and Italians. 
All three faced unique challenges during the war, depending on the diplomatic
relationship of the United States to their country of origin.  Each sought to improve the
image of their ethnic group within the larger community by supporting federally approved
wartime activities, while also struggling to protect elements of their ethnic culture they
considered important not only to themselves but to the diversity of San Francisco. 
Each chapter begins with the description of one of the city’s many parades or
large public functions.  These activities reflected not only residents’ desire to express
their support for the American war but also their desire to show the nation that San
Francisco stood behind the cause 100 percent.  According to Roger Lotchin, city leaders
21
used civic events during World War II to suppress individualism and draw residents
closer together.  I argue that this can also be seen with public displays of patriotism
during the Great War.  People of various backgrounds in part defined themselves based
on their perception of what it meant to be a San Franciscan.  Patriotic rallies united
residents in a common purpose:  helping their city and nation win the war.   Organizations
conducted these parades in the city’s most public spaces, generally starting or ending
somewhere along Market Street, the artery that cuts diagonally from the Ferry Building,
through the downtown business district, to City Hall.  According to historian Jon C.
Teaford, business districts in the early twentieth century served as the “knot uniting the
various strands of the city.”  Any parade of people on Market Street was sure to grab the
attention of the masses who might live in neighborhoods scattered throughout San
Francisco, but who in many ways connected to the larger community by their presence on
Market Street.   Such visual manifestations of patriotism served to commemorate unity,29
while hiding the fissures within the community.  While San Franciscans wanted to
promote a concerted war effort, they also sought to secure their vision of the city’s future
and secure their way of life.  Businessmen wanted to draw more business to the city;
politicians and would-be politicians wanted to get elected; labor wanted to keep their
unions strong; soldiers wanted reminders of home; and immigrants wanted the larger
populace to accept their ethnic diversity while they enjoyed the economic benefits
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associated with at least a modicum of assimilation.  The divisions inherent in the urban
populace resulted in serious disagreements regarding how to achieve urban goals, creating
a fractured vision of San Francisco’s current and future identity.
This sturm and drang is evident in residents’ desires to promote a concerted war
effort while competing with others for political and economic power.  During the war,
divergent segments of the populace used patriotic rhetoric to attack their urban opponents,
labeling them disloyal or at the least patriotically inept.  San Franciscans united for
general purposes, such as reconstruction, the graft trials, the PPIE, and the Great War, but
differed widely on the specifics of how theirs goals should be achieved.  The greater the
challenge, the more orderly and organized the people and neighborhoods functioned, no
matter how disconnected their individual aspirations.  The war provided an overarching
organization system, one in which participation in the war effort united the diversified
groups, creating a well-operating city and war machine.
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Chapter One
“It is in San Francisco because she knows how”: 
The Panama Pacific International Exposition and the Struggle for an Urban
Identity 
On the morning of October 14, 1911 San Franciscans lined six miles of city
streets from the St. Francis Hotel to Golden Gate Park’s stadium.  Shortly after ten
o’clock, mounted police began escorting automobiles carrying President William Howard
Taft, along with city and state dignitaries, to the site of the ground-breaking ceremonies
that would initiate the construction of the Panama Pacific International Exposition
(PPIE).  Residents of the city followed the long line of cars, marching bands, soldiers
from the Presidio, and sailors from the Naval Training Station as they made their way to
the spot in Golden Gate Park that had been home to the Midwinter Fair of 1893.  The
ceremony at the park was, as the San Francisco Chronicle described it, “simple in the
extreme.”  Charles Moore, president of the Panama Pacific International Exposition
Company, made a few brief comments, as did Mayor Patrick McCarthy and Governor
Hiram Johnson.  President Taft then addressed the crowd, examining the history of
Panama and the progress made to date on the canal.  In conclusion, he praised San
Francisco and California as a whole for “their energy and their enterprise and their
patriotism and their generosity” in raising the funds necessary to commemorate what Taft
considered a seminal event for America as it expanded its international trade and
intercontinental ties.   Using a silver spade, President Taft scooped up a small amount of
dirt, which he poured into a rosewood box held by Charles Moore.  President Taft then
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raised the exposition flag up a makeshift pole while workers released one hundred white
doves and the crowd sang the “Star Spangled Banner.”  Moore dismissed the crowd as
fireworks erupted overhead.   This simple public exercise was the culmination of years of1
hard work by San Franciscans to draw international attention to their city and achieve
national recognition for their impressive reconstruction since the earthquake and fires of
1906.  Golden Gate Park was symbolic of how far the city had advanced in just five years
and the pride San Franciscans felt in rising like a phoenix from the ashes.  In 1906 the
park had served as a temporary shelter for the city’s homeless.  In 1911 it sat poised to
entertain a world fair.  
The day after the ground-breaking ceremony President Taft dined with PPIE
directors at the Cliff House.  Moore presented the president with a commemorative
exposition flag like the one he had raised at Golden Gate Park.  In accepting the gift,
President Taft encouraged the directors to make the PPIE the “most successful exposition
in the world.”  He believed it would be a significant festival because it commemorated
the completion of the Panama Canal, a project Taft considered one “of the greatest work
of five, ten and fifteen centuries.”  He concluded by reminding those present that he had
supported San Francisco in her bid to host the exposition, for as “I have said before why
it ought to come here – I can only repeat – it is in San Francisco because she knows
how.”   For years to come, San Franciscans would passionately recite the last phrase of2
Taft’s speech, identifying San Francisco as “The City that Knows How.”  While the
San Francisco Chronicle, 15 October 1911, 34-35.
1
San Francisco Chronicle, 16 October 1911, 3.
2
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moniker denoted no specific urban action, for San Franciscans it conjured images of a
city constantly striving, and succeeding, to reach envisioned goals.  In 1911 San Francisco
was on its way to developing a new image of itself as a city that knew how to land an
international exposition despite recent devastation.  However, there were questions about
what else the city knew how to do besides rebuild.  Beyond the Panama Pacific
International Exposition, what else could San Franciscans boast their city was capable of
achieving?
The ground-breaking ceremonies provided residents with the opportunity to show
how far they had come since the earthquake and fire of 1906 destroyed five square miles
of the city.  It forced residents to consider where they had collectively been and where
their community was headed.  In expressing the spirit guiding the city into the future,
many San Franciscans referred to its unequaled past.  At the opening reception held for
President Taft the night before the PPIE dedication, two San Franciscans searched for
links to the city’s past in their evaluation of its present triumphs and future goals.  For
Charles Moore, president of the PPIE Company, the opening of the Panama Canal was an
opportunity for commercial pioneers to develop economic supremacy over trade with the
Orient and Latin America, comparable to San Francisco’s dominance of hinterland
commerce in nineteenth-century California, Washington, and Oregon.  Moore believed
the Exposition would create economic bonds between city businessmen and foreign
commercial entities, setting the stage for San Francisco to stake a claim to international
trade, just as city residents had controlled Nevada through their stakes in the Comstock.  
For Moore, San Franciscans were not leaving the past behind, but developing a new
26
monopoly over Pacific commerce that would reinvigorate the image of the pioneer.  
William B. Bourn, president of Empire Mines and the Spring Valley Water Company,
also saw the city’s former pioneer identity as intrinsically linked to its future.  For Bourn,
most American cities had virtually identical spirits, “differing only in the degree of
intensity with which the same pursuits are followed.”  He believed San Francisco was
unique because the gold rush had shortened the city’s childhood, causing it to develop
into an adolescent city faster than most.    3
In describing the city, Moore touched on the key to San Francisco’s early identity. 
The gold rush had converted a Mexican outpost into what one historian called an “instant
city,” which rapidly  “joined the ranks of cities that had taken centuries to evolve.”  As an
instant city, residents embraced the belief that their present circumstances were ever-
changing and pioneers who quickly learned to adapt reaped huge rewards.  At the same
time, the instant city gained control of the hinterland, spreading its economic and political
power and further fueling San Francisco’s rapid growth.   This progression of urban4
development led residents to search for ways to keep the spirit of their outpost beginnings
even as they outgrew the volatility of the 1850s.  The spirit of the frontier was easy to
maintain during the late nineteenth century when the pioneers were still alive and the city
continued to dominate the economy of California and the Pacific Coast.   After 1906 it
became more readily apparent to residents that the instant city was gone and that other
Pacific Coast cities were becoming San Francisco’s competitors, shedding their
San Francisco Chronicle, 14 October 1911, 15-16.
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dependent status.  For William Bourn, who described the city in terms of human
development, the San Francisco of 1911 was on the verge of achieving full maturation. 
However, he and others were unsure how to define this new urban adult.  While they
knew the city could no longer identify itself as a frontier outpost and increasingly faced
stiff competition from other West Coast cities, both men looked to the past to guide their
interpretation of the city’s present and future. 
For many residents San Francisco’s new identity would inevitably reflect its
unique past.  Americans had arrived in the small Mexican village of Yerba Buena in July
1846.  What they found was a small population of a few hundred residents huddled
around the community’s two central features: the military outpost at the Presidio and
Mission Dolores.  The Americans quickly surveyed the land, marking city lots for
potential future real estate development.  On January 30, 1847 the military officer in
charge bowed to pressure from new residents and officially changed the name of the town
to San Francisco to more clearly identify the community with the Bay that served as its
lifeblood rather than the small cove of Yerba Buena.  A year later the town was almost
completely evacuated when word of the discovery of gold in the American River reached
the community, but boatloads of newcomers seeking immediate wealth, envisioning San
Francisco as the financial center for the mining boom, quickly replaced the first
residents.   After the initial wave of miners poured through the Golden Gate, those who5
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5
GPO, 1887), 2: 800-801; Charles Wollenberg, Golden Gate Metropolis:  Perspectives on Bay Area History
(Berkeley:  Institute of Governmental Studies, 1985), 74; Gray Brechin, Imperial San Francisco:  Urban
Power, Earthly Ruin (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1999), xxiv, Barth, Instant Cities, xxi-xxii.
28
had made it rich as miners, or as merchants serving the miners, turned to banking or
commercial pursuits.  These entrepreneurs invested throughout the far west but continued
to use the city as their base of operations, pumping riches into the local economy. 
Meanwhile, more laborers moved into the city and became hired hands for mining
companies and the machine shops that produced mining equipment.  As consumers, these
laborers stimulated the urban economy with their purchases.   6
While mining lured many into the region, the city’s economic structure rapidly
diversified.  In 1880 San Francisco had 105,000 laborers; 36 percent worked in
manufacturing and construction, 29 percent in trade and transportation, and 34 percent in
service industries.  Manufactured goods from San Francisco were essential to the
hinterland, which was also dependent on the City by the Gate for its imports and exports. 
Thanks to its harbor, San Francisco dominated shipping.  San Francisco held a virtual
monopoly on Pacific Coast imports and controlled 83 percent of the exports from the
west coast of North and Central America.  The U.S. Census in 1887 considered San
Francisco to be the "commercial metropolis of the Pacific Coast."  Thanks to its harbor,
and the tributary rivers from the Sierra Nevada Mountains, San Francisco dominated the
region’s shipping.    The city was the center of the state’s industrial output, providing7
manufactured goods such as ships, iron, cloth, and processed foods to residents from
Washington state to the Mexican border.   In that year San Francisco had seven times the
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industrial output of its nearest competitor in the state, Los Angeles.   However, by 1910
the city’s manufacturing output had stagnated due to the transfer of some manufacturing
to the East Bay after the earthquake and fires and the rapid growth of Los Angeles.  By
1920, San Francisco’s manufacturing output was in noticeable decline.   In 1925, Los
Angeles surpassed San Francisco in manufacturing, having increased its output by 100
percent between 1900 and 1910 alone.  8
The economic opportunities available in trade, manufacturing, and the service
sector made San Francisco the most heavily populated city on the coast from the time of
the gold rush until the 1910s.  Fire destroyed the 1850 national census records for the city,
but the 1852 state census placed San Francisco’s population at 34,776.  By 1870 San
Francisco was the tenth largest city in America and the only Western city in the top ten
until Los Angeles moved into ninth place in 1920 with 576,673 residents.  Los Angeles
moved ahead of San Francisco by expanding its city boundaries farther into the suburbs
within its county.   San Francisco had been reporting combined city and county totals
since 1856 when the Consolidation Act merged the city and county of San Francisco into
one political entity.  It also separated San Francisco County from the southern portion of
the Peninsula, which become San Mateo County.  This division prevented San Francisco
from expanding beyond its 1856 size of forty-two square miles.  
The 1920 census showed that of almost 266,000 workers only 31% worked in manufacturing,
8
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After the earthquake and fire, city leaders became more concerned about the
economic competition of other Bay Area communities and the continued geographic
expansion of Los Angeles.  They sought to protect their prosperity through annexation. 
In 1907 San Franciscans began a concerted effort to develop a Greater San Francisco that
included San Mateo County, East Bay communities from Richmond to San Leandro, and
Marin County cities.  The bid for the PPIE won support from all these areas, leading San
Francisco business and political leaders to assume they would endorse the Greater San
Francisco plan.   Civic boosters successfully completed a petition drive that led to a
statewide initiative on the November 1912 ballot.  While many around the Bay supported
the initiative, San Franciscans did not anticipate the strong resistance that came from
Oakland.   Determined to retain its independence, Oakland led the state opposition to
consolidation.  On election day, only three counties voted for the initiative – San
Francisco, San Mateo, and Marin.  Despite this overwhelming defeat, San Franciscans
continued to talk about the possibility of a Greater San Francisco, although more
narrowly defined.  Leaders directed their efforts at consolidating San Mateo County as a
way to create what many assumed would be a more dynamic and prosperous San
Francisco.  For the next twenty years, politicians and Chamber of Commerce members
from both counties studied the possibility of consolidation.  In the end, San Mateo
residents rejected San Francisco’s plan of total annexation.  When San Franciscans
refused to consider the establishment of a borough system of government, the Greater San
Francisco plan ceased to be a viable option.   Today, San Francisco remains an urban
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community that encompasses only forty-seven square miles.    These geographic9
limitations prevented San Francisco from continuing to compete with other metropolitan
centers that had the capacity to spread their population over a larger area.  At the same
time, the city’s truncated size enabled it to retain a distinct geographical identity.  
The compact nature of San Francisco also accentuated another unique aspect of
San Francisco’s identity: its varied ethnic composition.  San Francisco, like many
Western urban centers, was a city with a historically large proportion of foreign-born
residents.  The gold rush brought in people from around the world and that trend
continued into the twentieth century.  In 1870, 42 percent of the city’s residents were
foreign-born whites and another 30 percent had white, foreign-born parents.   By 190010
the number of foreign-born whites had dropped, but the overall percentage of residents
from a foreign land or only one generation removed from migration remained high at 75
percent.   In the decades after the gold rush, the Irish were the dominant ethnic group,11
comprising nearly one-third of the city’s population in 1880.   German-born residents12
came in second behind the Irish from 1880 to 1910.   Though a small percentage of the13
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overall immigrant population before 1900, Italians increasingly made San Francisco
home, coming in third with almost 29,000 foreign-born residents in 1910.  In 1920 there
was not one immigrant group identified by the U.S. Census Bureau that was not
represented in San Francisco.   14
Despite large Irish, German, and Italian immigrants, the geography of the city
retarded the development of ethnic neighborhoods.  While transportation advances after
1900 allowed new residential development west of Twin Peaks, most new residents
moved into already established neighborhoods.  While Chinese and Japanese inhabitants
lived in segregated neighborhoods, seven of the nine distinct neighborhoods in this period
cannot be defined simply by ethnicity.  Marital status, occupation, and income were just
as significant in determining where someone would reside in early twentieth century San
Francisco.  Without strong ethnic enclaves, residents defined their neighbors and
neighborhoods by class rather than nationality.  However, ethnic background influenced
activities such as church attendance, support for local politicians of similar ethnic make-
up, and participation in social associations.   Since most early twentieth century residents15
had immigrant parents, or were from Europe themselves, San Francisco’s identity was in
large part tied to its large immigrant population and immigrant traditions. Residents took
pride living in a city of such ethnic diversity and often described it as a “city of
immigrants.”
The ethnic diversity of San Francisco, and a flexible social hierarchy typically
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found in an instant city, prevented the establishment of a political elite.  As a result, the
city often found itself with inefficient governance, run by political bosses who used
egalitarian themes in pursuit of their own power.  Only when these municipal
governments failed to maintain order and protect property did residents interfere with the
political status quo.   Part of the political culture’s egalitarianism stemmed from the anti-16
Chinese and later anti-Japanese rhetoric that united white San Franciscans.  Racism gave
whites a means of delineating between residents they believed deserved equal rights and
those who should be socially, economically, and politically inferior.   The free labor
ideology of the gold rush encouraged immigrants and native-born laborers to organize
unions that also prevented political dominance by the wealthy business elite.  By the early
twentieth century, one-third of the city’s workers belonged to unions that, according to
Michael Kazin, “wielded significant power over working conditions and elected
officials,” making the city “an anomaly that either impressed or horrified
contemporaries.”    The power of labor unions suggests that citizens continued to believe17
they lived in an urban community in which workers had just as much opportunity to
achieve political power as the wealthy of Nob Hill. The pace of change may have slowed
from the days of the instant city, but San Franciscans in the early twentieth century still
embraced that image of their city.  Born fully-formed from the gold rush San Francisco
afforded the pioneers who could tame the frontier fantastic opportunities.  No one,
however, could tame mother nature.
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At 5:12 a.m. on April 18, 1906 an 8.25 magnitude earthquake struck San
Francisco.  In the aftermath of the quake, fires broke out across the city, and due to the
broken water mains the city’s fire department had limited resources to fight the blazes. 
Firefighters and volunteers could only dynamite buildings to create fire breaks and wait
for the fires to burn themselves out.  When the last of the fires died out on April 21 five
square miles of San Francisco lay in ruins, including most of the financial and retail
districts, as well as large portions of the wholesale, factory and entertainment sections of
the city.  The fire destroyed more than 28,000 buildings and left three-fifth’s of the city’s
250,000 residents homeless.  On the morning of the earthquake, Mayor Eugene Schmitz
responded to the disaster by creating a Committee of Fifty to handle the immediate task
of providing necessities to the homeless.  Led by former mayor James Phelan, the
committee aided Presidio officers as they organized approximately one hundred sanitary
camps for residents.  The committee also divided the city into seven sectors for efficient
distribution of food and supplies. Bolstered by $2 million in immediate relief from
Congress and several million in Red Cross donations, city leaders shifted their focus in
May from relief to rebuilding.  The mayor replaced the Committee of Fifty with the
Committee of Reconstruction.   This committee included former city politicians,18
business leaders, professionals, and union members who put aside previous personal and
class divisions to develop plans for rebuilding the city.  Civic pride encouraged them to
seek out a comprehensive plan for reconstruction that would not only return the city to its




former glory, but create a better organized, more efficient, more modern San Francisco.
The Committee initially turned to a plan developed and published just prior to the
earthquake by the Association for the Improvement and Adornment of San Francisco. 
Emerging as a construct of the city beautiful movement, leading merchants and social
elites had formed the IASF in 1901 to encourage investors to buy city bonds for civic
improvements.   In 1905 the IASF commissioned a study from the famous urban planner19
Daniel Burnham.  Burnham had served as the chief architect of the Chicago World’s Fair
in 1893, had been a member of the Senate Park Commission that helped beautify the
Capitol, and designed a civic center for Cleveland in 1903.  The IASF challenged
Burnham to create a master plan for the city, one that would encompass and incorporate
all of San Francisco’s public spaces into a unified, communal ideal.  The Burnham plan
called for a city organized around concentric circles, each devoted to a different urban
activity – residential, educational, administrative, etc.  Streets would cut diagonally
through the circles, while parks and tree-lined boulevards would provide open spaces.  At
the foci, Burnham envisioned a Civic Center that would serve as the city’s political and
cultural heart.  Supporters argued that such impressive changes would provide a more
aesthetically pleasing environment that would draw in new businesses, tourism, and
national recognition.   Creating a city greater than the one destroyed by the earthquake20
Judd Kahn, Imperial San Francisco: Politics and Planning in an American City, 1897-1906
19
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 83-84.
Kahn, Imperial San Francisco, 83-84;  T. H. Watkins and R. R. Olmsted, Mirror of the Dream:
20
An Illustrated History of San Francisco (San Francisco: Scrimshaw Press, 1976), 203-204;  Jon C. Teaford,
The Twentieth-Century American City, 2  ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 40-nd
42; Mansel G. Blackford, The Lost Dream: Businessmen and City Planning on the Pacific Coast, 1890-
1920 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993), 40-42.  Daniel Burnham went on to develop a
36
and fire drew widespread praise from many in San Francisco.  Mayor Schmitz argued that
by following the Burnham model the city would not be building “for today but for all the
generations to come.”    In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, residents supported21
replacing the uglier aspects of the instant city, particularly its haphazard construction and
low-quality materials, with a new San Francisco built on a foundation of civic beauty. 
Such a city would attract international attention for its progressive engineering and
modern application of scientific principles, a far cry from the wild west image of the old
San Francisco.
However, support for Burnham’s plan receded almost as rapidly as the fires.
Residents began to recognize that the Burnham plan was not realistic; nor was it devised
for a city in desperate need of quick restoration.  For example, the plan did not provide
specifics for construction of sufficient housing, vital for the thousands of homeless
residents.  Businessmen, eager to resume their work, also rejected Burnham’s street
design because they could not construct buildings until the city completed the complex,
spoke-like street placement.  A large number of residents also dismissed the plans for the
Civic Center because the city could not afford to raise property taxes if it wanted people
to rebuild.  The Committee of Reconstruction quickly realized that the city needed
immediate reconstruction of businesses and homes so residents could get out of the
temporary camps or return from suburban communities.  The Committee, like many San
Franciscans, feared that those who had fled the city during the fire would take up
comprehensive plan for Chicago in 1909.
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permanent residence elsewhere if the city could not show imminent opportunities for
return.  Therefore, grandiose plans for civic improvement gave way to the reality of the
situation.   The Committee of Reconstruction encouraged rapid, if not efficient and
centrally-organized, rebuilding.    By the end of July the mayor boasted that 25,000 men22
had begun construction on seventy structures and that the city had issued another four
hundred building permits that month alone.  At the same time, the number of people
receiving food relief dropped from 250,000 to 17,000.   The pace of construction,
unhampered by overarching city plans, continued rapidly.  By 1909, 20,500 structures had
risen in the areas of the city gutted by fire.   23
The San Francisco of 1909 did not look like the San Francisco of 1905, nor was it
a new construct.  The rapid pace of reconstruction, void of central planning, imitated San
Francisco’s instant city origins.  Architects restored some buildings gutted by the fire, like
the Call Building and Old St. Mary’s Cathedral, to look much as they did before the
devastation.  However, some of the city’s most iconic landmarks could not easily be
replaced.  The fire destroyed the Mechanic’s Institute and its library of more than 200,000
books.  The Grand Opera House, the art collection at the Mark Hopkins Institute, and the
City Hall were all a total loss.   Such destruction prevented the city’s inhabitants from
simply reconstructing the past.  The Burnham plan could have served as the central
design needed to create a new identity for San Francisco as a model urban landscape. 
However, without expedited construction of homes and businesses, there would have
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been fewer residents to fund Burnham’s expensive projects.  Without a comprehensive
reconstruction plan, residents would continue to search for ways to define the new San
Francisco.
Having rejected the Burnham plan, a majority of San Franciscans embraced a
quest to rid the city of political corruption.  Even before the 1906 disaster the city’s
leading progressive reformers had begun advocating a campaign for good municipal
government, initiating secret investigations into corruption within the Union Labor Party. 
In 1901 Abe Ruef helped form the party after unions failed to win a general strike.  Boss
Ruef’s mayoral protégé, Eugene Schmitz, won the November 1901 election.   By keeping
the police out of subsequent strikes in 1902, Schmitz and Ruef established labor’s
political domination over San Francisco businessmen.  During the reign of the Boss Ruef,
San Francisco was recognized as the “tightest closed-shop town in the nation.”  Despite
such advancements for labor, it became widely known throughout the city that political
patronage could easily be bought if the price were right.    In 1905, Schmitz won
reelection and all eighteen members of the Board of Supervisors belonged to the Union
Labor Party.  Many of these men envisioned their political position as a means to
wealth.   24
The earthquake and fire temporarily forced the mayor, the supervisors, and Boss
Ruef to put the needs of the city first.  However, political corruption soon returned. 
United Railroads bribed supervisors to grant the company a free charter for installation of




overhead trolleys.  In doing so the Supervisors rejected a bid by the newly formed
Municipal Railway Company for less obstructive underground conduits.  Consequently,
investors in the Municipal Railway, who were also members of the Good Government
League, hired an unofficial investigator to look into urban corruption.  Based on those
findings, District Attorney William Langdon created a grand jury to study allegations of
graft, and it indicted Boss Ruef and Mayor Schmitz for extorting money from houses of
prostitution.   Weeks later police caught several supervisors openly accepting bribes. 
Special prosecutor Francis J. Heney offered immunity to the supervisors for confessions
of their misdeeds, and eventually more than a dozen supervisors testified against Ruef.   25
Residents of San Francisco supported the investigation into the corruption, seizing on the
opportunity to create a new national image of San Francisco as a city free of politicians
who accepted bribes and catered to the vice underworld. 
  As with the Burnham plan, public support quickly evaporated for the graft trials
as idealism clashed with economic realities.  Boss Ruef’s confession led to the indictment
of Patrick Calhoun, head of United Railroad, in the summer of 1907.   Simultaneously,
Calhoun defeated the city’s streetcar union by housing strikebreakers in carbarns.  The
strike and the trial of Calhoun heightened the class-consciousness of the city’s wealthy
conservatives.  Many became vocal opponents of the trials, accusing prosecutors of
calling for the full force of the law only against the bribe givers and letting the bribe
takers go free.  A jury convicted Ruef and sentenced him to fourteen years in San
Quentin.  Calhoun’s trial ended in a hung jury in 1908 and a second trial in 1912 resulted
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in an acquittal.  While residents applauded efforts to remove corrupt politicians, there
seemed to be little interest in punishing the city’s business elite, many of whom had
contributed to the national economic prominence of San Francisco.  
Laborers also opposed the trials’ continued attacks on the Union Labor Party. 
Although labor unions and business leaders disagreed on who should reign over the city’s
economic and political future, both rejected the Good Government League and opposed
the progressive political vision for the city.  As a result, neither group strongly opposed
the other’s candidates in the 1909 elections.  P. H. McCarthy, president of the Building
Trades Council, won the mayoral race and Charles Fickert, favored by conservative
businessmen, became the city’s new district attorney.  The labor-business consensus
against the Good Government League masked the conflict between these two segments of
the populace who sought to reduce the power of the other.  What people outside San
Francisco witnessed was civic unity in rebuilding homes and businesses and the removal
from power of a quintessential political boss.   However, labor’s quest to maintain union26
supremacy in politics, and the desire of business owners’ to destroy the closed shop,
seriously undermined any attempts at future consensus.
Believing such unanimity vital to the continued health of the city, P.H. McCarthy,
and his successor James Rolph, juggled the demands of both labor and business. 
McCarthy failed to maintain the balance, angering unions when he supported business
initiatives and losing middle class voters with his lax approach to vice eradication. 
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McCarthy’s opponent in the 1911 mayoral race,  James “Sunny Jim” Rolph, defeated the
incumbent by personally imbuing qualities to which a variety of San Franciscans could
relate.  Rolph was a son of immigrants, raised in the working-class South of Market
neighborhood (SoMa), and personified the American ideal of social mobility most San
Franciscans expected their residents could achieve.  In the days after the earthquake,
Rolph founded the Mission Relief Association to raise funds for the people of SoMa and
organized distribution of aid.  He had also been one of the most prominent promoters of
the 1909 Portola Festival that had demonstrated residents’ ability to produce a citywide
event despite reconstruction.  Citizens could see in Rolph a mayor that would support
them because he was one of them.   Once in office, Rolph became the city’s number one
booster, encouraging national recognition of past achievements while developing future
plans for civic improvement and economic development.  With the support of his
constituents, Rolph set out to help San Francisco reclaim its title of Jewel of the Pacific.27
The election of Rolph took place just as San Francisco won the government’s bid
to host the Panama Pacific International Exposition, a civic project of international
proportions.  San Franciscans’ efforts to serve as the exposition’s host city had been a
decade in the making.  In 1904 the San Francisco Merchant’s Association (one of several
organizations that merged in 1911 to form the Chamber of Commerce) urged city leaders
to volunteer San Francisco as the site for a planned exposition to commemorate the
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completion of the Panama Canal.  While the dual disasters of 1906 caused many to
question the feasability of hosting such a fete, the speed at which reconstruction
commenced led residents to believe that San Francisco could be ready for an exposition
in 1915.  The event would give San Franciscans the opportunity to advertise themselves
as residents of a world-class city and aid in the formulation of a new urban vision.  28
Having risen from the ashes and cleaned up corrupt politics, the PPIE would be the event
through which residents could unveil their new city.  San Franciscans wanted to produce
an exposition that would rival those held by other American cities and show their city’s
global importance.
To win the exposition, San Francisco businessmen, politicians and civic boosters
organized a new corporation in 1910 to develop the city’s proposal and initiate the drive
for community support and financial subscriptions.  On April 29, 1910 the corporation
held a mass meeting meant to send a message to Washington that San Franciscans were
committed to the exposition.  In only two hours, the corporation raised $4 million.  Over
the next two months San Franciscans subscribed another $2 million.  While a significant
portion of this $6 million in promised funds came from wealthy benefactors and civic
donors, the prospect of an international festival drew support from all segments of the
urban populace.  Unions viewed the exposition as furthering the opportunity for
employment in construction and other service-sector industries.  Many residents would
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profit from the increase in tourism as people from around the world came to participate in
the exposition.  On January 31, 1911, the U.S. House granted the PPIE to San Francisco,
making it the first international exposition held on the Pacific Coast.  The House only
approved the site, not the funds to construct or carry out the exposition.  The money came
from San Franciscans, who turned their proposed subscriptions into approval of a $5
million city bond, with matching state funds.   With the growing economic importance of29
Southern California, and the movement of residents and businesses to other areas of the
Bay after the fire, San Franciscans privately worried that federal officials might disregard
its bid because it was a city, at best, in disrepair.  The acceptance of their bid to host the
PPIE gave San Franciscans national validation for their efforts to reestablish their role as
the premier city of the west.
When Taft broke ground in October 1911 at Golden Gate Park, local leaders had
yet to decide the exact location of the PPIE grounds.  Eventually, the PPIE’s executive
committee and city leaders settled on Harbor Cove, near Fort Mason, as the heart of the
exposition.  The contractors then began the process of creating a city within a city.  Harris
de Haven Connick, director of the city’s Board of Public Works, oversaw the construction
of the exposition’s infrastructure, while the privately-led Directors of the Exposition
supervised the construction of the buildings.  First, workers had to construct a seawall and
pumps to draw water out of the cove.  Then, they dredged the Bay to fill in one hundred
acres of new land; the last extensive landfill project in the city.  Before buildings could be
erected, sewers, water and gas mains, they installed railroad spurs and fire protection
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measures across the site.   30
If the PPIE were to be a reflection of the city that surrounded it, certain civic
improvements needed to be implemented alongside the construction at Harbor Cove.   In
March 1912 voters approved an $8.8 million bond for the purchase of land for a civic
center complex, following the spirit of Burnham’s vision if not his exact plan.  Residents
voted ten to one in favor of the bond, signaling the importance they placed on the creation
of an urban epicenter as a means of redefining what they considered vital to the city’s
infrastructure and to make their city ready for the PPIE.  Mayor Rolph immediately
announced a public design competition for the civic center’s first building, a city hall. 
Unlike its predecessor, which had taken twenty-seven years to build and whose shoddy
construction and collapse during the earthquake had come to symbolize the graft and
corruption of old San Francisco, the new city hall became a symbol of open, efficient
government that the Good Government League had envisioned.  Completed in three years
and under budget, the new city hall represented the will of San Franciscans to rebuild
quickly and efficiently, with good building materials and quality workmanship.  Mayor
Rolph liked to boast to visiting dignitaries that the city hall dome stood eleven feet, seven
inches higher than the Capitol dome in Washington, D.C., making it the tallest such
structure in the nation at the time.  Rolph advertised the city hall as a national monument,
denoting his belief that it was something far grander than just a city project.  For Mayor
Rolph and other civic boosters, city hall reflected their concerted desire to build a radiant
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city out of the ashes and win the admiration of people around the world for their efforts.   31
Once residents approved the purchase of the civic center land, municipal leaders
began plans for other significant architectural projects in the city’s new political and
cultural center.  The auditorium project, completed before the city hall, combined the
desire to have an anchor point for the development of a grand city epicenter with the
practical needs of the upcoming PPIE.  While PPIE directors wanted to keep their
attractions concentrated on the exposition grounds, they needed a venue that would seat
up to 10,000 for exposition attractions, concerts, and national conventions that wanted to
hold their annual meetings in the exposition city.  One million of the $5 million bond
voters had approved for the PPIE went into the construction of the auditorium.  After the
PPIE closed, the auditorium became the property of the city.  One month after the closing
of the PPIE work began on the third facet of the civic center plan, a public library.  Mayor
Rolph and the Board of Supervisors approved $772,220 from city funds for the
construction of the library and another $375,000 came from Andrew Carnegie.  The
library was the final project completed before American entrance into World War I.  At
that time, plans were underway to finish the civic compound with a state building for the
housing of government offices and an opera house, but those would have to wait for more
funds.  Even without these two structural additions, San Franciscans could perceive the
development of the civic center complex as granite and steel embodiments of their
determination to craft an urban center.  The mature San Francisco that William Bourn had
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envisioned in 1911 was becoming an architectural reality.32
The PPIE also reflected San Franciscans’ attempts to redefine their city. 
Expositions were meant to promote a nation’s achievements, provide entertainment, and
allow visitors a glimpse into foreign cultures.  For any city hosting an exposition, the
international attention was an opportunity to showcase the advances of its residents and
promote the unique qualities that had compelled federal leaders to grant it the exposition
in the first place.  Robert Tydell, drawing from sociological references, argued that fairs
provided the residents of the host city a chance to define their history visually while
helping them comprehend the present and express hope for the future.  The PPIE, like
previous American expositions, sought to create symbols of collective unity without any
inclination of class tension.  The exposition directors were among San Francisco’s
wealthiest businessmen, including William H. Crocker, Reuben Hale, I.W. Hellman, and
M. H. De Young.  It was their vision of an ordered society that determined the layout of
the exposition, but there is no indication that their plan met with opposition from other
segments of the San Francisco populace.   Residents of San Francisco, as they had after33
the 1906 disaster, joined forces to support the purpose and image conveyed by the PPIE. 
They envisioned the PPIE as a means to advertise the progress of their city and to impress
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the throngs of American and international visitors.  The displays incorporated into the
PPIE illustrate the desire of  Exposition directors, architects, and landscapers to portray
San Francisco as a modern city, surging ahead of Eastern communities that had become
static and unappealing.  PPIE exhibits were meant to help define the city’s future, but
developers also used the exposition to construct a more desirable past.  They rejected
images of San Francisco’s frontier days and instead emphasized what they considered
more appealing, and ancient, cultural influences.  Throughout the PPIE grounds
developers promoted what they hoped represented the present and future direction of San
Francisco – refinement and harmony. 
While a handful of exhibits displayed San Francisco’s gold rush past, planners
chose to imagine San Francisco as the far-flung descendant of ancient Mediterranean
cities, around which great men had built massive empires.  These ancient emperors had
employed men skilled in all facets of art – architecture, painting, sculpting, and
landscaping – to produce exquisite cities that represented their power over an entire
region.  The PPIE was to create in illusionary form the same for San Francisco.  The
exteriors of all the major buildings throughout the exhibition were covered in faux
travertine, replicating the marble patina of Roman palaces, and appearing in the
California sun as a “pale pinkish-gray buff.”  Wide-open courtyards, dotted with
sculptures and fountains, lay between the great walls of the eight main exhibit halls –
more regally referred to in the literature as palaces.  In the portals and archways marking
each palace’s entrance, sculptors had created intricate reliefs, mimicking the European
Renaissance.  The palaces were meant to remind visitors of the great monuments of
48
history, such as the Mosque of Ahmed I in Constantinople and St. Peter’s in Rome.  Even
the Tower of Jewels, a 435-foot tall structure at the main entrance, was meant to exude
refined taste.  Covered in more than 100,000 polished pieces of glass, each of which hung
like the crystals of a chandelier, the Tower glistened in the sunlight or spotlights.  As the
coastal winds blew, the glass reflected the colors of the natural and man-made world
around it, giving the tower the illusion of being adorned in jewels.  An “Eastern woman
of culture” validated the planners’ goals of creating a cultural mecca on the Pacific Coast
when she exclaimed as she walked through the grounds, “Why, all the beauty of the
world has been sifted, and the finest of it assembled here!”   34
The inclusion of the Byzantium and Roman influences was only the beginning of
the diverse, Mediterranean style represented at the exposition.  However, this expression
of varied forms was brought into harmony by the requirement that all buildings
conformed in color and general architectural scheme.  The eight central palaces, designed
by different architects and adorned by many artists, reflected the individual visions of
their creators.  At the same time, each building appeared to be part of the same design
thanks to the use of travertine for the exterior walls, the use of domes, and similar
entrance porticoes.  This design did not, therefore, require absolute uniformity, but a more
harmonious, blending of styles, including elements of Italian, Spanish, Moorish,
Byzantine, Roman, and Far Eastern designs.   The incorporation of so many varied styles35
reflected a desire to allow individual artistic vision while keeping the exposition from





appearing to lack cohesion.  Planners and artists worked to create a balance between
conformity that would quash independent expression and too much individuality.
Another way to create this harmony of design was through the use of color and
building materials.  Exposition directors hired Jules Guerin to oversee the colors used on
all exteriors, which even included walkways, flags, and exposition guard uniforms. 
Guerin selected nine colors for the exposition palette, each a subtle shade that would
remind visitors of the hues found naturally in and around the Bay.  The greens, golds,
reds, and blues selected also imitated the subtle shades commonly associated at the time
with images of Mediterranean communities. Contemporary descriptions of the PPIE
frequently mention that one of the most unique aspects of this exposition was the level of
coordination that went into the planning and design for the entire exposition.   While San36
Franciscans had rejected the grand planning of Daniel Burnham, the cohesive style of the
PPIE provided a visual denunciation of the images outsiders might have had of the city. 
Built almost as quickly as it had been born, the PPIE’s harmonious blend of artistic styles
promoted the exposition, and the city that hosted it, as a community that had shed its
haphazard, frontier past.  The PPIE encouraged San Franciscans, and visitors to the
exposition, to think of San Francisco as a city capable of balancing cultural differences
and willing to embrace a future where cultural refinement could be achieved.
On February 20, 1915, the Panama Pacific International Exposition opened,
welcoming visitors from around the world to experience the idealized vision of San
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Francisco embodied in the “Jewel City.”  The day began with a wireless radio message
from President Wilson, the first sent from the White House to the West Coast,
symbolizing the rapid pace of technological progress.  First day’s attendance was
estimated at 245,000 patrons.  By the end of the first ten weeks the exposition boasted
more than four million attendees.  The opening salvos of the Great War in August 1914
hindered international attendance and participation.  Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and
Austria did not send official representatives to the PPIE, but merchants and artists from
those countries erected booths in the various exposition halls.  Despite the war, San
Francisco entertained more than 18.7 million visitors before the lights on the exposition
grounds were extinguished for the last time on December 4, 1915.   Those who traveled37
to San Francisco during the PPIE witnessed the concerted efforts of city residents eager to
serve as gracious hosts to the world.  The fact that these residents, through perseverance,
financial pledges, and general hospitality had successfully carried off an international
exposition less than ten years after the earthquake and fire had required civic unity. 
Those unified efforts provided residents with a distinct urban identity, an understanding
that sacrifice could lead to great rewards and recognition, reflected in President Taft’s
proclamation that San Francisco was the “City that Knows How.”  Residents put aside
their class, political, and ethnic differences to advertise to the world, through the PPIE,
their vision of San Francisco as the most refined, cosmopolitan, commercial center on the
West Coast. 
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However, the PPIE had simply covered over the urban realities with faux
travertine and mirrors.  With the closing of the PPIE, the monolithic display of unity
began to fracture as various segments of the population struggled for control.  City labor
unions had suspended all work stoppages during the PPIE in return for preferential
employment on projects associated with the exposition.  Six months after the PPIE ended,
their conflict with business owners resumed.  On June 22, 1916, longshoremen and
steamboat workers initiated a strike that threatened to halt all shipments in and out of San
Francisco.  When shipping companies hired strike breakers, Mayor Rolph leaned toward
supporting the workers by refusing to provide extra police at the docks to protect
employers and their strikebreakers.  The Chamber of Commerce president, Frank Koster,
sought to quash the current strike and eradicate the closed shop.  Only with an open shop
policy could San Francisco businesses compete successfully against the growing
economic power of Los Angeles.  
Koster believed such goals required a more unified commitment from the city’s
leading businessmen and professionals.  He started by organizing a five-man Law and
Order Committee on July 10.  This Committee publicly professed to champion the rights
of employers to hire whom they wanted regardless of union membership and urged
donations from businessmen to aid the committee in protecting the waterfront.  The fact
that the Chamber chose to call this the Law and Order Committee reflected the city’s
vigilante past.  While this new organization might not resort to executions to advance
their concept of justice, they saw the committee as capable of exerting physical, political,
and economic pressure to kill the power of the city’s unions.  A week after the creation of
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the Law and Order Committee, the waterfront strike ended, but the committee continued
to look for ways to undermine the economic and political power of the city’s unions.   38
As residents recovered from the tensions surrounding the waterfront strike, the
Chamber of Commerce organized a demonstration of its support for the growing national
preparedness movement.  The Chamber called for a parade on Preparedness Day,
Saturday, July 22.  They chose Thornwell Mullally, Patrick Calhoun’s nephew and chief
assistant to him during the 1907 United Railroads’ strike, as the parade marshal. 
Preparedness, and the prominent position in the parade of a symbol of the open shop
fight, pitted labor against the city’s business elite.  The Labor Council announced that the
unions affiliated with it would not participate in the parade.  The editor denounced the
event as an “artificial stimulation of patriotism within our city” and insisted war
preparedness only aided military contractors.  During the parade, a bomb exploded at the
intersection of Steuart and Market Streets, a block from the Embarcadero.  The blast
claimed the lives of nine people and injured at least forty others.  Two days later, Frank
Koster expanded the Chamber’s Law and Order Committee to one hundred members,
pledging to seek out the bombers and anyone else planning another attack.  The Law and
Order Committee, looking at the bombing as another opportunity to reduce the strength of
the closed shop, considered union members to be the most likely suspects.  
Though no witnesses came forward in the days after the bombing, police arrested
two well-known labor radicals, Warren Billings and Tom Mooney.  In August, a grand
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jury indicted both men, along with Mooney’s wife Rena, a jitney driver named Israel
Weinberg, and local union organizer Edward Nolan.  By the time the United States
entered the Great War, a jury had sentenced Billings to life in prison and Mooney had
received the death penalty.  Most unions placed considerable distance between
themselves and the supposed bombers, emphasizing that the accused were not members
of the city’s mainstream unions and that labor had nothing to gain by such destruction of
life and property.  Prosecutors and the Chamber, however, painted Billings and Mooney
as part of a greater conspiracy of unionists who sought to drive the city and the nation
into chaos just as the United States found itself careening toward war with Germany.39
By the end of 1916, many San Franciscans could not have failed to notice that
their city had not live up to the qualities of refinement and harmony displayed so
prominently by the PPIE.  The intensification of class conflict in the summer of 1916
made clear the unity displayed during the PPIE was as temporary as the exposition’s faux
travertine buildings, most of which were razed in the months after the fair ended.  The
PPIE had served as the culmination of a decade-long quest to rebuild, reinvigorate, and
reinvent San Francisco.  The Preparedness Day bombing, the creation of the Law and
Order Committee, and the trials of the supposed conspirators threatened to undermine
San Franciscans’ efforts to redefine themselves as residents of the “City that Knows
How.”  San Franciscans desperately needed another seminal event to refocus their
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energies, unite their divergent populace, and promote their city as the preeminent West
Coast community.  The Congressional declaration of war against Germany, signed by
Woodrow Wilson on April 6, 1917, provided San Franciscans that opportunity.  As San
Franciscans sacrificed for the war effort, they sought to express the same qualities
promoted in the PPIE - a refined city whose divergent populace worked together
harmoniously for the greater good.  In doing so, San Francisco could again show its
importance to the nation and why it was still the Jewel of the Pacific.  
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Chapter Two
“Oh if the Germans would only quit”: The Soldiers in San Francisco
In the fall of 1917, Charles Byron Swope enlisted in the army in his hometown of
San Diego.  In December, the military ordered him to report to San Francisco. 
Accompanying Charles to the Bay Area was his 17-year-old wife of five months,
Gretchen.  After arriving at the Southern Pacific Depot in Oakland, Charles left his bride
in the care of her uncle and headed across the Bay.  At the Ferry Building, Charles
discovered that he was not the only man to report that day.  Military officials soon
ordered Charles and approximately twelve thousand other recruits to march up Market
Street en masse to the Recruiting Office.  There, recruiters ordered Charles and about
eight hundred others to go to Fort Mason, located next to the PPIE site, where a transport
ship would take them to Angel Island.  By the time the recruits marched to Fort Mason,
the vessel had already left for the island “and no one seemed to know when we would get
the next one.”  While waiting, Charles experienced the cold winds of the Bay, which went
straight through his thin civilian clothing and “abbreviated BVDs.”  Slowly the fog set in
and became so thick that Charles did not see the huge army transport until it was almost
at the pier.  He felt himself lifted off the ground by the swell of men clamoring up the
gangplank, and the distance between him and Gretchen became palpable.  “Oh how I did
feel the heart strings draw closer and tighten until it seemed something must break.” 
Consumed by emotion, Charles’ did not notice the scenery as the ship made its way north
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to Angel Island.1
The boat docked at Angel Island’s Fort McDowell.   Charles found the island to
be very beautiful, much like the natural scenery of Catalina Island in Southern California. 
Unlike the resort island, Angel was covered with “little brown blotches” where the army
had set up barracks and tents.  The new recruits marched up the hill to the government
buildings of the East Garrison where they were issued their uniforms.  Officers then
directed them to the mess hall for supper.  Charles, eager to find out how his wife was
adjusting to her new surroundings, headed to the YMCA building where the army had
installed one of two telephones on the island.   He found ten men waiting to use the
phone, but some men became so impatient with the wait that they left before the operator
had placed their calls.  Charles waited an hour before realizing that the central phone
operators on the island had discarded the whole call list from Charles’ location due to the
increasing number of unanswered calls.  Charles did manage to talk briefly with his wife,
but his first night on the island did not get any easier.  Exhausted by the day’s events and
the emotional toll they had taken, Charles hoped to get to bed early, only to find that the
new recruits were forced to sleep on the second floor of the main hall.  Below, in the
mess hall, a motion picture played until ten o’clock.  Once the movie concluded, more
than seven hundred recruits cleared the chairs and hauled out mattresses.  Each had two
blankets, but for Charles it was not enough to keep out the damp cold and he kept waking
The title in the quote came from Charles Byron Swope to Gretchen Swope, 10 November 1918,
1
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from dreams of “being in the arctic.”  At four o’clock, officers roused the recruits from
sleep and Charles began his first full day at Fort McDowell, Angel Island.   2
Charles and Gretchen Swope spent the war in the Bay Area struggling to maintain
their relationship and adapting to Charles’ military service.  The Swopes were not the
typical wartime family in that few weeks went by that they did not see each other. 
However, the Swopes serve as an example of how typical American couples faced the
challenges of balancing duty to country with a desire to maintain stability at home. 
Compared with the men who trained in cantonments in sparsely-populated areas of the
west and south, Charles Swope’s story illustrates the experience of men training in an
urban setting, and the impact such a military presence had on a large civilian population.  
The large influx of men like Charles Swope encouraged San Franciscans to search for
ways to make their city appealing to the U.S. military. The opening of the Panama Canal
in 1914 compelled the War Department to make plans to divide the U.S. Navy more
equally between the two oceans and create more permanent bases on the Pacific Coast. 
The presence of the Presidio, several smaller installations in close proximity, and the Bay
itself made San Francisco a logical choice.  The continued expansion of the military
presence in San Francisco after the war would provide residents with a new urban identity
– Defender of the Pacific.  The Great War became a test of San Franciscans’ willingness
and ability to create a safe environment for soldiers in training.  If residents failed to
provide an appropriate atmosphere for men preparing for combat, the city’s reputation
Charles Byron Swope to Gretchen Swope, December 1917, Swope Family Correspondence,
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would be tarnished.  Not only would the military refuse to trust the city with a naval
headquarters, but potential tourists and businessmen would refuse to support a city that
had not done its very best to serve the nation in its wartime demands. 
Charles Swope’s journey demonstrates the growing military presence in San
Francisco as the U.S. Army and Navy filled the Bay Area’s forts and bases.  To San
Franciscans, the war was an opportunity to prove their city’s superiority over other
western training facilities.  Men from eleven western states traveled by ferry, train, and
automobile to the area’s military encampments.  Writer Arthur Dahl described the city in
Overland Monthly as the center of the government’s military operations on the Pacific
Coast and called it a “busy and warlike city.  Its streets are filled with uniformed officers
and enlisted men, the flags of the various recruiting and examining branches of the
Service are flying before numerous buildings, and troops of incoming soldiers, sailors and
marines are landing daily. . . .”   Indeed, the city’s oldest fortress served as the engine in3
San Francisco’s military machine.  The Presidio had served as the embarkation point for
the nation’s soldiers during the Filipino Insurrection.  In 1916 the Army deployed all but
about one hundred soldiers from the Presidio to the Mexican border.  
That same summer, fueled by calls for preparedness, Congress passed the
National Defense Act, which established an Officers’ Reserve Corps, to train new officers
from the civilian and enlisted ranks, and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps for
colleges and universities.  The Presidio became home to training for both forms of




military instruction after the declaration of war April 6, 1917.   The first Officers’4
Training camp opened in May 1917 and the second in August 1917, each with 2,500
potential officers.  After three months of training, the Army recommended officer
commissions to approximately half of those who had started the program.  Commanders
then sent these newly commissioned officers to fill the ranks of newly created army units
at Camp Lewis and Camp Fremont.    A three-month ROTC camp provided training for5
university students in the summer of 1918 and included students from a number of
western universities.  During the eighteen months of the war, the Presidio also served as
temporary home to regiments from four Regular Army divisions training for overseas
combat, along with two National Guard regiments, a machine gun battalion, a field
artillery brigade, base hospital units, signal corps and several other non-divisional
military units.   6
While not all of the Army’s units served at the Presidio simultaneously, the influx
of soldiers required the Presidio to utilize its East and West Cantonment fully, and to
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begin expansion onto the former grounds of the PPIE immediately.   New construction in7
this area, which became the North Cantonment, began in late May 1917, replacing
Exposition buildings with temporary facilities.  The Quartermaster Corps wasted no time8
constructing the wood-framed, unsealed, single-story buildings, averaging a new building
every forty-two minutes.   Within eighteen days of initiating their work, the Corps had9
completed the new cantonment, including 81 barracks, 60 lavatories, 45 mess halls and
storehouses enough to equip 6,000 men.    San Franciscans showed great pride in the10
rapid return of the Presidio’s importance as the nation mobilized for war.  Impressed by
the speed in which soldiers constructed the North Cantonment and the upsurge of soldiers
in khaki pouring into the city, the editor of the San Francisco Call and Post proclaimed
the Presidio “the greatest training camp of the West.”   Such city-promotion sought to11
identify San Francisco as the center of the War Department’s work in the west,
highlighting the speed with which a large urban community could mobilize to meet the
needs of a growing military and support a greater surge of troops.     
When the war began, the Presidio also boasted the largest Army hospital in the
country, Letterman General.  With an average admittance of around three thousand
patients a year, Letterman received wounded men from the Pacific arena, the Panama
Canal zone, and western military bases.  During the war, East Coast hospitals surpassed
San Francisco Examiner, 14 May 1917, 2;  Thompson, Defender of the Gate, 605.
7
The San Francisco Call and Post, 29 May 1917, 5.
8
The San Francisco Call and Post, 18 June 1917, 2.
9
Thompson, Defender of the Gate, 600.
10
The San Francisco Call and Post, 29 May 1917, 5.
11
61
Letterman’s size.  However, Letterman still cared for almost 19,000 patients during the
eighteen months of the war.  The growing number of sick and wounded in the hospital
required additional facilities, leading to the construction of the complex known as the
East Hospital.  Here, crews constructed eighteen patient wards, two barracks for military
employees, a kitchen, mess hall, and a building for the Red Cross.  The main hospital also
required renovations, including new barracks, a nurses’ dormitory, two dinning rooms
and a one hundred patient psychiatric ward that replaced barred windows with “hotel
fashion” dormitories.  Letterman also specialized in the treatment of venereal disease,
created a unit of the Army School of Nursing, and developed an orthopedic center for the
treatment of amputees.   12
The work performed by Letterman General earned it a reputation as a premier
hospital and rehabilitation center for the nation’s armed services.  As wounded men
arrived for treatment toward the war’s end, the Army and Navy Journal insisted that the
“fame of Letterman has stretched to the four corners of the nation and to foreign lands,
where it is rated among the top-notchers, and it is this reputation that has attracted some
of the finest surgeons and medical men of the country for service on its staff.”   Despite13
its distance from the Western Front, the Presidio in San Francisco provided broken sailors
and soldiers a respite from the war and through rehabilitation prepared them to reenter the
civilian world.  The hospital’s growth benefitted many city residents who found
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employment on the base as military personnel were transferred to the East or to France.
San Franciscans also looked at the expansion of Letterman as further proof of the city’s
ability to support the Presidio and its personnel.  Residents took pride in boasting that
Letterman was the largest military hospital in the West, despite the establishment of forty-
four other general military hospitals during the war.   The expansion of the hospital14
during the war led to national recognition, like that expressed by the Army and Navy
Journal, and added validity to the argument that San Francisco should be the West Coast
base of operations for the U.S. military in the future.
The Presidio was only the largest in a series of military bases that dotted the San
Francisco landscape.  Around the turn of the century, the United States government
bolstered the military presence in San Francisco with the construction of coastal defense
posts to guard the entrance of the Golden Gate.  Forts Barry and Baker sat directly across
the Gate at the foot of the Marin hills and were easily visible from the residential sections
of San Francisco.  Fort Funston, whose temporary gun batteries the army constructed in15
February 1917, served as the southernmost San Francisco garrison, set within the dunes
between Lake Merced and the ocean.   Fort Miley, completed in 1900, sat at the16
northwestern tip of San Francisco in Lands End.  The Army made Fort Miley the
headquarters of the South Pacific Coast Artillery District and was home to four Coast
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Artillery companies.   Fort Winfield Scott, consisting of the western grounds of the17
Presidio, became the base for fourteen Coast Artillery companies, two of which were
deployed to France.  The Army designated Fort Scott one of only two civilian Coast
Artillery training camps in the nation (the other was Fort Monroe, Virginia).  It was also
one of six national sites for specialized training of enlisted men.  In October 1917, Fort
Scott had 2,157 Coast Artillery soldiers and trainees, more than any East Coast defense
post.  These new residents required the construction of fourteen new barracks, seven
messes, and fourteen sets of officers’ quarters.   18
The men stationed at these harbor defenses and at the Presidio required a vast
array of equipment and tons of food, which came from the general supply depot at Fort
Mason.  Located east of the Presidio, Fort Mason was not only responsible for providing
supplies to the troops of San Francisco, but to all posts and stations of the Army’s
Western Division.   According to the Army, Fort Mason “specialized in subsistence”19
acquisitions, providing supplies to an average of 75,000 soldiers a month.  Fort Mason
also supplied 204,000 tons of foodstuffs for soldiers on the East Coast and sent 20,000
tons to troops fighting in Siberia in 1918.  During the war, the Quartermaster Corps
purchased $65 million in foodstuffs from growers and processors in the Western
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Department’s eight state region.  This included 21 million pounds of evaporated peaches,
19 million pounds of dehydrated vegetables, and 85 million cans of salmon.  To make
room for these goods, the army constructed thirteen extra warehouses at Fort Mason and
extended the State Belt Railroad of California from the Presidio across Exposition
grounds, to Fort Mason, improving the transportation of supplies and men.   The tonnage20
handled by Fort Mason also required the base to expand its personnel.  The depot opened
a school for clerks, employed from the civilian sector, as more experienced military
clerks moved to mobilization camps and overseas service.  The number of employees at
Fort Mason grew from 195 in early 1917 to a high of 900 at war’s end, mostly from San
Francisco’s civilian populace.  21
Several military camps outside San Francisco’s city limits were very much a part
of the city’s scope of influence, since most sailors and soldiers on day leave could take a
short ferry or train ride into San Francisco.  The Yerba Buena Naval Training Station on
Goat Island was one of four naval training stations in the nation and the only one west of
the Mississippi.  Men from western states received almost three months basic training or
education in one of the station’s six specialty schools.  In any given month, the station
could house five thousand men.  By the end of the war 21,000 sailors had received
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training at Yerba Buena.   22
Mare Island, on the north end of the Bay near the community of Vallejo, was the
designated site of a naval reserve training facility, one of three on the West Coast.  Ten
thousand men received training at this facility, while an additional ten thousand worked at
the Mare Island Naval Yard.  These laborers constructed battleships and destroyers,
refitted German ships captured at the beginning of the war in Western ports, and repaired
various naval vessels.  Employment at the naval yards jumped from three thousand at the
beginning of the war to ten thousand sailors and civilians by the end of 1918.  While most
of the men and women who worked at the yards lived in nearby Vallejo, many ventured
into San Francisco by ferry on the weekends.  Mare Island was not within the city limits,
but San Francisco newspapers often counted the swelling production of ships there as part
of San Francisco’s wartime achievements.  These efforts to tie Mare Island with San
Francisco reflect the continued attempts by city residents to fabricate a Greater San
Francisco.  The people of Vallejo, like Oakland in 1912, openly rejected such notions. 
Vallejo papers “kept several barrels of printers ink and a scathing editorial writer on hand
to repulse out-of-town glory grabbers,” but the connections, real and perceived, to San
Francisco persisted.23
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While the residents of Vallejo objected to San Francisco’s encroachment on their
achievements, the residents of San Mateo County were more accepting of this outside
interference.  Without the financial assistance of San Francisco businessmen, the War
Department might have abandoned its plans for Camp Fremont near Menlo Park (twenty-
five miles south of San Francisco – see Chapter Four).  The camp, completed at the end
of 1917, eventually became home to the 8  Division of the Regular Army, comprised ofth
regiments from the Philippines and the Presidio, as well as draftees from Washington,
Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming.  During Camp Fremont’s first month of
operation, the military transferred 7,317 men to the new facilities.  At its peak in June
1918, Camp Fremont was home to 24,085 soldiers.  
These figures make Camp Fremont one of the smaller national cantonments, with
numbers comparable to Camp Kearny (San Diego), Camp Cody (Dening, New Mexico),
and Camp Beauregard (Alexandria, Louisiana).  The largest camps were on the East
Coast, where peak numbers averaged between 45,000 and 58,000.  The largest
cantonment in the West was Camp Lewis, more than forty miles from Seattle.  Most of
San Francisco’s draftees, along with men from seven other western states, were trained
there.  The camp reached a high of 44,000 men by the summer of 1918.  One can attribute
Camp Fremont’s lower figures to a number of factors, including delays in opening the
camp, the early deployment to France of the national guard division original slated to
train in the camp, and the lower draft allotments for the states sending men to Camp
Fremont.  Also, unlike Camp Lewis, Camp Fremont noticed a precipitous drop in
residents in the last few months of the war as the army deployed the 8  Division as part ofth
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the Siberian Expeditionary Force to Vladivostok.  24
Angel Island, though not strategically located for harbor defense, served multiple
purposes thanks to its centralized position in the Bay.  Foreign ships stopped at Angel
Island’s Immigration Station and Quarantine Station where government officials
inspected passengers and ships.  Until mid-1918 the Immigration Station housed enemy
aliens arrested in California, the Pacific Northwest, Hawaii, and the Philippines,
including the German consul Franz Bopp.  At any given time the facility held more than
seven hundred prisoners before the War Department moved all German detainees from
bases across the United States to two internment camps in North Carolina.   25
Also on the island was Fort McDowell, a receiving station for new recruits.  Here,
officers initiated the men in military drills while they awaited their regiment assignments
and transportation to one of the Western Department’s cantonments.  At the beginning of
the war, Fort McDowell processed 750 recruits per month, and within two months that
number jumped to three thousand.  The month Charles Swope arrived, December 1917,
Fort McDowell processed about four thousand men.  Like most, Charles expected to be
rotated off the island after he completed his preliminary training.  Due to his recruitment
in the camp’s band, however, the army extended his stay at Fort McDowell.  Swope
watched as by mid-1918, three thousand enlisted men from California and Oregon arrived
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at Fort McDowell every two weeks.  Swope eventually became one of less than 20
percent of the men on Angel Island whom the army considered permanent residents.  26
For the rest, Fort McDowell was merely the first stop.
The men processed at Fort McDowell before the arrival of the first draftees in
September 1917 had many reasons for enlisting.  One of the most repeated refrains
among the city’s volunteers concerned their sense of duty to the nation and willingness to
sacrifice present comforts and their lives in its name.  In seeking a recommendation letter
from Mayor Rolph, San Francisco attorney John Lawlor expressed his intention to enter
any service of the military that would take him, forfeiting his $500 monthly salary,
because he considered it “my duty to sacrifice it for my country.”    The city’s coroner,27
Thomas Leland, resigned because his “duty to my country prompted me to cast aside all
other considerations and immediately respond to that call.”  He understood the sacrifices
involved regarding his government position, medical practice, and family, but readily put
these responsibilities aside to take up his position as an officer in the California Naval
Militia.    The newspapers encouraged men to volunteer by introducing unique examples28
of men compelled by their sense of duty to join the armed services, cultivating an image
of the heroic Californian, and more specifically, San Franciscan.  San Francisco native
Angus McDonald had returned to the city after receiving life-threatening wounds while
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serving with the British at Ypres.  Despite his injuries, he presented himself to the San
Francisco army recruiting office in early 1918 and Secretary of War Baker provided
special permission for him to join the U.S. Army.  No one would have challenged
McDonald’s patriotism if he had chosen to remain on the sidelines and convalesce, but
The Bulletin focused on his willingness to sacrifice again, even though he knew better
than most what that really meant.  29
While some men expressed an overwhelming sense of patriotism and an
enthusiasm to sacrifice everything for the nation, others struggled with whether to join the
colors or remain at home.  For these individuals, like the son of California Senator Hiram
Johnson, Sr., the growing number of San Franciscans headed off to war made them doubt
their own decisions.   Hiram Johnson, Jr. hesitatingly claimed draft exemption  due to his
wife’s failing health.  His decision involved serious soul-searching, for his father had
instilled in him and his younger brother, Archibald, “a certain love of country and
patriotic fervor.”   He supported his brother Arch’s decision to volunteer and wished he30
could also “bear the physical hardship and the burden that come with the enlistment of all
the decent upright fellows who are doing their duty.”   Charles Kendrick began his war31
journal the day he left San Francisco for military training in Kansas City.  On that day he
felt his “grief too poignant for my own good” as he thought about the impact of his
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departure on his family and life’s work.  Despite this pain, Kendrick accepted that for the
foreseeable future he was “under the comand [sic] of Uncle Sam.  The wishes of the army
are my commands. . . . I am now a sacrifice to my country, whatever the outcome.”  After
this first emotional entry in his diary, Kendrick laid aside his personal feelings and the
rest of his journey, ultimately to France, reflected an acceptance of his fate and
responsibility, chronicling only the scenery and events of his day.    Family and careers32
made the choice to join the armed services more difficult, but many believed that the
United States required such sacrifices from its most noble citizens and that a man’s duty
to his country came first.
Historian Cecilia O’Leary has argued that World War I provided a temporary
solidification of American nationalism based on a “racially exclusive, culturally
conformist, militaristic patriotism.   The rhetoric of men like Leland, Johnson, and
Kendrick suggests that nationalism, in part, explains their participation.  However,
O’Leary’s argument that the propaganda machine’s sacrificial rhetoric was the
predominant reason for enlistment or draft acceptance does not fully explain these men’s
motives.   For Hiram Johnson, Jr. his father’s lessons on the proper conduct of a citizen33
influenced him far more than the patriotic articles disseminated by the Committee on
Public Information.  Thomas Leland sacrificed his position as coroner in August 1917,
just as the propaganda machine began its work.  Charles Kendrick, who had no reason to
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express in his personal diary anything other than his full emotions, perceived his actions
in enlisting as his effort to do “my duty as I see it,” not as the result of pressure he felt to
respond appropriately to government expression of patriotic responsibility.   34
O’Leary also identified a national decline in more traditional patriotic expression,
those that emphasized the importance of freedom and democracy, as the CPI churned out
reports that emphasized “a faithlike loyalty to the nation as the highest form of
allegiance.”    However, San Francisco residents expressed patriotic obligation along35
with progressive, democratic goals in their descriptions of the impact military service
would have on the city’s citizen soldiers.  Military training not only made soldiers but
developed in them desirable qualities all citizens should emulate.  A young man of
wealth, described in The Daily News as an “unmotivated sort,” living a life surrounded by
wine, women, and leisure, discovered that he really did not mind pealing potatoes after
only a few months training.  Gone were the late night parties, which could have led him
to an early grave.  The moral, according to the editor, was that “war may be hell but hell
may be salvation, in some cases.”   In explaining why the United States entered the war,36
the editor of The San Francisco Call and Post acknowledged that war was hell but the
only way to alter archaic political systems significantly.  Thanks to the war, China and
Russia had overthrown tyranny and showed signs of becoming republics.  The author also
believed that war would remake American society.   “Caste, rank, class feeling–these
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things the war is wiping out, as a hundred years of peace could never even hope to do.”  37
Passionate, patriotic rhetoric suffused the speech and actions of San Franciscans during
the war, but so did progressive nationalist sentiments that emphasized responsibility over
blind acceptance of duty.  The goal of spread democracy abroad and egalitarianism at
home still factored into many men’s explanations for enlistment.
While politics or patriotism drove some to join the colors, others joined for
financial reasons.  The Army paid a private, first class, $36.60 a month; non-specialized
seamen, first class, made a dollar less.  If an enlisted man had dependents, the War
Department required that he allocate at least $15.00 of his monthly salary to them.  If a
soldier or sailor had dependents, and therefore an allotment, the government provided an
additional allowance to the man’s family, based on the number of dependents.  The wife
of a serviceman received a $15.00 allowance, $10.00 for one child, $17.50 for two, and
$5.00 for each additional child.  A single soldier could also allot part of his salary to his
parents, siblings, or grandchildren if he could show they were his dependents.  This
dependence made them eligible for the government allowance as well.  Although the
maximum government allowance was $50.00, when combined with at least $15.00 from
the soldier’s allotment, many unskilled laborers found they could provide more for their
families by serving in the military than they could in civilian work.   38
The government, at times, also used bonuses to encourage enlistment.  An
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announcement by the army that they would pay members of the first Officers’ Training
Camp $100 a month for their three months of training sparked an increase in applications. 
According to the Examiner, this salary made it easier for “hundreds who heretofore had
felt they could not afford to go” to sign their applications.   Those who joined after the39
announcement of pay worried that their own reasoning for enlistment might be
questioned as a result.  In his request for a recommendation letter from University of
California professor David Barrows, George Finnegan recognized that he would be
competing for a position in the training camp with “thousands who have discovered
hitherto undiscovered patriotism after the promise of one hundred dollars per month.”  40
In order to build infantry bands for the Presidio regiments, the army advertised their plan
to pay musicians $36 to $48 a month, beyond the regular pay afforded a soldier in the
army.    While Charles Swope did not comment on this additional stipend when he41
accepted the position with the band at Fort McDowell, that money would be important to
him and Gretchen as they tried to assert their financial independence from their families.
Money may have driven some men to enlist in the early months of the war, but
after the initiation of the draft, men still undecided about whether to volunteer had little
time to act.   San Francisco newspapers shifted the focus from how much a man could
make in the army with immediate enlistment to the men’s ability to select how to serve.
One advertisement for the Naval Reserve targeted registered men by informing them
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there was “No Drafted Men in the United States Navy” and that by volunteering for the
naval reserve they could receive the same pay, perform the same duties, and share in the
same opportunities for promotion as men in the regular navy, but with one important
distinction:  they would serve for only four years or “For the Duration of the War”
[emphasis in the original].   When Arch Johnson volunteered for the California42
Grizzlies, his father agreed that it was “infinitely better” for Arch to go in July, when he
could receive a position as Captain, “than that you go six months or a year hence, as a
private or a subaltern, with all its disadvantages.”   The San Francisco Call and Post43
interviewed men at the recruiting stations in June 1917.  They found that “practically
every man who enlisted today stated that he preferred to go into service voluntarily and
make his choice of arms and branches of the land forces than to wait for conscription and
be assigned wherever the military authorities may elect to send him.”   The last day the44
army allowed draft eligible men to volunteer was December 14, 1917.  In the six days
before the cutoff, San Francisco stations logged two thousand enlistments and expected
another thousand in the last twenty-four hours before the deadline.   It may not have been45
a patriotic response, but it served a practical purpose in that men could choose how to
serve if the government were going to require it anyway.
San Francisco draft-aged men not persuaded to enlist by a sense of duty or the
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possibilities of personal advancement found that after Registration Day, June 5, 1917,
social pressure and the law limited their decision-making abilities.  As the city geared up
for Registration Day, Superior Judge Thomas Graham, chairman of the County Council
of Defense, proclaimed that he was “relying upon the patriotism of Young America to
rise to the occasion” and registrar for the draft.  However, if any draft age men planned to
avoid service, they would “find themselves unpopular among their neighbors and scorned
generally.”  A few days after the registration drive, the San Francisco draft boards posted
the names of all who registered at city hall, the post offices, and in the local papers.   At46
nine o’clock on the evening of registration, the city’s police began to check registration
cards and raid rooming houses, hotels, and saloons for those who had violated the law
and whom the police, and the city at large, now referred to as slackers.   Newspapers47
recommended that men always carry their blue registration cards as the police stopped
“every man who looks as though he is of the registration age.”   Though those arrested48
could face one year in jail for defying the draft, judges typically ordered the defendant to
register, at which time the charges were dropped.   No city or state in the nation could49
afford to win a reputation as a safe haven for slackers.
After registration, draft age men waited for letters from local draft boards who
notified the men randomly selected to serve their country.  Once in front of the draft
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board, men could claim exemption for marital status or essential wartime occupations. 
One of those who filed an exemption was Hiram Johnson, Jr.  The case of Hiram
Johnson, Jr. illustrates one of the biggest problems with the Selective Service Board’s
initial implementation of its exemption policy.  In trying to fill the first draft quota by
September 1, 1917, the War Department gave the local draft boards considerable leeway
in interpreting the Selective Service Act.  For example, the Act stated that a married man
could claim deferment if he had dependents who had no other means of support.  Local
draft boards, therefore, had to determine if a married man could legitimately claim
exemption because he had dependents.  In some locales, boards refused exemptions if it
appeared that men had married just to get a deferment, what many called “slacker
marriages,” while other boards gave blanket exemptions to all married men.  In the case
of Hiram Johnson, Jr., the local draft board interviewed his father-in-law, P. E. Bowles
(president of American National Bank), who told the board that he was not willing to
support his daughter and her children, but would do so if Hiram did not receive an
exemption.  The board used this testimony to deny Hiram’s deferment.   50
Like most draft boards in the nation, Hiram’s board included members of the
city’s political, business, and professional elite.  The chair, Randolph V. Whiting, was a
former assistant District Attorney and a reporter for the State Supreme Court.   John S.
Phillips was co-owner of Van Norden-Phillips Printing Company.  Draft boards normally
had three members but, ironically, Hiram Johnson, Jr. had been appointed to the third seat
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on the board.  When he realized it was possible he could be drafted, Johnson resigned and
the position was still vacant when the board reviewed his case.  On the one hand,
Johnson’s case looks like a local draft board unsure how to define the new rules
established by the Selective Service Act.  Hiram himself was unsure of his ability to win
the appeal, despite his father’s insistence from Washington that the Senate has passed the
Selective Service Act with the expressed understanding that unmarried men would be the
first to go.  Hiram recognized that the draft boards could define the vaguely worded law
to mean that only those men who could prove that their dependents would become wards
of the state would be exempt.  However, Hiram Johnson’s questions to the board after
their ruling suggests that his situation was more than a case of questionable
interpretations of the law.  When asked if the board had denied exemption to any other
married man with dependents, or if the board had brought any other married man’s in-
laws in for questioning, the draft board replied in the negative.  This led Hiram and his51
father to believe that the senator’s political opponents, and not the wording of the
Selective Service Act, had determined the outcome of the draft board’s decision. 
Hiram immediately acted by sending a letter of appeal to the regional board,
accusing the local board of using his name, and the political reputation of his father, to
garner personal notoriety for the board members.  Hiram also suspected that some of his
father’s political rivals in the city, who went unnamed in his correspondence, had
influenced the decision, particularly when the Chronicle began to publish comments
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about the case from Phillips and Whiting.  No evidence of a greater political conspiracy
surfaced, but the issue brought out Senator Johnson’s local supporters to defend his son,
notably Senator Johnson’s law partners Matt Sullivan and Theodore Roche (also close
advisors of Mayor Rolph) and Bulletin editor Fremont Older.   Once the draft board52
resolved the matter in late August, and Hiram received his exemption, the matter faded
and Hiram appeared to suffer no further public scrutiny of his decision to stay in San
Francisco.   While his case was unique in that no other son of a U.S. Senator faced such53
scrutiny in asking for a draft exemption, it also identifies a problem many married men
across the nation faced as draft boards fumbled to interpret their responsibilities under the
Selective Service Act.  It is likely that men without legal training or the support of
influential fathers might not have requested exemptions, not understanding the law any
more than the draft boards did.   Public reaction against this particular element of the
draft forced the War Department to develop a classification system for draft registrants
based on occupation and marital status by the end of 1917.54
For men who did not claim or receive exemptions, the next step was training.  As
seen in the records from bases in and around San Francisco, the military expected these
new citizen-soldiers to adapt quickly to military routine.  An example of this regimented
lifestyle is evident in the training of officers at the Presidio.  The three months of
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intensive study centered on preparing men to become commissioned officers, including
perfection of the same drills they would soon teach others, management techniques
necessary for proper organization of enlisted men, and leadership skills.  During the first
month, all R.O.T.C. students followed the same course of instruction, after which they
were assigned to artillery, cavalry, infantry, or engineering.   They spent between twelve55
and twenty hours each week in drill and another two to three hours per week marching or
on guard patrol.   Besides drill, students spent twelve to fifteen hours a week in lecture56
classes.  Mandatory evening study hours rounded out each trainee’s day.   Students
worked half days Saturday, studying anything instructors felt needed to be added.  Once
the trainees moved to the specialized courses, the work week rose to between forty-eight
hours a week (the average for the infantry and engineers) to fifty-eight hours a week (the
average for artillery).   Anytime during this process, the military could release the men57
from camp for health reasons or failure to pass course examinations.  The men who
survived the three months of training then faced final examinations and placement.  
Due to the extensive amount of material drill sergeants and instructors needed to
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cover, the training schedule for potential officers was more rigorously enforced than the
average enlisted man might face at other bases around San Francisco.   Despite attempts
by the Army General Staff to develop a standard training program, maintaining a monthly
training schedule when new men trickled into camp weekly was impossible.  Officers,
many of them fresh out of officer training, pieced together a daily routine as best they
could.  They frequently focused on providing recruits with the basics – drill and
marksmanship.  Most assumed, like one new lieutenant stationed at Camp Fremont (who
himself had little more than theoretical training with machine guns before being placed
with a machine gun company at Fremont), that the real training would come once they
arrived in France.       58
Though their days revolved around drill and study, there was time for leisure
activities.   Men generally had several hours of free time in the late afternoon, again after
dinner, and at least a half day Saturday, and all day Sunday.  With this much time off,
President Wilson and his advisors worried about the possible trouble men might get into
without familial constraints.  They therefore created the Commission on Training Camp
Activities in the days after the war declaration.  The CTCA served as the central
organization responsible for providing men with what its board of progressive reformers
considered proper, moral forms of entertainment. They hoped to prevent “the American
army from suffering the moral and physical degeneration commonly associated with
military training camps.”  To fulfill this goal, the CTCA established in-camp recreation,
Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The
58
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 36-40; Marsh [last name unknown] to Sidney Howard, December
23, 1917, Sidney Coe Howard Papers, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
81
organized social hygiene education for the men, and coordinated soldier and civilian
interaction.    Most of the national guard and army cantonments lay in or near towns59
unable to provide sufficient entertainment opportunities for the tens of thousands of men
who inhabited the camps by early 1918.  Sixteen of thirty-three cantonments were located
in or close to towns with populations smaller than that of the nearby camp at maximum
capacity. Only eight camps, including Camp Fremont, lay within thirty-five miles of a
city with a population of more than 200,000 in the 1920 census.  
Most communities, therefore, did not have the facilities to house large groups of
men in search of theatrical or musical entertainment.  The CTCA stepped in and with the
assistance of a host of religious and reformer organizations, established facilities for live
and filmed entertainment, known as Liberty Theaters.    Local civilians, both amateurs60
and professionals, provided live entertainment in the same auditoriums that housed the
movies.  Nine hundred men attended a production of  Mikado by the San Francisco
Players Club at the Y’s Letterman auditorium.    Understanding the importance of such61
activities, San Francisco citizens raised money to purchase Smileage Books, a booklet
filled with five cent coupons that entitled the bearer to free admittance in Liberty
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Theaters, Liberty Tents and auditoriums run by the CTCA in local camps.   In the first62
two days, San Francisco purchased more than six thousand books and sent them to camps
so men could participate in “first-class, wholesome and thoroughly entertaining shows of
all kinds. . . .”   The CTCA’s quest to channel spare time into morally appropriate63
pursuits determined the types of entertainment allowed in camp.  The CTCA frequently
issued approved movie lists to all its camps, each including the names and descriptions of
approximately fifty recent releases considered morally and patriotically acceptable.64
Music also played an integral part of the Commission on Training Camp
Activities’ entertainment plans.  The CTCA at first saw singing as a leisure activity that
men could do independently, but increasingly they sought to direct men toward music
that, like the movies, they perceived as patriotic and above reproach.  In August 1917 the
CTCA created the Camp Music Division.  The Division designated camp song leaders
and initiated the printing of the Official Army Song Book.  The CTCA distributed this
book to every officer and soldier in the Army and National Guard.  They published two
editions of the Song Book during the war.  Put together quickly to give soldiers some
musical guidelines, the 1917 version provided words to favorite tunes while the 1918
edition, which was more carefully prepared, included melody lines and illustrations.  Both
books contained more than eighty songs and like the CTCA’s movie program, limited its
contents to music that “showed the dignity of America’s position and respect for Allies.”  
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These included hymns like “Nearer, My God, to Thee,” patriotic tunes such as “America,
the Beautiful,” along with popular and regional songs, including “Aloha Oe,” and “Yaaka
Hula Hickey Dula.”   65
Catchy, popular tunes exemplified the CTCA’s efforts to provide men with fun
and enjoyable activities while restraining emotional expression. The CTCA published
songs with lyrics that verbalized their personal thoughts on such important issues as
homesickness, boredom, camp monotony, and fears of the future. However, the singing
occurred in a public setting where releasing emotions would be constrained by the
presence of hundreds of other people.  A song like “Where Do We Go From Here”
allowed men publicly to utter the great question these men must have thought to
themselves.  However, when performed by the one thousand trainees at Mare Island at a
jovial, upbeat tempo, the sailors did not have time to think too deeply about the answer. 
The words of the song also maintained the light-hearted mood by explaining that they
were heading to Germany to “slip a pill to Kaiser Bill and make him shed a tear” while
shooting his men “in the rear.”   The power of music to raise morale and provide66
restrained, emotional release for trainees led the War Department in the summer of 1918
to order regimental bands increased in size from twenty-eight to forty-nine pieces, and the
government appropriated money for more instruments and sheet music.   This increase67
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made way for Charles Swope’s addition as a permanent member of Fort McDowell’s
band and lessened his concern about deployment to France.   68
With his position in the band, Swope’s daily schedule had little to do with drill
and military study and everything to do with music, including morning and afternoon
rehearsals, private practice time, and performances at both the East and West
Cantonments on Angel Island.   Swope’s participation in camp practice, rehearsals, and69
concerts kept him busy.  It also reflected the importance the CTCA, and the military
overall, placed on musical activities in camp.  The CTCA believed such musical troupes
would boost morale and reduce boredom, preventing men from seeking less morally
appropriate forms of entertainment.  The letters of more conservative men in camp show
the CTCA’s endeavors were not completely successful.  Men did attend CTCA-sponsored
camp activities, but these events did not significantly alter their moral character.  Charles
Swope complained that most of the men at Fort McDowell spent their leisure time
playing poker and cursing.  While he admitted that he was not always as kind to his wife
as he should be, he was in no way “as vile minded as some of these dogs.”   Bruce70
Howard began his military training at Fort McDowell and reported to his older brother,
Sidney, that the camp was “a fright, filled with the lowest scum and jailbirds of S.F., who
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occupy themselves with talking, fucking and crap-dice.”   The CTCA could require that71
their new civilian-soldiers participate in wholesome sing-alongs, but vice remained in
every camp.
The CTCA also could not prevent men from leaving the base in search of
entertainment, no matter how many performances and physical activities they provided. 
Men from the Presidio ventured out into the city that surrounded the encampment when
they had a few hours to spare.  Soldiers stationed at Fort McDowell and Camp Fremont
had to wait for scheduled ferry and train services, limiting their excursions to days when
training was cancelled or weekends.  San Francisco was not unique in its attraction to
American soldiers and sailors.  The U.S. Army Military History Institute surveyed World
War I veterans and when asked about nonmilitary activities, found that “going to town or
visiting the nearest city” ranked first.   What was special about San Francisco was that its
size and diverse population provided greater entertainment options than were available to
most military trainees.  Only three other camps, all on the East Coast (Camps Mills, Dix,
and Meade), were within thirty-five miles of a city larger than San Francisco (New York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore respectively).   The men stationed at Camp Fremont and the72
other military outposts in the Bay Area could experience all that one of the most heavily
populated cities in the nation had to offer.  Unfortunately, some of those recreational
experiences could undermine the health and well-being of the men in uniform, leading the
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War Department to threaten to abandon any encampment if municipal governments and
residents allowed immoral activities to corrupt trainees.    73
Facing the possibility that the economic benefits from the military camps would
evaporate and leave the city with a reputation of moral corruption that might hurt future
tourism and war contracts, city leaders worked with the military to create proper forms of
entertainment.  At the request of Governor William Stephens, civic-minded residents held
the first meeting of the San Francisco Committee for Recreation of Soldiers and Sailors
on July 14, 1917.   Its purpose was to stimulate civilian interest in recreation for men in74
uniform, to coordinate city clubs’ activities for soldiers, to make available to the armed
services all city facilities, and “to decrease and eliminate those forces in the city which
thrive by the degradation of enlisted men.”   As the CTCA became more nationally
organized in late 1917, the San Francisco Committee became one of the hundreds of local
organizations around the nation collectively known as the War Camp Community
Service.  The goals of the original committee, however, remained unchanged.   75
The WCCS in San Francisco was divided into subcommittees, each responsible
for one component of the activities the city planned to furnish men in uniform.  The
Educational Committee supplied French and English lessons as well as citywide lectures
on national and international affairs.  The Library Committee extended the city’s library
Bristow, "Creating Crusaders,” 138-139.
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facilities and publicized their availability to enlisted men.  Other committees cooperated
with churches and fraternal organizations in preparing hospitality tents and proper
entertainment for the troops.  The WCCS encouraged families to adopt soldiers and invite
them to their homes for Sunday dinner or an evening of games.  They petitioned residents
with vehicles to join the Auto Recreation Corps, donating their machines and a driver one
day a month to take men on sightseeing trips around the city or into the country.   With76
the approval of the WCCS, the Palace Hotel opened one of its ballrooms for enlisted men. 
The room included card tables, writing desks, food, and “a bevy of young girls, from the
best families in San Francisco” as dance partners.   The Hotel St. Francis and Hotel77
Whitcomb set aside rooms, at discounted rates, for soldiers so they would have
respectable places to stay while in town.   78
The WCCS also provided funds to organization wanting to establish club rooms
that catered only to men in uniform.  The California League for Women’s Service used
such funds to rent space in the basement of the Monadnock Building on Market Street
and at 2526 Lombard Street, close to the Presidio.  The League converted both spaces
into service mens’ clubs; the former called the National Defenders’ Club and the latter the
Presidio Defenders’ Club.  Both stayed open from nine in the morning until eleven at
night and provided lounges and reading rooms, private rooms for napping, billiard and
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card tables, shuffle board, writing desks, pianos, a stage for concerts, and a lunch
counter.   The WCCS advertised for the local YMCA branches in town, which gave any79
man in uniform free access to their physical and educational facilities.  The Y’s Golden
Gate Avenue branch estimated that it served between three and four thousand soldiers and
sailors each week.   Local theaters donated more than two thousand tickets a week to the80
WCCS for distribution to enlisted men on leave in the city, guaranteeing good,
wholesome shows.  As on base, music served as an important component of the WCCS,
providing an opportunity for civilians and soldiers to join in patriotic, religious, and
entertaining choruses, reaffirming the reasons for going to war and displaying the support
of people back at home.   81
Arthur Dahl of the Overland Monthly believed the WCCS in San Francisco
achieved its goal of serving the physical and mental needs of the area’s soldiers while
establishing “higher mental standards.”  For young men, away from home for the first
time and in the big city, the temptation to blend into the crowd and experiment in
unwholesome desires was great.  Thanks to the WCCS, Dahl and other moral reformers
believed they were witnessing the development of gentlemen who increasingly demanded
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of themselves and others a higher moral standard of living.   San Francisco’s large and82
diverse population provide resources, like a variety of social associations and well-funded
business establishments, that allowed the city to extend services and facilities to citizen
soldiers, many from rural areas of the West, who probably had never experienced all that
a large metropolis had to offer.
Reports in the city’s newspapers, however, suggest that the WCCS activities did
not motivate all soldiers and sailors to behave like proper gentlemen, or even to abide by
the law.  Congress passed a law in May 1917 prohibiting the sale of liquor to uniformed
men.  Anyone caught violating the law faced a military court, while those who sold the
liquor faced a fine of $1000 or one year’s imprisonment.   The threat of incarceration,83
however, did not stop people from selling drinks to men in uniform.  Soldiers were also
known to violate military regulations by wearing civilian clothes to purchase liquor in
stores that abided by the law.  The San Francisco Morals Squad, led by police Lieutenant
Charles Goff, disguised themselves as soldiers and attempted to purchase liquor at the
city’s hotels and bars.   Officers also investigated hotels and boarding houses rumored to84
be providing aid to men who wanted to violate the liquor prohibition.  The Morals Squad
discovered that room 18 at the Santa Fe Hotel provided soldiers with civilian clothes that
could be rented for $3 a day.   85
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Besides liquor, the Morals Squad raided brothels, arresting “immoral women and
visitors.”   The number of venereal disease cases reported to the San Francisco Health86
Department made no distinction between men who contracted gonorrhea or syphilis
before arriving in camp and those within the city.  However, one can assume that out of
thirty-seven cases of syphilis and three cases of gonorrhea reported for one week in
February 1918 from the Presidio and Yerba Buena training station, at least a portion
contracted the disease due to sexual activity in San Francisco.   One Presidio medical87
officer provided the San Francisco Health Department with the address of a hotel where
one soldier had acquired “an acute case of gonorrhea.”   While some weeks the Health88
Department recorded no sexually transmitted diseases from the military bases that did not
mean soldiers and sailors always stuck to what the CTCA and WCCS considered proper,
moral entertainment.
One man who did not need to limit his leave-time activities to the morally
prescribed entertainments of the CTCA or WCCS was Charles Swope.  Swope’s
experiences as a soldier stationed in San Francisco contrasts with the vast majority of
men who spent their days and nights in the company of strangers.  Charles spent his free
time with his wife, Gretchen.  A newlywed, with no children and no property, Gretchen
could relocate to Oakland.  Without her extended family, Gretchen could not have joined
Charles in the Bay Area, for the newlyweds had little money.  The couple had been living
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with Charles’ parents in San Diego since their wedding.  In the early months of 1918,
Gretchen took care of her relatives’ house, and their young children, in lieu of paying
room and board.  At first, Charles seemed happy with this arrangement, sensing that his
wife was better off with her kin than living alone in San Francisco.   However, within a89
month of their arrival, Charles began to worry that her family, whom he barely knew,
would think badly of an in-law who could not provide for his wife.   Despite the War90
Risk Insurance Act, Charles had yet to see a paycheck and the government was delayed in
sending out allotments and allowances.  While Charles had the courage to sacrifice his
life for his country, his inability to take care of his wife made him overly sensitive about
remarks Gretchen’s family made regarding his leave time in Oakland.  In an emotional
letter to Gretchen, Charles remarked that Otto’s “kindness has in reality been a
‘camaflouge’ [sic] of the real situation.”   Charles’ own insecurities, namely his inability91
to assert his position as husband and man of his own house due to the war, led to repeated
arguments between him and his wife and created tension between Charles and his new in-
laws when he visited their Oakland home.  
Charles’ struggle – to be husband, provider, and soldier – was common among
military trainees, whether their spouses remained geographically close or not.   Most were
unable to care for the financial needs of their families due to the inability of the federal
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bureaucracy to keep pace with the growing military.   In Charles’ case, the army did not
send Gretchen her first allotment check until June 1918, more than six months after they
had arrived in the Bay Area, and that was only after Charles had filed the appropriate
paperwork twice.  For the first half of the year, the couple searched for ways to
supplement the three to six dollars per month the military paid Charles for band
performances.  The couple received an untold sum of money each month from Charles’
parents while Charles did what many soldiers and sailors did in his situation – filed for
relief with the Red Cross.   92
Red Cross Chapters around the Bay Area worked diligently to take care of the
needs of soldiers’ and sailors’ families in their community through their Civilian Relief
Home Service Sections.  Between October 1917 and October 1918, the San Francisco’s
Home Service Section provided assistance to 2,060 families in the city.  Thirty-five
percent of those families required financial aid like Charles and Gretchen.  The rest
received medical services, hospital care, legal advice, insurance, assistance obtaining
allotment checks and “friendly advice.”   Charles, like most soldiers, assumed that93
government allowances would be mailed to dependents soon after their induction into the
military.   Enlisting, and ultimately drafting, a four million man army required an
efficiency that did not appear overnight and government clerks could not keep up with
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demand.  In early July 1918 the government reorganized the allotment payment system,
dividing the paperwork load between the Bureau of War Risk Insurance (which was
trying to process more than 2.5 million claims), the War Department, the Navy
Department, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.  The Bureau of War Risk Insurance
provided only the minimum $15.00 allotment and government allowance, while the
military branches assumed responsibility for any additional allotment a soldier or sailor
wanted deducted from his salary.   Until the government developed more effective ways94
of paying soldiers and their dependents, families like the Swopes had to rely on the
generosity of others and wait for the backlog to clear.
Gretchen, like many American women during the war, decided she could not wait
for the federal government to act.  She suggested in late January 1918 that she should find
a job, but her uncle and husband advised against it at the time, believing the allotment and
allowance would be forthcoming.  However, when the checks failed to arrive by May,
Gretchen did not feel she could continue to wait.  With Charles’ tacit acceptance of the
necessity of the situation, Gretchen accepted a job as a cashier in an Oakland store.  Once
Gretchen began receiving the army checks in June, combined with her pay at the store,
the couple finally asserted their independence from her family and considered the
possibility of Gretchen renting a room in San Francisco.  Such a move would give them
their own space for the first time since they had married and more time together during
Charles’ leave from the island as he would not have to wait for the ferry from San
Francisco to Oakland.  Charles believed that the cost of living with relatives was twice as
Bulletin (San Francisco), 9 July 1918, 2.
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much as renting a San Francisco flat.    95
Charles was also increasingly worried that his young wife’s current living
situation might compromise her moral integrity.  Charles disapproved of Aunt Minnie’s
entertainment choices, including “old dances, theaters, and other cheap amusements,”
which he believed reflected her overall immorality.  Charles insisted that Aunt Minnie
was “not refined enough to enjoy anything real good.  We want to be with some one who
can inspire us with higher ideals, instead of draging [sic] us lower and lower.”   Charles96
had never questioned Aunt Minnie’s activities before the couple claiming their economic
independence from Gretchen’s relatives.  Unable to secure a better situation for his wife,
Charles remained silent on the issue of Minnie’s morality.  Once able to provide for his
wife through the allotment checks, Charles reasserted his position as defender of his
wife’s character.  His wife’s youth, the fact that she was experiencing life in a big city for
the first time, and the couple’s growing bank account also played a factor in Charles
desire to find new housing for Gretchen.  Although she would be closer to the vices of
San Francisco, she would also be closer to Charles and his moral influence.
Charles felt even better about Gretchen’s situation when her older sister,
Katherine, moved to San Francisco from San Diego after the YMCA appointed her
husband to serve in the Golden Gate Branch.  Gretchen moved in with her sister and her
two children and soon afterwards discovered she was pregnant.  Sharing the expenses
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with her sister, Gretchen quit her job and paid her share of the rent, utilities, and food
with her allotment and allowance.  However, Charles worried about providing for their
new baby.  Until early October 1918, Charles still believed there was a good chance his
band assignment would end and he would be shipped to France.  Consequently, Charles
sought ways to supplement his income, using his time not engaged in band
responsibilities to engage in economic pursuits.   Charles, an amateur photographer and97
print maker, turned his hobby into a moneymaking venture at Angel Island by
photographing men who wanted to send photos home to their families.  Charles
developed the film with his own chemicals and dark room in the band barracks.   In mid-98
August, Charles wrote his wife that he could already contribute $35.00 for the month to
their savings from his photographic work.   99
Charles’ efforts to supplement his income were not unique.  In the summer of
1917, before the men of the Officers’ Training Camp at the Presidio received their pay,
several entrepreneurs used their leave Saturday and Sunday to find part-time work
downtown.   For full-time soldiers unsure of their immediate future and unable to100
control whether they would be sent to France, taking care of current financial needs and
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planning for after the war was all they could control.  Charles Swope concentrated on his
long-term goal of taking care of his wife and child after the war by saving enough to buy
land in San Diego for a farm.  After the newlyweds went on a reckless spending spree
while Charles was on one of his leaves, he observed that they must “think of our farm and
skimp for the present.”   While the war enveloped the here and now, the financial101
resources they accumulated during the war might make their future brighter.  Though the
couple could do little about their current situation, they spent the last months of the war
looking ahead.  
For men like Charles Swope, still stationed stateside, the armistice ended their
military service swiftly.  After the armistice declaration, the bases in the Bay Area relaxed
their leave policies even further, allowing Charles to visit his wife frequently enough that
letters were no longer necessary.  As a result, the story of Charles and Gretchen Swope
abruptly ends November 12, 1918.  It is unclear what happened to the couple after
Charles left the service, but however brief Charles Swope’s time in the U.S. Army, the
war did alter his family.  Learning to cope with everyday life, made more trying by
wartime separation, forced American families to adapt.  Despite the brevity of the war,
such lessons could not be erased.  Gretchen had learned to manage her family’s finances
and was forced to make decisions that ran counter to advice from her husband and other
male relatives.  The young couple also got a crash course in making ends meet in the
midst of a rapidly changing economic climate.  The Swopes had grand plans of starting a
Charles Byron Swope to Gretchen Swope, 19 August 1918, Swope Family Correspondence,
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farm near their parents in San Diego, and there is no evidence that the year they resided
near the Golden Gate had swayed them into remaining in the area.  Nevertheless, Charles’
letters express nothing but San Francisco’s positive attributes.  In the case of Charles
Swope, San Franciscans succeeded in taking care of him and his wife’s needs and making 
both feel welcome.  
San Franciscans could not have expected all the soldiers and sailors temporarily
stationed in the city to stay when the war ended, but they hoped that by providing
wholesome, and yet varied entertainment that they had created thousands of boosters. 
These men would return to their home communities praising all the wonderful
opportunities for leisure and work the City by the Bay had to offer, inciting friends and
families to venture into San Francisco.  City leaders also expected to use what many
considered the improved moral environment of San Francisco as proof that the nation’s
growing military machinery would be warmly, and properly, accepted in San Francisco. 
When the war ended and the War Department had the time to select a home base for the
Pacific Coast naval fleet, Mayor Rolph and other city leaders quickly offered Hunter’s
Point in San Francisco.   San Francisco had reaped huge financial rewards from the102
military during the Great War.  Thousands of men stationed in and around the city used
what money they had not allotted to their families to purchase San Francisco commodities
like meals, gifts, hotel rooms, trolley and jitney rides, and entertainment.   Many civilians
had also found employment as contract workers on the bases, providing services formerly
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done by soldiers too busy with training and preparation for deployment.  With the war’s
end, city leaders sought to continue the financial boom by taking advantage of the
military’s proposed expansion.  Thanks to their wartime experiences, San Franciscans
could easily envision their city as the new headquarters of the Pacific fleet.  The military
had always had a presence in San Francisco, but this new opportunity led residents to
imagine a redefinition of their city as a bastion of military supremacy.
99
Chapter Three
“Mayor of All the People”: James Rolph and Municipal Governance
On the afternoon of September 21, 1917 San Franciscans celebrated the filling of
the Selective Service Act’s first quota with a parade.  Rain showers ended just before a
line of more than 10,000 men began their march from the Ferry building to the Civic
Center.  Led by a platoon of mounted police and flanked by six regular army soldiers for
every one enlisted man, the 1,500 civilian-dressed draftees made their way along Market
Street to say goodbye to their city before proceeding to basic training at Camp Lewis,
American Lake, Washington.  George Gallagher, president of the Board of Education,
ordered all schools closed for the day so children could join parents and teachers in the
festivities as “every window on both sides of the street and from the roofs of office
buildings” was filled with well-wishers.  The parade turned north on Van Ness Avenue
and continued its march, single file, into City Hall.  In the lower corridors of the Hall,
Annette Rolph – the mayor’s daughter – and 300 school children handed each man a
bronze button as “a souvenir and a token of recognition.”   James Rolph, Jr. met the
contingent in the Hall’s foyer where he shook hands with each man before they made
their way out to the Civic Center grounds.  Once they were all assembled, Mayor Rolph
spoke to the waiting crowd.  He addressed the men as “soldiers of the United States
Army,” sparking an eruption of cheers from all gathered.  Rolph expressed the gratitude
of the people of San Francisco for the soldiers’ “obedience” to their nation’s call to arms
and wished them “Godspeed when you go to carry the flag of our country to foreign lands
100
and to fight for the honor of America.”   The mayor’s oration blended the right amount of
patriotic reverence with light-hearted exuberance.  After telling the young men that
residents were “filled with emotion” to see them head to war, he lightened the mood by
holding an impromptu neighborhood competition.  As Rolph shouted out the names of
the city’s major residential districts, he encouraged the new soldiers to out-cheer their
brothers-in-arms from other neighborhoods.   This parade to commemorate the beginning1
of a journey for San Francisco’s favorite sons was an opportunity for the city to honor
those who might sacrifice their lives for their country and their city.  It was also a parade
in which James Rolph could exercise one of his favorite duties as mayor, strengthening
bonds of friendship with city residents.  No one was mayor of all the people like “Sunny
Jim.”  
The war provided Mayor Rolph with opportunities to do what he did best: 
promote civic unity, advertise the city’s great accomplishments, and provide oversight to
the various municipal departments under his control.  His desire to be the “mayor of all
the people” meant reminding San Francisco’s residents of their common goals: the
successful completion of the war and the safe return of the city’s soldiers.  This unity
required Rolph’s participation in activities he loved, especially events that allowed him to
interact personally with the people of San Francisco.  Critics have derided Rolph for
wasting too much time on ceremonial duties, particularly after the PPIE closed.   They
argued that his obsession with the titular role of mayor prevented him from providing
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effective leadership, which ultimately led to political factionalism in the city by the
1920s.   Part of the reason for such harsh criticism of one of San Francisco’s most2
popular mayors stems from the lack of extensive research into his life and work.  Despite
his nineteen years as mayor of one of the nation’s most heavily-populated cities and a
term as California governor during the early years of the Great Depression, there has been
little attempt to chronicle his political activity in the decades since his death in 1934.  3
While the scope of the present study is too narrow to rectify this historical oversight, the
mayoral work of “Sunny Jim” during the war illustrates the importance of his leadership
to San Francisco and its residents.  
 Rolph recognized that if the city’s leaders could not put aside their personal,
political, and ideological differences, the city could not respond effectively to the war
dictates from Washington, thus putting the city’s future federal assistance and its national
reputation in jeopardy.  James Rolph held together San Francisco’s political factions by
promoting himself as the “Mayor of All the People,” in public ceremonies and municipal
meetings, unifying the city’s disparate groups, and responding to the important wartime
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tasks required by the government.  Rolph sought to mobilize residents behind his vision
of the city’s future that included greater support for war veterans, municipal ownership,
and a compromise solution to the city’s vice issue.  Though not always successful in
gaining the support of San Franciscans to adopt his plans for the city, Rolph’s attempts
during the war reflect a mayor engaged in resolving the problems that plagued his city.
James “Sunny Jim” Rolph, Jr. started life “South of the Slot” on August 23, 1869. 
He was the eldest son of James Rolph, Sr. and Margaret Nicol, who met on a ship from
New York to San Francisco in 1868 and married two days after they debarked.  James
Rolph, Jr. graduated from the Episcopal Church’s Trinity School in 1888 and went to
work as a messenger in the shipping firm Kittle & Company.  Employing knowledge
learned from that company, Rolph started his own shipping partnership in 1898 with
George Hind.  Hind, Rolph & Company found success importing sugar from Hawaii,
lumber and nitrates from South America, and wool and coal from Australia.  Rolph
married Annie M. Reid in 1900 and despite his growing assets, the couple lives in the
same working-class neighborhood in which they were both raised.  Rolph stepped into the
public arena after the 1906 earthquake and fire, establishing the Mission Relief
Association with the help of neighborhood friends, including Matt I. Sullivan.  The
Association sought to meet the immediate needs of neighbors and Rolph’s home became
the supply depot.  
Rolph continued his public activities by supporting the reconstruction of the city,
most notably through the work of the Mission Bank he founded and his service on the
103
Portola Festival Committee in 1909.   The five-day festival marked the city’s return as a4
tourist destination, showing the nation that San Francisco could organize and carry out a
large event, putting the city in the running for the PPIE.  Rolph served on the Committee
of Six that worked successfully to get the exposition, propelling Rolph to the top of the
list of individuals who could upset incumbent P.H. McCarthy in 1911.  Rolph bridged
class differences.  He owned a shipping company and a bank, and was a three-term
president of the Merchants’ Exchange; yet, Rolph supported organized labor and the
unionization of his shipping firm.  As president of the Shipowners’ Association of the
Pacific, he had helped to maintain good working relations with the Sailor’s Union of the
Pacific through its first formal contract and resigned from the Association in 1906 when
members decided to back the open shop.  Rolph’s campaign slogan, “South of Market for
Mayor,” aptly identified his working-class background.  Many laborers choose Rolph
over McCarthy because they believed the latter had spent his term in office courting
business interests to the detriment of labor.  On September 26, 1911, Rolph beat
McCarthy nearly two to one, inaugurating the nineteen-year reign of Mayor James
Rolph.5
In historical monographs that discuss the work of California progressives, Rolph
is not even a footnote.  Some have argued that the mayor was more comfortable
practicing traditional politics based on personal relations than progressives who preferred
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a more logical and rational management style.    Others have denied that Rolph was a true6
progressive because California progressives were “more hostile to organized labor than
they were to corporate monopoly.”   This perspective, which defines progressives as7
intellectual elitists, excludes anyone outside the professional middle class from the
progressive ideal.   Rolph’s support of organized labor should not invalidate his8
progressive nature.  More recent definitions of progressivism reject the notion that it was
a well-organized political agenda.  Rather, progressivism was a political culture formed
“to bring about a politics of needs . . . and government by administration rather than by
party. . . .”    In his 1918 gubernatorial bid, Rolph sounded very much like a progressive9
in his pledge to continue the “great humanitarian, constructive, progressive work of
Governor Hiram W. Johnson’s administration.”  He advocated state ownership of
utilities, called for health insurance and some form of unemployment and old age
insurance, as well as the cleanup of any inefficient state boards of commissions.   His10
vision of San Francisco’s identity required its residents’ to unite behind common civic
goals to create a city that, at the very least, was comparable to the great cities of the
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world.   Rolph’s 1911 campaign platform resounded with progressive visions of the11
future: an end to municipal patronage and graft through civil service, reform of liquor
licensing, municipal ownership of utilities, improved transportation, and promotion of the
city through public works.  Such progressive characteristics won Rolph continuous
support from a broad cross-section of San Franciscans.
Rolph initiated his plans for the city during his first term in office, including
construction of the Civic Center complex, the development of the Hetch Hetchy project,
and municipal ownership of utilities through the creation of the Municipal Railway.  He
frequently turned to personal advisors for guidance, including recognized leaders of the
Progressive Party, such as Matt I. Sullivan and Theodore Roche (law partners of
Governor Hiram Johnson).  Rolph also fully utilized the abilities of experts whom he
appointed to municipal positions, allowing them a free reign to develop city policy based
on their wealth of knowledge.  This less aggressive approach to mayoral governance has
drawn criticism from contemporaries and historians alike.  Some have argued that after
the close of the PPIE and the move into City Hall in late 1915, Rolph retreated from
executive leadership.   A 1960 interview with Andrew Gallagher, a San Francisco12
supervisor in the 1920s, is often cited as the source for this argument that Rolph served
more as a figure head than a leader.  Gallagher told one historian that “. . . as the years
passed the Mayor gave a decreasing amount of his attention to the problems of
John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Tyranny of Change: American in the Progressive Era, 1890-
11
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administration and he relied increasingly on his capable secretaries, advisors, and political
supporters to attend to the day-by-day problems of government.”   13
Even historians who portray Rolph as a good mayor concede that his executive
skills did not make him a great mayor.  They describe Rolph as a “neutral harmonizing
force, the vital human amalgam around whom all San Franciscan’s converged and
without which no city can truly live and thrive.”   During the Great War, these skills14
were of tremendous importance.  Rolph’s ability to resolve conflict between competing
factions proved essential, particularly in his efforts to protect the city’s relationship with
the military.  At the same time, Rolph was also more politically active than others have
given him credit.   In 1918 he ran as a candidate in the California gubernatorial election,
promoted the interests of soldiers and their families, and continued to push for the
expansion of municipal ownership.
Critics of Mayor Rolph use his frequent absences from the city during the war to
prove his lack of diligence to the needs of his constituents.  The most notable case of this
was in the summer of 1918 when Mayor Rolph decided to run for governor.  His
challengers were William D. Stephens, Hiram Johnson’s successor when he assumed his
senatorial duties in March 1917, and Francis J. Heney, original prosecutor in the San
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Francisco graft trials.  A 1913 state law allowed office-seekers to cross-file, creating the
possibility that one person could win a plurality in both party primaries, or win the
primary of a party not their own.  In 1917, the state legislature added Section 23 to the
state election law that stated that a candidate had to win his own party’s nomination to
win any other primary.  All three candidates took advantage of cross-filing in 1918. 
While Rolph stuck to the two main parties, Stephens filed with the Republican,
Prohibition, and Progressive parties and Heney ran as a Democrat and Progressive party
candidate.    While the other two candidates announced their intention to run in early15
1918, Rolph did not get into the race until early summer, spending most of July on the
campaign trail in Southern California.  The fact that he did not decide to run until late in
the campaign season led Hiram Johnson, Sr. to disregard Rolph as a viable candidate.  He
refused to support his candidacy, despite his personal disdain for Stephens.   16
Whether Johnson’s assistance would have helped Rolph is debatable because the
counties Rolph lost were rural counties and Los Angeles – counties Stephens won
because of his support for prohibition.  In the end, Rolph lost the Republican primary to
Stephens by 21,952 votes.    Though not a member of the Democratic Party, Rolph won17
that primary over Heney, 74,955 to 60,662, sparking intense debate regarding the
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legitimate Democratic Party candidate for governor.  The Democratic State Central
Committee endorsed Heney, arguing that since Rolph had not polled enough votes in his
own party’s primary, Section 23 disqualified him from winning the Democratic
nomination.  California Secretary of State Frank C. Jordan ruled that neither Rolph nor
Heney could run in the general election because they had failed to win their party’s
nomination as required by Section 23.   Theodore Roche and Matt Sullivan took Rolph’s18
case to the state Supreme Court, insisting that Section 23 was unconstitutional.  On
September 25, 1918, the Court ruled against Rolph and Heney, leaving the Democratic
Party with no candidate at all.   Despite his defeat, the 1918 gubernatorial race
demonstrated Rolph’s statewide popularity.  In total primary votes, Rolph polled thirty-
five thousand more votes than Stephens and almost 158 thousand more votes than
Heney.    Rolph’s campaigning took him out of San Francisco for a number of statewide19
speeches but the mayor did not neglect his city.  San Francisco and its wartime efforts
continuously drew Mayor Rolph’s attention, and his personal involvement, back to his
work as municipal leader.
Rolph frequently used his position as municipal executive to secure the well-being
of the city and its citizenry, especially those affected personally by the war.  In November
1917, Rolph requested an investigation by the City Attorney, George Lull, into the impact
of war service on men of the Police and Fire departments who enlisted in the armed
forces.  Lull replied that their leave of absence would hurt their pensions, as the city
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charter required continuous active service for a prescribed period.  Therefore, the city
would need to amend its charter if these men were to receive full benefits.  Rolph’s
official response to Lull’s communication is unknown, but at the top of Lull’s letter
Rolph scribbled: “By all means prepare amendment.”   This proposal received approval20
from the Board of Supervisors and they submitted it to the people in the 1918 general
election as charter amendment number 28.  The amendment allowed members of the
Police and Fire Department to serve their country without breaking the “continuity of
service required” to receive a pension, though they would not count the time spent in the
military as service toward retirement.   “Pensions with colors” as the papers called the21
amendment, passed 42,499 to 22,163.  This two to one support for the amendment
signifies the importance Mayor Rolph, and the large majority of voting residents, placed
on providing the city’s men in uniform with compensation for their service to the city and
the nation.22
Rolph also had a hand in the creation of proposed charter amendment 26 that
would have established a three-year fund to take care of servicemen’s dependents.   In23
early 1918, Rolph became involved in the issue of welfare for dependents when he started
receiving letters from servicemen’s family members, unable to pay their bills due to
government delays in sending allotments and allowances.  One father, whose son was in
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training at Camp Lewis, worried that his daughters would have to leave high school to
“fill the gap” in the family’s income left by their older brother’s military service.   In24
May, Rolph suggested the Board of Supervisors allocate $100,000 from the city’s budget
to help “those San Franciscans who may be made dependent by the war.”   The25
Supervisors initially unanimously supported the measure, but when Lull questioned the
legality of such a budgetary change, they backed away from the proposal.  Rolph
promised one man who had written to him that the Supervisors’ decision would not deter
him from raising the money privately, if needed.   26
The letters from constituents also fueled his support for Chapter Amendment 26,
which would allow city-based welfare for soldiers’ dependents.  Not everyone backed
such an amendment.  The Civic League of Improvement Clubs and Associations urged its
members to vote against amendment 26 after its Board of Governors met with leaders of
the local Red Cross.  The Red Cross argued relief for dependents fell under their
administration and a city fund would create a “duplication of effort and energy.”   Rolph27
attempted to appease the Red Cross by offering to appoint five members from the San
Francisco Chapter to handle the funds.  In late October, he issued a public statement
urging people to vote for the amendment, reminding the city of the sacrifices made by
Anonymous letter to James Rolph, Jr., 11 July 1918, James Rolph, Jr. Papers, North Baker
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those serving the armed forces.  “Shall we at home show that we have neglected our civic
duties, that we have made no progress. . . . Surely, San Francisco patriotism demands
better things of citizenship.”   However, by the time Rolph made this heartfelt request,28
the military had sorted through its backlog of paperwork and families were receiving their
money.  
Coupled with Red Cross assistance, there was no evidence by the end of October
that military dependents were still without basic necessities.  By election day it was also
evident from news reports that the war would not last another couple of years, but a few
more months at the most.  As a result, newspaper editors like M. H. De Young of the
Chronicle urged residents to vote down amendment 26.  De Young thought it was not
only unnecessary, but likely to encourage corruption because the amendment lacked any
mention of commission oversight.  Such arguments against the amendment led to its
overwhelming defeat.   In this case Rolph proved unable to unify the people to support29
his plan for welfare to soldiers’ families, but no urban mayor could win majority support
on every measure.  Rolph’s failure to secure passage of this amendment should not take
away from his attempts to meet the special needs of soldiers and their families during the
war.   
Rolph’s concern for the future well-being of the soldiers and the city led him to
help returning veterans find employment.  Board of Supervisors’ Clerk J.S. Dunnigan was
Mayor James Rolph, “To the People of San Francisco,” Municipal Record 11 (October 31,
28
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in Washington, D.C. in October 1918 and reported in a confidential telegram to Rolph
that San Francisco must quickly show ways it could employ demobilized soldiers and
sailors.  Military officials had told Dunnigan that they would more rapidly return men to
communities where jobs were readily accessible.   With the Presidio designated a
demobilization center, if the city could advertise a list of employment opportunities, the
city could benefit from the large number of men from around the west mustered out of the
military in San Francisco.  The committee Rolph created included members of the Board
of Supervisors, Rolph’s close advisors, union leaders, and a secretary charged with
preparing a register of every San Franciscan in the service at the time of the Armistice. 
Members of the committee then sought to verify which men on the list already had
assurances from prewar employers that they could resume their jobs when they returned. 
The committee then sought out private companies with jobs available and developed a list
of vacant municipal offices.  They even sent letters to the federal government urging it to
lift construction restrictions on city projects as soon as possible so the city could hire
soldiers for public works projects upon their return.    Rolph’s creation of this committee30
reflected his belief that the municipal government should do everything possible to help
San Franciscans regain their livelihoods and stave off unemployment and discontent. 
Rolph sought to circumvent the economic downturn that normally struck urban areas in
the months after a war as government contracts and war-related industries retreated,
thereby creating a city policy that the rest of the nation could emulate.  Rolph’s efforts to
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provide aid to those suffering from wartime dislocation furthered his image as the “Mayor
of all the People” while boosting the national reputation of the city as one that cared for
its residents in the hope of attracting new residents and industries. 
To provide living and working space for potential new residents, the city also
needed to continue its infrastructure improvements.  Crucial to this endeavor for Mayor
Rolph was municipal ownership of the city’s rail lines.  With municipal ownership, Rolph
argued, all San Franciscans benefitted, not just the wealthy or special interest groups.  31
Despite constraints placed on the municipal budget as the result of the war, Rolph fought
to extend the city-owned railroad, the San Francisco Municipal Railway.  The Municipal
Railway emerged in response to the power of the United Railroads in the city, its
connections to the 1906 graft scandal, and its brutal suppression of the Carmen’s Union
strike in 1907.  In December 1909, voters approved a bond issue to purchase the private
Geary Street line, creating the first municipal railway in the nation.  By 1915, the
Municipal Railway controlled ten lines and the Public Works Department had begun
work on the Twin Peaks tunnel, necessary to connect the western region of the city with
downtown.   32
To further promote expansion of residences to this remote region of the city, and
to extend the reach of the Municipal Railway, Rolph supported and the Supervisors
approved the financial resources necessary to construct new rail lines on Market Street. 
In June 1916, City Engineer Michael O’Shaughnessy oversaw the beginning of the
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project as workers ripped up the pavement on Market to make way for the lines, which
would run parallel to the existing United Railroad tracks.   United Railroad retaliated by33
getting a court-ordered injunction against the city, arguing that it had exclusive rights to
run lines on Market.  In late January 1917, the U.S. District Court lifted the injunction,
permitting “the extension of the Municipal Railway upon any street as the public
necessity might require.”   The District Court’s decision gave the city the legal green34
light to proceed with construction of the Market Street line.  It also bolstered Mayor
Rolph’s resolve to challenge the United Railroad’s power in other areas of the city.  Thus
the city, and not United Railroads, began to take control of the future development of the
city’s transportation facilities.
The start of the war did not hinder construction of the Twin Peaks Tunnel, which
opened on July 14, 1917.  The tunnel’s completion intensified the conflict between
supporters of the Municipal Railway and United Railroad.  The tunnel was only wide
enough for two sets of track and the mayor envisioned the tunnel as a conduit for
municipal trains exclusively.  Lack of access to the tunnel would prevent United Railroad
from gaining a foothold in the western sectors of the city.  However, many leading
businessmen insisted United Railroad should be allowed to compete for passengers,
thereby requiring the city to allow its usage of the city’s tunnel.   The mayor’s plan for
independent Municipal Railway lines on Market Street and control of the Twin Peaks
tunnel received support from residents who believed the city would charge more
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reasonable rates and provide the geographically-constricted city with new residential
development west of Twin Peaks.  Real estate agent A.S. Baldwin argued that such a real
estate boom would benefit the entire city – increasing construction jobs, raising municipal
tax revenue, and preventing the loss of residents to East Bay competitors who promoted
the more plentiful land options of their communities.   The Mission [District] Promotion35
Association supported Mayor Rolph’s position.  Although some of its residents might
choose to leave their neighborhood for newer housing, the Mission Association believed
municipal ownership of the tunnel was in the city’s best interest. Like many San
Francisco residents, members expressed their opposition to United Railroad’s use of the
Twin Peak’s tunnel by reminding the mayor of the company’s connections to the scandals
of the previous decade.   36
Their support of the mayor’s plan reflected the sentiments of many who saw the
Municipal Railroad as the way to clear the city of United Railroads perceived depravity.
The mayor’s vision of a city void of private ownership of transportation also found
adherents among union labor that had fought for a decade against United Railroad’s anti-
union policy.  A piece in the Building Trades Council’s Organized Labor urged its
members to rally behind the mayor, insisting the new municipal lines “would provide
people with much-needed service” at reasonable rates and prevent the “plundering and
robbing of our city of valuable rights and property.”  The paper couched their argument
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for city-run transportation in wartime rhetoric, urging city leaders to thwart the “lip-
patriotism” being spouted by the United Railroads in its attempt to continue dominating
city rails.  They urged the supervisors to do their patriotic duty to end the “public
robbery.”   For the Building Trades Council and others, heightened wartime patriotism37
ran parallel with their civic ideals.  They envisioned a city unhampered by United
Railroad’s history of corruption and with the municipal resources necessary to entice new
residents and businesses. 
Those opposing Mayor Rolph’s plan expressed doubt that the city could generate
economic development if the Municipal Railroad continued to expand.  They argued that
the mayor’s policy was fiscally irresponsible, inefficient, and a threat to public safety. 
The Civic League of Improvement Clubs and Associations considered the entire
Municipal Railway project to be a financial liability for the city.  Though city officials
claimed the Railway had begun to show a profit by early 1917, the League thought its
figures proved otherwise.  According to the League, the real expenses – including the
interest on the bonds, legal fees, and the general operating expenses – showed that the
Railway was not running in the black.  The League compared this deficit to the city
revenue collected consistently by taxing private transportation companies.  They
concluded the city could lower taxes and provide other necessary services, like street
work, if they turned the Municipal Railway over to private investors.   The League also38
considered the additional two tracks being constructed down Market a disaster on several
Organized Labor (San Francisco), 12 May 1917, 7.
37




fronts.  First, the League considered it a financial disaster, one that would result in
depressed real estate prices on Market Street as businesses sought less congested parts of
the city (or maybe another city) to ply their trade.  It would also be an efficiency disaster
in that the unified car service and universal transfers provided by the United Railroads
could not continue.  Lastly, the League envisioned personal disasters as pedestrians
precariously maneuvered across four tracks of speeding trains and dodged cars and jitneys
that shared the street.   39
The Chamber of Commerce seconded the Civic League’s fears that the additional
tracks increased the potential for serious accidents and injuries.  The Chamber insisted
that just the risk of injury would keep consumers away from the heart of the city. 
Merchants south of Market worried they would have to close because “women shoppers
will not risk the loss of life and limb by crossing a thoroughfare congested by four car
lines, jitneys, automobile and vehicular traffic.”  Both the Chamber of Commerce and the
Civic League believed the best solution was to terminate construction on the new tracks
and for the city to accept the United Railroad’s offer to continue providing service on
Market Street – from the Ferry to the residential districts west of Twin Peaks.  40
Ultimately, in August 1917, the Supervisors rejected a proposed compromise with
the United Railroad that would have allowed joint use of the Twin Peaks tunnel and the
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existing lines on Market.   The city inaugurated street car transportation service through41
the tunnel in early February 1918 and contractors completed the last of the new tracks on
Market in late May.  Although wartime conservation forced the city to cut back on road
construction for the last few months of the war, Rolph’s vision of the city unified by the
Municipal Railway made great strides during the war.   Besides the creation of the “K”42
line from Twin Peaks, the city also expanded the “D” line into the Presidio, further
serving the needs of the military and the city .  Rolph reported to A.S. Baker of Salt Lake43
City that San Francisco’s Municipal Railways “are in every way satisfactory, beneficial
and conspicuously successful.”   For Rolph, the city had won its battle against “exclusive
private ownership” by wresting absolute control of transportation away from
corporations, providing an efficient, profitable utility that employed more than eight
hundred by May 1918.  
The conflict that arose over the expansion of the Municipal Railway, and the
subsequent limits placed on the United Railroads, shows the debate over municipal
ownership did not diminish just because the city mobilized for war.  For Mayor Rolph,
municipal ownership allowed the people the power to “run their own affairs,” creating a
more egalitarian urban political culture.   The interests of the city as a whole outweighed44
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the interests of the wealthy business elite in his mind.  The Civic League and Chamber of
Commerce opposition to the Municipal Railroad illustrates a common division within the
city regarding municipal ownership of utilities.  Unions and working-class
neighborhoods, like the Mission, joined forces with city progressives and some
businessmen to support Rolph’s vision of a municipal government that controlled utilities
and provided services to all residents at more affordable rates.  For the heads of San
Francisco’s largest corporations and their small business backers, the expansion of
municipal control threatened private enterprise.  Despite their ongoing battle with labor
(see Chapter Five), the Chamber of Commerce did not attack municipal ownership as a
plot devised by socialist-leaning unions and their political backers.  Instead, they
challenged the economic feasability of the plan and its impact on the city’s future success. 
Both sides of the municipal ownership debate wanted the same thing – an efficient
transportation system that provided access to the greatest number of potential customers. 
They wanted to be able to advertise San Francisco as a city ready for development, with
an infrastructure that attracted new residents and businesses.  Each side believed the
other’s plan for this goal would ultimately undermine economic growth, leading potential
investors to select one of San Francisco’s urban competitors instead.  This conflict over
municipal ownership would continue to arouse heated debate well into the 1920s not only
over transportation, but also the delivery of San Francisco’s water and energy.
Rolph, with the assistance of Chief Engineer O’Shaughnessy, refused to let the
war halt work on the Hetch Hetchy Dam and aqueduct and the city’s quest for an
adequate water supply.  O’Shaughnessy, who had previously served as chief engineer for
120
the Southern California Water Company, designed and promoted the project after its
construction began in the summer of 1914.   Despite the war, Blyth, Witter & Company45
completed a significant part of the overall plan in October 1917 by laying the last of the
sixty-eight miles of track that connected the Sierra Railway with the Hetch Hetchy dam
site.   The new track enabled O’Shaughnessy to ship heavy machinery and materials to46
the area, but other wartime problems prevented the chief engineer from meeting prewar
construction goals.  Shortly after the completion of the rail line, O’Shaughnessy admitted
to members of the Civic League that the limited availability of supplies due to wartime
construction had increased the price of equipment and materials.  He hoped the project
would stay within the $45 million budget he had proposed in 1916, assuming prices
dropped after the war.   47
To add to the financial stress, the Board of Supervisors failed to find buyers for
the $11 million in bonds O’Shaughnessy had requested at the beginning of the year.  The
war, and the subsequent bonds issued by the government, had diverted people’s attention
and money away from Hetch Hetchy.  As a result, the Finance Committee of the Board of
Supervisors had only disposed of $1.6 million in bonds at the end of the year.   The war48
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also reduced the pool of industrial workers who sought city jobs.  O’Shaughnessy
complained in August 1918 that while more than four hundred men worked on the
project, another two hundred could be employed, “but they cannot be got.”  49
O’Shaughnessy needed many of those missing workers for the completion of a dam at
Lake Eleanor.  The dam was needed to insure sufficient water during the dry season to
operate the Lower Cherry River power plant, which began operations May 6, 1918.  The
power plant was essential to O’Shaughnessy’s overall plan, providing the electric power
required in the construction of the rest of the project.  O’Shaughnessy originally intended
for the dam to be ready by June 1918, but it was late September before workers had the
Eleanor dam operational.   50
The completion of this portion of the project occurred at an auspicious moment
for the city and its efforts to further the Hetch Hetchy project while doing its bit for the
war effort.  In early August, the Federal Power Administration, led by H.G. Butler,
ordered municipalities to cut their use of power.  The city cut back operation of street
lights and implemented “skip-stops” on the Municipal Railway.   With the completion of51
the Eleanor dam, Butler directed the city to sell its surplus power.  The Municipal Record
estimated that the Lower Cherry River power plant generated enough power to operate all
the Municipal street car lines and was doing its part to relieve the power shortage in
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California.  Though the restrictions on the municipal use of electricity ended with the
war, the city continued to sell electricity to Pacific Gas and Electric from its Hetch
Hetchy project well into the 1920s.   The war might have slowed construction, but Hetch52
Hetchy’s ability to contribute to wartime needs kept the project moving forward with the
blessing of the federal government.  The War Industries Board classified the work as an
essential industry a month before the armistice, entitling the city to priority privileges on
material required.   Unlike most construction jobs that were suspended due to the lack of53
resources and manpower, the war aided the completion of Hetch Hetchy by turning it into
a regional wartime essential rather than a city project.
 In the case of Hetch Hetchy, San Francisco gained from the expanded wartime
powers of the federal government.  However, in other cases federal dictates challenged
residents’ efforts to promote their city as a premiere Pacific destination.   Of all the54
federal demands on the city of San Francisco, the pressure to get control of vice created
the greatest amount of discussion and received the most attention from the city’s political
leaders.  San Francisco’s reputation as a haven for drinking, gambling, drugs, and
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prostitution threatened to undermine the city’s future ability to win military bases and
promote the city as a good place to visit and relocate.  Even before the United States
entered the Great War, some residents had attempted to rid the city of its vice districts,
most notably the Barbary Coast and the Tenderloin.   Residents had tolerated prostitution
in the Barbary Coast since the Gold Rush days, but the moral reform movement of the
early twentieth century increasingly put pressure on the city to bring it under control.  In
March 1911, Mayor McCarthy and the Board of Supervisors – responding more from
concerns about rising venereal disease rates than a desire to shut down the Coast –
established regulations for prostitutes.   Every four days the Board of Health examined55
prostitutes and issued certificates of health if they were clean, or sent the women to the
new Municipal Clinic for treatment.  The Municipal Clinic treated nearly one thousand
women a month, with a revolving contingent of approximately twenty-five hundred.    56
James Rolph continued to support the Clinic when he became mayor, as did his
new President of the Police Commission, Theodore Roche.  Rolph, Roche, and several
Supervisors believed that prostitution resulted from human nature.  They could regulate,
but never completely suppress it.  The Clinic and the health certificates brought the
venereal disease rate in the red light districts down by 66 percent, but moral reformers
demanded nothing short of the complete destruction of the Coast and Tenderloin, along
with the dissolution of the Municipal Clinic that they believed encouraged improper
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behavior by treating the diseased.  57
In 1913, various religious and women’s organizations, along with The Examiner’s
editor, John McGrath, formed a committee to pressure the municipal government to close
the vice districts.  Unlike in previous years, when reformers argued the measure was
morally necessary, this committee won a larger following by emphasizing the negative
impact the regulated vice districts might have on the image of San Francisco as it
prepared for the PPIE.  In May, bending to growing public pressure, Mayor Rolph
stopped police assistance to the Municipal Clinic, effectively killing it.  In September, the
Police Commission issued new regulations for the Barbary Coast that prohibited dance
halls from serving liquor and banned women from saloons.  The state’s Red Light
Injunction and Abatement Act, passed in 1914, gave the city even more power to combat
vice, but the Police Commission preferred a passive approach, revoking liquor licenses
rather than investing in large raids of the district.  For the next two years, the city’s police
worked to close houses of prostitution as they found them, but various groups within the
city demanded a more stringent policy.  The vice crusade heated up again after the closing
of the PPIE when publicity concerning the subject could not severely damage Exposition
tourism.  Former mayor Eugene Schmitz – in an effort to re-enter municipal politics –  led
the charge in 1916, publishing reports of continued vice in supposedly closed districts. 
He also initiated a recall petition against Mayor Rolph.  The recall campaign went
nowhere, and Schmitz – intrinsically linked to the city’s history of political corruption –
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failed to provide the leadership moral crusaders demanded.    In early 1917, those58
opposed to vice in San Francisco turned to Rev. Paul Smith.
Smith was the pastor of the Central Methodist Episcopal Church in the Tenderloin
District.  Smith and his congregation often came face to face with the effects of vice. 
Some claimed that Smith’s crusade against the district began after a prostitute solicited
the pastor directly.   Starting in early January 1917, Smith regularly called for the59
elimination of the district in his sermons.  He spent his weekdays urging prominent
citizens to assert their influence with the Police Department.   Smith not only sought the60
closing of the Tenderloin and what was left of the Coast; he also wanted to see the police
do more to end vice in residential areas and to enforce the city’s two a.m. drinking law.  61
Not everyone agreed that vice would disappear with more rigid police inspection. 
Fremont Older, editor of The Bulletin, insisted that prostitution would simply scatter
across the city, making it more difficult to detect.  He urged the vice crusaders and the
city officials to find a compromise.   62
One historian has argued that Mayor Rolph remained “largely detached” from the
January vice debate, but there is evidence to suggest that by the end of the month, Smith’s
vice crusade led the mayor to act.   At a large anti-vice rally at the Dreamland Rink on63
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January 25, Rev. Smith and his supporters overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling for
the mayor to create a vice commission.  Several days later, city newspapers reported that
Rolph had selected twenty-five people to serve on such a commission, including several
pastors, social workers, physicians, and one of Rolph’s personal advisors.   The Police64
Commissioners also created a “Morals Squad,” led by Sergeant Charles Goff, which
began raids on suspected brothels in mid February.  The police arrested men and women
for suspicion of prostitution and blockaded the entrances to streets and alleys where men
were known to frequent roving bands of women.   65
Despite the appointment of the Vice Commission and the Morals Squad, Rev.
Smith continued to attack Mayor Rolph.   A week before the declaration of war, Smith66
sent an open letter to the mayor through the press, providing names and places where
prostitution was “both fostered and tolerated.”  Smith attacked the mayor by holding him
responsible for the eradication of the vice dens.  He also threatened to make public the
names of businessmen who owned the buildings where prostitutes openly worked.   In67
many ways, Smith was trying to generate attention for his vice crusade by resurrecting the
specter of the previous decade’s graft trials.   Smith believed that the city’s politicians and
business leaders profited from allowing prostitution to continue and that, just like in the
days of Boss Reuf, such toleration of corruption would cause moral decay that could
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destroy the city – just as the shoddy work on the old City Hall was responsible for its
collapse.  
Because America’s declaration of war came so closely on the heels of Smith’s
threat to city leaders, estimating the impact of Rev. Smith’s crusade on shutting down the
vice districts in 1917 is difficult.  Historian Liston Sabraw estimates that Smith’s
campaign led to the closing of almost four hundred houses of “ill-fame” in the next two
years, but he fails to consider what happened to the vice crusade after America entered
the war.    When the war started, Smith’s attacks were not the municipal government’s68
primary concern regarding vice conditions.  Facing increased pressure from the federal
government, particularly the War Department, Mayor Rolph and others struggled to make
the city acceptable as a place to train a clean fighting force.
In July 1917, the War Department issued a statement meant to quell nationwide
rumors that the men heading to training camps were being “hounded by a ‘vice trust’.” 
They insisted that the police in large cities, working with military officers, had closed
established vice districts, specifically mentioning the closure of San Francisco’s
Tenderloin.  The greatest threat to a soldier’s morality, the War Department believed, was
in bands of “scattered adventurers, gamblers, dramsellers,” and the like.  The War
Department made it clear that local governments should eradicate these threats or face
losing camp sites to cleaner communities.   The Morals Squad, led by the promoted69
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Lieutenant Goff, continued to raid “notorious places,” arresting women and their visitors
and barring anyone from returning to those alleys, boarding houses, or hotel rooms.   On
May 21, 1917, Goff’s squad brought one-hundred twenty-five men, women, and girls
before the Police Judges in a single day.   70
To aid in the cleanup, the San Francisco Department of Health recommended that
the Board of Supervisors allocate $6,000 for a new ward at San Francisco Hospital that
could care for women suffering from venereal diseases, thereby removing the possibility
of their contact with soldiers and sailors on leave.  The Board of Health did not refer to
the defunct Municipal Clinic in its explanation of the proposed “Ward L,” but the
creation of the new ward reflected the old clinic’s successful reduction of venereal
disease.  Unlike the Municipal Clinic, which had been closed to protect the moral image
of the city at the time of the PPIE, they could tout Ward L as a war measure vital to the
security of the nation’s soldiers.  Such patriotic motives saved Ward L from the
condemnation of moral reformers that ultimately killed its predecessor.  Health Officer
William C. Hassler deemed the ward an “urgent necessity at this time owing to the fact
that a very large number of infections are being spread and that this menace is more grave
at this time by reason of the war conditions” and the possibility that more undesirable
women might flow into the city as the military camps grew.   71
Mayor Rolph, in assuring the military that San Francisco would protect soldiers
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and sailors from the spread of disease, supported the creation of the ward.  He promised
that he would “use his best endeavors to secure the money” despite a limited emergency
budget.   The Board of Supervisors showed their support by allocating the money needed72
to operate the hospital war.  Soon afterwards, judges in the city’s Women’s Court began
turning over women suspected of prostitution to doctors for examination.  In October
1917, Judge Matthew Brady heard 497 cases.  He ordered 135 women suspected of
prostitution or other illicit behavior that might lead to disease to undergo testing at the
hospital.  Twenty-eight of those women spent time in Ward L.  Such numbers suggested73
to city leaders and the War Department a vigorous effort to clean up the city and protect
the soldiers training in the area. 
The support of the War Department enabled Mayor Rolph and other supporters of
Ward L to provide public health care as a patriotic endeavor.  Raymond Fosdick,
chairman of the Commission on Training Camp Activities, gave his public support as did
Western Department army officials.  The Supervisors allowed the Board of Health to
spend whatever they needed to keep the ward running through the 1917-1918 fiscal year. 
At the special request of the U.S. Army, the ward’s budget increased to $50,000 the
following year.  In supporting the appropriation, Rolph told Fosdick that San Francisco
would do whatever it could to help quickly end the war.  “We want all Government
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Departments to feel that they need but ask, and it shall be done.”   Despite its opposition74
to the mayor’s Municipal Railroad expansion, the Civic League of Improvement Clubs
and Associations supported the work of the ward and donated money, considering it the
“duty of the authorities intrusted with the preservation of the public health to protect the
civilian as well as the military.”   The support for Ward L from the municipal75
government and organizations like the Civic League reflected the belief that they could
not eradicate vice from the city, but that they could eliminate the aspects most dangerous
to soldiers - and the reputation of San Francisco - through regulation.
Many moral crusaders, however, considered Ward L to be nothing short of
municipal sanctioned prostitution.  Mrs. C.E. Grosjean, a member of the Board of
Directors for the Taxpayers League and member of the Parents’ Rights League,
denounced the mayor and Supervisors for supporting Ward L.  Mrs. Grosjean argued that
all the ward did was provide willing women for soldiers, women taught by the very
existence of Ward L that they “can sin and go free.”  Rolph deflected this criticism by
reminding Grosjean that the city had budgeted money at the insistence of the U.S. Army,
and therefore, the city could not revoke the money or close the ward.   Sentiments like76
that of Mrs. Grosjean had led to the closing of the Municipal Clinic in 1913.  However,
the moral reformers’ vision of a city completely clean of vice failed to see the reality
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facing San Francisco during the war.  It would be impossible for city leaders to rid the
city of vice with so many transitory soldiers and sailors in its midst.  Municipal officials,
like Mayor Rolph and members of the Board of Health, believed the best way to handle
urban vice was to regulate it and control the spread of disease.  Therefore, they saw no
reason to go further than the War Department required to keep military encampments in
San Francisco.  77
The establishment of Ward L did not end the debate over the diligence of
municipal leaders to keep the city free of vice.  Judge P.F. Barlow, a New York woman’s
court judge, railed against San Francisco’s judicial structure that allowed most women
charged with prostitution to return to the streets in short order without serving jail time. 
As a result, the court saw the same women time and again.  Barlow suggested the city
adopt New York’s policy of sending repeat offenders to a workhouse for two years.   The78
report of the Women’s Court could confirm Barlow’s analysis of the situation.  While
Judge Brady sent 135 women for medical examinations in October 1917, the judge only
sentenced fourteen women to the county jail.   Meanwhile, the Heath Department79
reported fluctuating numbers of venereal disease cases appearing in the city and military
bases.  For the week ending December 29, 1917 (the first week the Health Department
published the number of syphilis and gonococcus infections), the Health Department
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learned of 103 new cases of syphilis and four cases of gonococcus infection in the city,
though the Presidio and Yerba Buena Training Station reported no new cases of venereal
disease.  Two weeks later, the city reported only three new syphilis cases and seven
gonorrhea infections, but the bases reported sixteen men with syphilis and ten with
gonorrhea.   80
Fearing that the two dozen cases might evolve into an epidemic that would force
the War Department to transfer its men to healthier communities, Mayor Rolph requested
a meeting with Arthur Murray, Commander of the Western Department Headquarters of
the War Department.   The meeting, which took place in Rolph’s office on February 11,81
reflected the divisions within San Francisco regarding vice and Rolph’s attempts to quell
the disparate voices so that what people saw outside San Francisco was a city united. 
Those assembled included Mayor Rolph, four police judges, the Provost and Assistant
Provost Marshals, Police Chief White, Police Commissioner Roche, several members of
the Board of Health, and the Chief Medical Officer of the Western Department.  The
meeting began with intense debate over the best way to clean up the city and quickly
degenerated into a battle over who should be blamed for the continuation of the problem. 
The military’s representatives denounced the women of the city, especially “girls in
department stores . . . working on small salaries,” who picked up soldiers for fun and
carelessly spread disease.  They suggested that the city hire more women social workers
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to patrol the streets looking for such girls, with the power to force them to undergo
physical exams or face jail time.  Speaking for the police, Theodore Roche retorted that
he did not believe his officers should subject women to random medical exams without
evidence of a crime, which led to a brief  discussion of whether such exams would violate
the women’s civil liberties.  Then, the military blamed police judges for failing to jail
more women suspected of prostitution.  Judges Brady and Sullivan countered by
suggesting that the police sent the court insufficient evidence.  Many of the women, and
the men accused of being their pimps, demanded jury trials, resulting in acquittal due to
lack of evidence.  Brady turned the tables on the military, suggesting that the army failed
to do its part to protect its men.  Rather than harshly punishing the weak women in
Brady’s court, why not “discipline [the] strong soldiers at the Presidio.”  Colonel Maus,
Army Chief Medical Officer for the Western Department, retorted that he objected to
such a suggestion, for it was “prostitutes [who] sow seeds of syphilis” and no matter how
much the Army disciplined soldiers, it “cannot change human nature.”  
Mayor Rolph, in hopes of saving his city’s patriotic reputation and the money
generated by the military’s presence, became the mediator in this den of accusations. 
Trying his best to find a solution, Rolph emphasized the work the city had already
accomplished in cleaning up vice and its desire to maintain good relations with the
military.  “We don’t want [the] reputation of Seattle,” Rolph insisted.  “We [will] co-
operate in every way and we [will] bear the expense.”   Despite his usual deference to the82
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expert suggestions of his advisors, Rolph sided with the military and refused to blame the
soldiers for the problem.  The mayor ultimately left the decision of how best to clean up
the city to the military officers.   Rolph, Roche, Brady, and Sullivan preferred to focus on
treating cases of disease and limit raids of boarding houses.   However, Rolph agreed to
do more to eliminate prostitution if it would keep the military from sending soldiers and
sailors elsewhere, hurting San Francisco’s reputation and future relationship with the
military. 
The congenial atmosphere Mayor Rolph’s words established at the end of the
meeting on February 11 appeased the military authorities.  The War Department did not
call for any further meetings or pressure city officials to alter their established anti-vice
policy.  Rather, the police and soldiers assigned to the Morals Squad continued their
efforts as before – arresting street solicitors, suppressing liquor sales to soldiers, and
investigating immoral activities and rooming and apartment houses.   The lack of public
complaints from moral reformers or the War Department for the duration of the war
indicates that those who lived and played in San Francisco found the city’s efforts
satisfactory.   The measures were successful enough to draw condemnation from residents
who supported regulated prostitution.  Mayor Rolph received several letters arguing that
if single men did not have access to “girls of the business,” who knew how to keep
themselves free of disease, they would turn to “chippy girls” looking for a good time who
did not know how to take care of themselves.    While Rolph may have agreed with this83
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sentiment, given his history of support for regulated prostitution, he could not retreat from
his wartime policy.  
In his efforts to win the War Department’s approval of the city’s efforts to clean
up vice, Mayor Rolph hoped to attract national attention to San Francisco’s patriotic
national service.  He received such validation when in March 1918 the Federation of
Jewish Charities in Louisville, Kentucky wrote to the mayor, asking for his advise on how
to handle their vice problems.  Louisville, home to the Army’s Camp Taylor, was a city of
more than 200,000 residents and more than 57,000 soldiers by the summer of 1918.  It
faced many of the same challenges as San Francisco in providing wholesome
entertainment for men in uniform.  The fact that they turned to Rolph for guidance
suggests that national publications had suggested that San Francisco, long known as
“frisky Frisco” by sailors, had cleaned up its act.  In his response to the Federation of
Jewish Charities, Rolph praised the diligence of his city’s police and the police judges
and the important contributions of Ward L to San Francisco.  According to Rolph, the
“results of this system have been far-reaching,” leading the State Board of Health and
military officials to commend the city for its efforts.   Rolph continued to believe that84
vice could not be eliminated, and he continued to oppose laws that would attempt to
banish it outright, a position at odds with the city’s moral reformers.  However, Rolph’s
policy of presenting the city as a willing facilitator in the demands of the federal
government appeased the War Department, preventing the relocation of thousands of men
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from San Francisco.  The city kept its bases and the city’s government improved its image
as a caretaker of the nation’s citizen soldiers.
Mayor Rolph, endeavoring to be the mayor of all the people and promote a spirit
of egalitarian, spent the eighteen months of the Great War struggling to balance
competing forces, both municipal and national.  Rolph used his ceremonial
responsibilities – as parade marshal or goodwill ambassador to the troops at Camps
Fremont and Lewis – to create an image of a city united behind the war effort.  He
worked throughout the war to provide for the men, and their families, who represented
San Francisco on the battlefield in France and Siberia, promoting civic pride in the city’s
wartime accomplishments even when he did not win a majority of supporters for his
cause.  In handling the vice issues in a way that appeased the War Department, if not
moral reformers, Rolph protected the civilian-military relationship San Francisco would
need to utilize after the war and created a system that other urban centers could emulate. 
His desire to administer a well-planned, efficiently run city despite wartime conditions
remained paramount, leading him to continue his plan to expand the Municipal Railway
into new parts of the city.  These actions required Rolph’s personal attention, but the
more routine daily administration of his office was frequently left to the boards and
commissions of experts that served the executive, laying the foundation for 1920s
political conflict.  The factionalism that became part of the city’s political culture in the
1920s is evident during the war, as seen in the heated debates regarding amendment 26,
expansion of municipal ownership, and the conflicts regarding the vice question. Despite
these clashes with residents who did not share Rolph’s vision of what San Francisco in
137
the postwar decades should look like, Rolph managed to maintain majority support. 
Sunny Jim remained the Mayor of All the People for another decade before running for
governor and winning the political prize he had failed to achieve in 1918.  
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Chapter Four
“You Have Not Invested Till It Hurts”:  City Businessmen and the Chamber of
Commerce
On Sunday morning, October 6, 1918, a massive crowd poured into Golden Gate
Park and headed for the baseball fields.  The people were to take part in a new film
directed by Thomas H. Ince.  Dubbed the “Sweetheart Film,” the stars of the silent drama
were the friends and relations of men serving in the United States military.  The U.S.
Division of Films promised that they would show the finished product in all the American
rest camps in France.  Northern California soldiers would have the opportunity to see
their families on the movie screen and everyone wanted to send the men their best wishes. 
 People from as far north as Shasta County and as far south as Fresno made their way to
San Francisco for the occasion.  At one o’clock, a rocket shot up from the recreation
fields and an estimated 150,000 began slowly to march northward to the Mid-Winter Fair
Memorial Museum where Ince’s cameras were rolling.  Many participants carried signs
with short messages for their soldiers.  One mother carried a small baby in one arm while
holding a sign in the other that said “Dad, this is Patricia.”  The city’s firemen marched
before the cameras with a message to their comrades in France that read “Never mind the
bacon, but bring home the Rhine.”  For three hours this procession made its way past the
cameras, smiling and waving for posterity.  For a brief moment, many families felt more
connected to their soldiers overseas than they had since their departure.   1
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The 150,000 residents of northern California who participated in the film had one
man to thank for its production, San Francisco Chronicle owner Michael H. de Young. 
De Young, who had founded the paper in 1865 with his brother, had the financial
resources and business contacts necessary to get this film made.  He used his newspaper
to publicize the event and his money to get Ince and his crew to film it.  De Young, like
many of San Francisco’s business elite, also donated part of his fortune to civic
improvements.  His favorite project was the Mid-Winter Fair Memorial Museum, which
served as the backdrop for the film, advertised in de Young’s paper as “the greatest love
story ever told, and filmed.”   De Young donated many items from his personal art2
collection to the museum and provided much of the funding necessary for its expansion in
1917.   His contributions to the museum reflected de Young’s desire to make San3
Francisco the cultural destination of the West, an image most publicly expressed during
the PPIE.  
In his work with the museum and his efforts to provide San Franciscans with the
chance to send visual messages to loved ones in France, de Young represented the
qualities the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce expected of its members.   Formed in
1911, the Chamber of Commerce sought to facilitate trade networks and mobilize support
for civic improvements.   In doing so, the Chamber hoped to promote San Francisco as4
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the best place on the coast to start a business and raise a family.  When the United States
entered the Great War, the Chamber called on its members to demonstrate their patriotism
and willingness to make immediate sacrifices for future rewards.   For Chamber president
Frederick Koster, the community could only meet the nations’ needs if it were “run with
the utmost smoothness.”  That would require significant sacrifices from the city’s
businessmen.   “You are not a patriot – not worthy of the name of an American if you5
have not invested until it hurts.”  6
In bringing Ince to San Francisco, Chamber member Michael de Young was
investing – in his personal, business, and city’s reputation.  As owner of the San
Francisco Chronicle, De Young experienced the economic benefits and the difficulties
associated with running a business in wartime.  The influx of troops meant a growing
readership, but a reduction in supplies resulted in federal calls for paper conservation. 
This forced the Chronicle and other city papers to reduce the number of pages printed by
12.5 percent.   Some industries, like printing, faced uncertain times caused by wartime7
regulations, while other sectors profited by catering to the military’s needs and increased
Pacific trade.  In either case, San Francisco businessmen sought to portray themselves and
their companies as American patriots, making sacrifices for the greater good.  
De Young’s film drew national attention to San Francisco, fulfilling one of the
Chamber of Commerce’s goals during the war – displaying San Franciscans’ patriotism. 
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With a membership roster of almost 8,000, the San Francisco Chamber was the largest in
the country.  It used its size to promote the city while uniting the business community
behind a common vision of an urban metropolis.  The city’s businessmen, who
historically did not run for elected municipal office, used the Chamber to affect urban
change.   Besides advertising the city’s patriotism, the Chamber spent the war defending8
San Francisco’s business interests from Pacific Coast competitors.  To accomplish that
task, the Chamber had to take on the city’s labor unions.  The Chamber believed that as
long as businesses had to bow to union pressure and accept the closed shop policies of the
last decade, the city had no hope of luring businesses away from West Coast rivals like
Los Angeles.  The Chamber used its patriotic activities to justify its attacks on labor.  It
also explained the wartime profits of some of its members as the rewards of loyal service
to the nation. 
Not every businessman in San Francisco reaped huge financial gain during the
war.  Some had to sacrifice current profits for the sake of the war effort, hoping such acts
would result in future economic rewards.  In no area of the business sector was this more
true than in public eating establishments, including restaurants, hotel dining rooms, and
social clubs.  They faced the daunting task of adapting to the ever-changing Food
Administration’s edicts while keeping their businesses afloat.  One of the earliest
departments created by the California Food Administration was the Public Dining
Service, headed by Edward Benjamin, to coordinate food conservation by restauranteurs. 
Steven C. Levi, Committee of Vigilance: The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce Law and
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Benjamin encouraged public dining houses to pledge conservation of important food
items like beef, pork, wheat, and sugar.   Every establishment that accepted the9
restrictions received a replica of the Food Administration emblem for their front window
so that customers would know that their business was supporting federal policy.  10
Business without the insignia faced declining patronage as residents sought out patriotic
establishments. 
In early November 1917, San Francisco restaurants and hotels decided to take the
lead in adopting Food Administration guidelines, inaugurating Meatless Tuesdays and
Wheatless Wednesdays.  Rather than wait for the federal government to implement
restrictions, San Francisco eateries joined eastern cities, like New York, in professing
their patriotism by initiating voluntary action.   However, living up to the guidelines11
jeopardized the very existence of businesses dependent on providing customers with
products containing meat and wheat.  According to Edward Krehbiel in his report on the
California Food Administration, one San Francisco businessman with a roast beef stand
along the waterfront almost went out of business trying to live up to Meatless Tuesdays. 
To feed the more than two hundred workers who patronized his establishment at lunch,
the businessman replaced his standard fare with cheese, sardines, and jelly and served
Edward Krehbiel, Report of the United States Food Administration for California (typescript,
9
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double portions at the same price.   The businessman’s patrons continued to frequent the12
stand and luckily, Meatless Tuesday proved short-lived.  Thanks to a shortage of trains to
transport cattle from western ranches eastward, the Food Administration lifted the
restrictions on beef consumption for six western states in January 1918.  That summer,
the Food Administration simply suggested strict economy for beef rather than voluntary
elimination.13
Although beef became more plentiful at San Francisco eateries, the need to ship
tons of wheat and flour to France required tighter federal restrictions.  While individual
households were encouraged to conserve voluntarily, the federal and state Food
Administration carefully regulated public eating establishments.  Beginning January 28,
1918 wholesale suppliers for restaurants could not sell their clients any more wheat flour
than they sold them in wheat substitutes.  These alternatives included corn meal and corn
flour, barley flour, potato or sweet potato flour, rice flour and buckwheat flour.    The14
California Food Administration required bakers to substitute at least one-third of their
baking flour with the approved alternatives.  They could advertise their cakes, pies,
doughnuts, and pastries as “Victory Products” that could be sold on Wednesdays and
Wheatless Mondays.  Ralph Merritt reminded bakers that omitting regular flour was a
Edward Krehbiel, Report of the United States Food Administration for California (typescript,
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patriotic duty, but the restrictions were anything but voluntary.   The Food15
Administration mandated that hotels and restaurants using three or more barrels of wheat
flour a month obtain a license to purchase the commodity.   If an eatery failed to stick to16
Food Administration guidelines, licenses could be revoked.  As a result, hotels and
restaurants had to adopt all federal and state Food Administration directives or face losing
their license and their ability to do business.  By the end of the war, the number of
restrictions had increased.  This included providing Victory Breads that were no more
than two ounces, excluding wheat from all evening meals, and limiting wheat flour to six
pounds for every ninety meals served.   These restrictions required restaurants to make17
sure their bakers complied with these instructions.  Miscalculations in the amount of
wheat flour used could result in the Food Administration forcing the business to use all
substitutes.  In extreme cases, the Food Administration could revoke a baker’s license,
cutting off his access to supplies.
Unfortunately for San Francisco restaurants and cafes, wheat flour was not the
only commodity restricted by the Food Administration.  Due to the increased prosperity
tied to war production, people had more money for luxury items like candy and soft
drinks.  At the same time, America competed with its Allies for sugar from Cuba (which
suffered from a decrease in production) as Germany had cut off their trade with sugar
Ralph P. Merritt, 13 February 1918, Mrs. J. E. Thane Papers, Hoover Institution Archives,
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plantations in the East Indies.  The submarine attacks on cargo ships exacerbated the
situation in the Atlantic.   As a result, after May 15, 1918, the Food Administration18
began requiring certificates to purchase sugar.  Public eating places, to which the Food
Administration issued Class C certificates, could purchase three pounds of sugar for every
ninety meals.  Bakers, who held Class D certificates, could use 70 percent of the sugar
they had used during the same period in 1917.   With these restrictions, restaurants19
limited their patrons’ consumption of sugar or risked running out before they could
purchase another month’s supply.   An eating establishment without sugar would not be20
a popular place, and no sugar would also suggest a lack of loyalty to the nation.  
Therefore, city restaurants and bakeries had to alter their menus for the sake of the nation
and their businesses’ future.
Failure to comply with the Food Administration’s guidelines could also generate
negative publicity for San Francisco and its food service industry.  This led some of the
city’s leading café and restaurant owners to take a proactive stand.  They organized a
citywide jury of restauranteurs to monitor the city’s public dining halls to make sure all
followed the rules.  The jury investigated businesses and “tried” owners accused of
serving wheat beyond the Food Administration’s requirements.  The jury served as an
intermediary between the Food Administration and local businesses, providing
restauranteurs the opportunity to handle disloyal actions without government interference. 
The Bulletin (San Francisco), 2 July 1918, 9.
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When the jury found five restaurants guilty of serving wheat “without efficiency,” they
gave the businesses the option to close for two days or have their cases turned over to the
national Food Administration.  The Food Administration would impose more severe
penalties if it investigated and determined the business had violated the restrictions. 
When it acted against five other San Francisco bakeries for the same infraction, the
businesses were each closed for seven to fifteen days.  Such extended closings could put
the survival of a small firm in jeopardy.   The local food jury enabled San Francisco21
eateries to protect their own by limiting the severity of the punishment.  It also provided
peer pressure to keep everyone in line and prevent the stigma of disloyalty from
tarnishing the reputation of the city’s food service industry. 
San Francisco restauranteurs also worked together to educate themselves, their
employees, and their patrons regarding the most effective ways to handle the limitations
on sugar.   On July 15, 1918 some of the larger restaurants hosted an informational
meeting for the city’s food industry workers.  This gathering was part tutorial and part
patriotic rally.  Entertained by a jazz band, one thousand café, hotel, and restaurant
workers learned the importance of conserving sugar from Food Administration
representatives.  The goal was to provide the employees with the proper, Food
Administration-approved, responses to customer demands for more sugar.  This meeting,
according to journalist Oscar Ingels, placed every cook and waiter “in the first line of the
Food Administration trenches.”   They put the staff in charge of reminding residents the22
California Food Administration, “Official Food Bulletin,” 13 August 1918, Mrs. J. E. Thane
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important work of the consumer in wartime.  By explaining the reasons for their sacrifice,
the employees felt they had done their patriotic duty, appeased hungry customers, and
protected their employer from an investigation by the jury or the Food Administration. 
By working together, San Francisco’s food service industry upheld federal mandates and
gave credence to the idea that the city’s businessmen were loyal patriots who would
invest until it hurts.
Another government restriction affected restaurants whose location put them at a
geographic disadvantage.  The Selective Service Act prohibited the consumption of liquor
on military bases and prohibited anyone from selling liquor to a man in uniform.  In June
1918, President Wilson signed a law that closed all saloons, liquor-selling cafes, and
liquor stores within one-half mile of any base with more than one hundred fifty
garrisoned men.  More than one hundred saloons and cafes around the Presidio, Fort
Mason, Fort Scott, and Fort Miley were closed.  The Cliff House, owned by Adolph
Sutro's daughter Dr. Emma Merritt, was one of those within the zone around Fort Miley. 
John Farley, Cliff House manager, pledged to keep the downstairs facilities open for
visitors, but the upstair’s café had to close.  Farley admitted that the closing was “for the
good of the country,” but he, as did the reporter for the Bulletin, mourned the loss of one
of the “most celebrated and gayest original cafes in America.”   The federal government's23
wartime food and drink restrictions altered the way San Francisco restaurants and cafes
did business, if they were permitted to continue in business at all.  They could take solace
in knowing that the sacrifices they made during the war might lead to greater rewards in
The Bulletin (San Francisco), 13 July 1918, 24;  The Bulletin, 30 July 1918, 2.
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subsequent years.  Their fellow citizens would remember what businesses had complied
with federal authorities and frequent the establishments of those who had done their
patriotic duty.  The Chamber of Commerce could also use these displays of loyalty by San
Francisco restauranteurs in its booster campaign.  This campaign sought to advertise the
city's wartime efforts to national authorities.  The Chamber hoped such reminders would
sway the government to think of San Francisco when allocating military and civilian
contracts.  In expressing the patriotism of San Francisco businessmen, the Chamber noted
that other West Coast cities did not show the same concerted, effective action to comply
with federal mandates.
The Chamber considered one of the most important postwar federal projects to be
the construction of a port for the Navy’s Pacific fleet.  Chamber members agreed with
Mayor Rolph and other civic leaders that the war afforded San Francisco the opportunity
to demonstrate that it could meet the War Department’s needs.  No action would prove
that more, they felt, than helping the federal government finance the construction and
maintenance of Camp Fremont.  As the nation prepared to call the first wave of draftees
in the summer of 1917, communities vied for the right to host a new military training
camps.  Each city, and its patriotic wealthy backers, promised land to the War
Department, knowing that in return the government and its soldiers would financially
give back to the community.  On June 28, a committee of businessmen met with Mayor
Rolph and offered the War Department a one year free lease of land near Palo Alto. 
Three prominent San-Francisco commercial leaders promised that their companies would
donate the essentials for the camp.  S. P. Eastman of the Spring Valley Water Company
149
vouched for an ample water supply for the camp.  John A. Britton, President of Pacific
Gas & Electric, assured the camp sufficient gas and electricity.  E. D. Leavitt,
representing William Sproule of the Southern Pacific Railroad, guaranteed spur lines to
connect the camp to San Francisco.   24
San Diego and Los Angeles also placed bids for army cantonments.  Los Angeles
promoted its city as more suitable for an encampment by highlighting San Francisco’s
reputation for open acceptance of vice.  One hundred Los Angles businessmen sent
telegrams to Congressmen urging them to reject San Francisco’s proposal because
soldiers “would be debauched.  Moral conditions were so bad in and around San
Francisco, the telegrams declared, that soldiers could not be near this city and remain
uncontaminated.”   Some residents of Palo Alto worried about the moral conditions, but25
their concern was with soldiers encouraging the coeds at Stanford University to engage in
immoral behavior.  Despite such concerns, local opposition to the camp was limited.  26
Most residents perceived the training camps as an economic blessing.  The camp would
symbolize the region’s patriotism and provide recruits from the Pacific Coast with a
training facility close to home.  It would also be a financial windfall for local businesses
who would profit from the money soldiers spent.  
Los Angeles’ attacks on San Francisco’s moral fitness did not prevent the War
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24
Town Talk: The Pacific Weekly (San Francisco), 14 July 1917, 14.
25
The Argonaut (Berekley), 14 July 1917, 18.  The Argonaut reported two months later that one
26
man near Menlo Park had asked the court for an injunction against the training camp construction, but that
appears to have been denied.  The Argonaut, 1 September 1917, 130.
150
Department from accepting San Francisco’s proposal in July 1917, designating the camp
for the Forty-First Division, National Guard.  The government did reject the city’s
original land offer near Mayfield for a more suitable, and less costly, piece of real estate
adjacent to Menlo Park.  Leasing the land, approximately 7,200 acres, cost around
$150,000.  The government expected San Francisco and the other communities on the
Peninsula to raise the money for the lease while the government allocated more than $1
million for camp construction.  San Francisco’s Lindgren & Company received the War
Department’s construction contract and at the height of construction, 1,800 laborers from
the area worked to ready the camp for the soldiers.   The importance of this encampment27
to the commercial elite of San Francisco is evidenced in the fact that, in late July, the
Chamber of Commerce dispatched its vice president, Robert Newton Lynch, to
Washington to keep the project on track.  28
Despite Lynch’s efforts, the construction of the camp did not go smoothly and at
one point it did not look like soldiers would ever train at Camp Fremont.  On August 23,
after the government had expended most of its budget on the project, the War Department
ordered the Forty-First National Guard Division to head for Charlotte, North Carolina.  29
The same day, the government suspended all work at Camp Fremont and sent the workers
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home.   Newspapers in San Francisco reported that the military would abandon the30
camp, and writers at The Argonaut vented their frustration by attacking those they blamed
for this embarrassment to the city.  They chastised Mayor Rolph for his inability to raise
the $150,000 promised to lease the land quickly.  They speculated that Rolph’s ties to the
city’s unions prevented him from fraternizing with the city’s wealthy elite, who had
initially promised the funds. The magazine also accused Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels of pressuring the War Department to give his home state of North Carolina a
training camp at the expense of San Francisco.   In articulating the reasons they believed31
work had ended at Camp Fremont, the magazine touched on two common fears San
Franciscans frequently contemplated during the war.  One was the inability of the city’s
factions to work together for the greater good and the other was the possibility that the
city would not appear attractive enough to compete with other cities for federal dollars. 
In reality, the problem was the State Board of Health’s rejection of the drainage system at
the camp and the War Department’s decision to send the Forty-First Division to France as
quickly as possible.  In mid-September, construction resumed when the government
announced a new order for four million feet of lumber to complete the camp’s
construction.   Less than a week later, the War Department ordered the transfer of five32
infantry regiments from the Presidio to Camp Fremont when laborers finished the
The Daily News, 23 August 1917, 2.
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construction work.   Due to cramped condition at the Presidio, the 8  Infantry regiment33 th
arrived at Camp Fremont in late September and began getting the camp ready for the first
wave of the Selective Service Act’s draftees.
Those draftees were slow to arrive.  While The Argonaut incorrectly blamed the
work stoppage in August 1917 on Rolph’s failure to raise the promised funds, Rolph and
the Chamber of Commerce were to blame for the delays in troops deployment to Camp
Fremont in the fall of 1917.  The city had not raised the money necessary for the land
lease and less than twenty-five businessmen had donated funds to complete the sewer
work.   The War Department refused to move more soldiers until the land they needed34
for training had been assured and the sewer work completed.   On November 27,35
Frederick Koster urged members of the Chamber of Commerce to organize a Camp
Fremont Fund Committee, consisting of one hundred businessmen, to take care of this
threat to the city’s reputation.   Within minutes, the businessmen donated $10,000 and36
organized to raise the rest.  The Daily News editor and president Eugene MacLean
insisted it would “look mighty odd” if the city “should fall down flat on its share of the
bargain after inviting the government to settle near the city.  “It will be downright poor
business if San Francisco lets that camp be abandoned,” MacLean declared, “and rather
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33
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doubtful patriotism.”   37
Not only did the lack of funds call residents’ patriotism into question, many feared
it would negatively affect San Francisco’s chances of getting a larger share of the
military’s resources in the future.  Colonel Richard Park of the Army’s Engineer Corps
compared San Francisco’s slow response to that of the other West Coast cities with Army
camps.  San Diego had already raised enough money to give the Army 8,000 acres rent
free for five years and Tacoma $70,000 for one year.    The Chamber’s Camp Fremont38
Committee presented their case to the businessmen as vital to the city and their individual
pocketbooks.  Committee chair John Britton urged his fellow businessmen to subscribe
“not only as a patriotic duty but from a sound business standpoint.”  Articles in the
Chamber’s Activities sounded nothing like the emotional, patriotic pleas for sacrificial
donations found during the Red Cross and Liberty Loan Drives.  The articles described
Camp Fremont as an essential component in San Francisco’s economic future.  They
described Camp Fremont as the city’s financial responsibility and that if businessmen
failed to see that duty fulfilled the War Department would take its business elsewhere. 
By this time, Camp Kearny was fully operational and one million dollars a month went
from the soldiers into the hands of San Diego businessmen.  While Britton encouraged
San Franciscans to “give cheerfully,” his message reflected an underlying fear that San
Francisco was in danger of failing to keep economic pace with its urban rivals.   39
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By early January 1918, the Chamber’s Camp Fremont Committee, with help from
the Rotary Club, raised approximately $125,000 of the city’s promised contribution to the
cantonment.   Each subscriber to the Camp Fremont Fund received a placard that40
depicted a soldier, the American flag, and a picture of John Charles Fremont for whom
the camp was named.   Such illustrated cards enabled businessmen to display their41
patriotism in their front window for all potential clients and customers – particularly the
newly arrived soldiers – to see.   With the bulk of the money raised, the army moved
several additional regiments from the Presidio to Camp Fremont in January 1918.  42
However, not everything turned out as advertised by the Chamber’s Camp Fremont Fund
Committee.  The Chamber of Commerce acknowledged that they never met the $150,000
goal, falling $10,000 short, but it never explained this failure.    The delays in completing43
the camp and collecting the funds meant that Camp Fremont never achieved maximum
capacity.  Although the camp could hold up to forty-thousand men, at its peak in the
summer of 1918 Camp Fremont had only twenty-seven thousand.  Most of those trained
at Camp Fremont were members of the 8  (“Golden Arrow”) Division.  This divisionth
began leaving  Camp Fremont in August 1918 for Siberia and the army did not add
significantly to Camp Fremont’s troop levels after that.    44
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Despite falling short of their intended goals, the businessmen of San Francisco
and the surrounding communities profited from the troops stationed at Camp Fremont.  A
number of Menlo Park store owners rented space to San Francisco merchants so they
could ply their wares closer to camp.  These included at least three candy shops, four
cafes, two photo studios, two jewelry shops, a French laundry, and a storefront for San
Francisco’s United Cigar Company.  Newsboys delivered four of the five major San
Francisco newspapers daily to the camp to provide men with information regarding
“things for them to do in their off duty time” in San Francisco.  For men who wanted to
partake in what the city had to offer, jitney drivers charged soldiers on leave a dollar a
piece for a ride from camp to Market and Fifth Street, twenty-four hours a day.    For45
soldiers who did not need to get to town (or back to camp) immediately, Southern Pacific
ran regularly scheduled service from Camp Fremont to San Francisco, charging soldiers
$1.10 round trip.  San Francisco’s Civic League of Improvement Clubs and Associations
urged Southern Pacific to lower fares to encourage more men to venture up to the city.  46
While Southern Pacific refused, arguing the rates were comparable to those provided
between Camp Kearny and San Diego, it did eventually establish three special trains from
the camp to the San Francisco depot at Third and Townsend.   47
The importance of Camp Fremont to the San Francisco business community, and
their significance in calling the camp into existence, is evident in the program printed for
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the camp’s Patriotic Song Festival on June 9, 1918.  On the page of “Patrons and
Patronesses,” twenty-two of thirty-five couples listed held strong ties to the business
interests of San Francisco.  The list included the presidents or owners of four San
Francisco newspapers: R. A. Crother (Bulletin), M. H. DeYoung (Chronicle), F. W.
Kellogg (Call & Post), and Eugene MacLean (Daily News); bankers William H. Crocker,
Herbert Fleishhacker, and I.W. Hellman, Jr.; and wealthy San Francisco patrons W. Mayo
Newhall, George A. Pope, and James L. Flood.   Camp Fremont provided the city’s48
wealthy elite the opportunity to express their loyalty to the nation and promote their own
businesses.  It also gave San Francisco boosters a chance to show the federal government
that San Franciscans could stand united to take care of the War Department’s financial
and logistical needs.  The fact that the Chamber, Mayor Rolph, and city as a whole failed
to raise the money cast doubt on their ability to follow through with their promises. 
Nevertheless, the Chamber and city leaders considered the construction of the base and its
housing of thousands of men a successful showing of their city’s eagerness to work with
the War Department.   
Furnishing services to the men at Camp Fremont was only one way San Francisco
businessmen took advantage of the increased wartime needs of the military.  The
Quartermaster depot at Fort Mason was charged with providing the food and basic
supplies needed by approximately 150,000 men stationed in the Twelfth Army District
during the war.  Fort Mason sent out weekly notices, reprinted in the Chamber’s
Program “For the Boys at Camp Fremont: Mammoth Patriotic Song Festival,” Jeffrey Schweitzer
48
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publication, with a list of items required by the growing number of soldiers in the district. 
This list included subsistence goods, much of which went through San Francisco
wholesalers on its way from farms to military encampments.  Fort Mason also needed
various miscellaneous supplies (things like drawing ink, needles, scissors, and laundry
soap) that it procured from commercial firms in the area when they could not obtain them
directly from the manufacturer.  Eastern depots quickly went through their supplies of
uniforms and field equipment, and no factory on the West Coast had ever manufactured
Army apparel before.  Therefore, Fort Mason accepted bids from companies willing to
produce the Army’s wool uniforms, as well as denim and cotton clothing, and eventually
contracted with ten businesses in its district.  San Francisco manufacturers won four of
those contracts, twice as many as its nearest competitor, Seattle.  By the end of the war,
the Quartermaster depot had placed 20,000 purchase orders and contracts.   The limited49
number of manufacturing facilities in San Francisco meant that the city could not supply
all of the Army’s needs.  Companies in Los Angeles, Tacoma, Portland, Spokane, and
Seattle benefitted from military contracts.  However, the speed with which goods from
local businesses could reach the depot gave San Francisco businessmen an advantage
over their manufacturing rivals elsewhere.
While some San Francisco companies produced the field equipment for the
district’s soldiers, others received contracts to construct the ships to transport the men and
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protect them on their voyage to the battlefield.  Union Iron Works of San Francisco,
owned by Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, received government contracts for twelve
submarines in May 1917.  This contract required company president John McGregor to
make a quick trip east to get the tools and equipment necessary to expand his company’s
production capacity.  This expansion required the construction of a new machine shop
and $1 million in equipment expenditures.  Union’s expansion continued in early 1918
when the Navy Department took possession of the old Risdon Iron Works and turned it
over to McGregor so that his company would have the space needed to construct torpedo
boat destroyers.  In commemoration of Independence Day in 1918, Bethlehem’s two San
Francisco shipyards, along with its Alameda plant and two Oakland shipyards, launched
seventeen vessels in a single day – the most in the Bay’s history to date.  Each of the
Bethlehem plants launched four destroyers, but the Union plant held the distinction of
launching the most tonnage in one day of any yard in the nation.   In 1918, the shipyards
in San Francisco Bay launched sixty-four ships, almost half the total number of vessels
constructed on the West Coast that year.  
 San Francisco newspapers publicized such statistics as evidence of San
Francisco’s strength, ignoring the performance of residents and businessmen from the
East Bay.  “If the world were a Cyclops, its single eye would be turned on San Francisco
today,” The Bulletin declared.  The Chamber of Commerce, on the other hand, conceded
the fact that only two of the eight shipbuilding plants were located within the confines of
San Francisco.  However, the Chamber still incorporated the number of ships constructed
in the entire Bay area when in sought to prove San Francisco’s dominance on the West
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Coast.  The Chamber boasted that San Francisco (like The Bulletin omitting the word
Bay) had successfully constructed 40 percent of the steel vessels built on the Pacific
Coast, more than the output of Oregon and Washington combined and “more than two-
thirds the number being built in other California Yards.”    The Chamber’s inclusion of50
the figures from the East Bay shipbuilding yards, while excluding the cities themselves,
reflected the conflicting images of San Francisco and whom the city represented.  On the
one hand, cities like Oakland and Alameda were rivals, drawing industries and residents
away from San Francisco.  On the other, the successes of those cities had to be included if
city boosters wanted to put San Francisco head and shoulders above its rivals in Los
Angeles, Seattle, and Portland.
 To maintain its competitiveness, San Franciscans needed to seek out new
economic opportunities aggressively before they fell into the hands of other coastal
metropolises, whether across the Bay or down the coast.  Dominance in international
trade, long a source of pride for San Francisco, was one area businessmen could not take
for granted during the war.  San Francisco had profited from the disruption of European
trade with Asia and the Pacific since 1914.  That year, the value of imports and exports
through San Francisco was $80 million and $64 million respectively.  By the time the
U.S. declared war, the value of exports had doubled and imports had risen 68 percent. 
The trade values continued to rise, each surpassing $200 million by the end of 1918.  
While the trade with China and Japan remained relatively steady, the greatest
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growth resulted in new commercial ventures with other areas of the Pacific Rim, most
notably the Dutch East Indies and Australia.  The value of exports to Australia tripled
from January 1917 to December 1918 as San Francisco businessmen filled the gap left by
British merchants unable to get ships or supplies to that part of the commonwealth.   The51
Dutch East Indies, with its tobacco, cane sugar, copra, and hardwoods, also emerged as a
new area for San Francisco trade in large part because of the war.  Before 1913, the Bay
Area averaged only one Dutch ship a year, loaded with sugar from Java.  Cut off from
traditional markets in late 1914, the Dutch turned to the American West Coast.  In 1916
San Francisco welcomed eighteen Dutch ships with 200,000 tons of goods, worth
approximately $5 million.  In just the first month of American participation in the war,
the city’s newspapers reported twelve steamers en route from Batavia to San Francisco.  
By the end of the year, Dutch imports surpassed $40 million.    52
Businessmen realized, however, that such wartime gains could prove short-lived,
as they found out with Russia.  When the U.S. declared war, the government confiscated
German ships previously interned in American ports to protect neutrality.  In June 1917,
the government gave shipping interests – like San Francisco-based Pacific Mail
Steamship Company and Dollar Company – the right to use these ships to transport
railroad equipment and machinery “for the rehabilitation of Russia.”  San Francisco
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served as the center for this Russian trade and a number of German ships underwent
repairs at the Union Iron Works shipyard, having been scuttled by their crew before
American confiscation.   After the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917, the trade53
quickly dried up.  San Francisco merchants shipped $1.3 million in goods to Russia in
1917, compared with $63,000 the following year.   Such precipitous declines in trade54
could also happen in areas of the Pacific Rim traditionally beholden to European
colonizers once the war ended.  Recognizing that the wartime trading boom could lead to
a postwar bust, the Chamber and others sought to secure San Francisco’s interests and
establish new partnerships before the end of the war in hopes of holding off foreign and
regional competition.  
To save San Francisco’s future trade networks, the Chamber sought to protect
wartime gains from federal intervention.  When the War Trade Board added copra (dried
coconut kernels whose oil served as a substitute for fat in manufactured goods like soap)
to their list of restricted imports, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce launched a
protest campaign.  In letters to the War Trade Board, various members argued that the
copra trade was vital to San Francisco shipping interests.  Copra provided lumber-filled
ships going to the South Sea Islands with a product that they could transport back to San
Francisco rather than inefficiently run with an empty vessel.  The Chamber also had
evidence that Japanese firms were making deals with Central and South American
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53
The San Francisco Call and Post, 27 June 1917, 1-2;  San Francisco Chamber of Commerce,
54
Seventh Annual Statistical Report of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce for the Year Ending
December 31, 1918 (San Francisco:  Publicity Department, 1918), 14-15.
162
companies to ship Oriental goods that they could not sell in the U.S. due to the wartime
embargo.  The Chamber urged the War Trade Board not to put too many restrictions on
U.S. trade or Japan would seize control of Pacific markets, reducing San Francisco’s
chances of expanding trade with South America in the future.  The pressure from
individual businesses and the Chamber of Commerce, along with copra’s multiple uses as
a substitute, caused the War Trade Board to reverse its decision.  Only a few weeks after
initiating the ban on copra, the WTB dropped it from the list of banned imports.  55
The Chamber also attempted to reduce the negative impact of the U.S. Shipping
Board’s rulings on San Francisco trade.  Soon after the war declaration, the Shipping
Board began commandeering steamships and other vessels.  Citing wartime necessity, the
government could commandeer any ship for its use.   In late October 1918, those in San56
Francisco’s import and export businesses saw the commandeering of the Pacific Mail
Company’s steamships Venezuela and Santa Cruz as a serious threat to the passenger and
freight lines between San Francisco and Asia.  The Chamber of Commerce’s committee
on foreign trade tried to convince the Shipping Board to reverse its decision to seize the
two ships.  It raised six objections, including the possible loss of trade to other countries,
the “serious curtailment” of tax revenue that would weaken the federal government’s
ability to fund the war, and freight congestion that would undermine war efficiency.  The
Chamber also insisted that Pacific Coast shipping companies had already sacrificed their
fair share.  They had constructed half the nation’s new naval vessels on the West Coast,
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preventing production of new boats for the commercial fleet.  Left with aging ships
requiring repairs, companies now had to worry about losing those vessels too.  The
Chamber noted that the federal government threatened to destroy the “present and future
prosperity of this Coast.”  The Chamber was not the only one to recognize the danger. 
Approximately two hundred individuals and businesses sent telegrams of protest to the
Shipping Board and to California’s senators and congressmen regarding the matter.   57
The war ended within weeks of this dispute over the confiscation of the Pacific
Mail’s vessels, but the uproar it caused, along with the copra import debate, illustrates a
strong movement within the business community to challenge the federal government’s
wartime mandates.  Individual businessmen were willing to sacrifice to help the nation
win the war – buying bonds, contributing to the Camp Fremont fund, and encouraging
valuable employees to enlist.  However, they expected these sacrifices to pay off in the
long term.  When the restrictions on trade appeared to threaten the future of San
Francisco’s shipping industry, businessmen did not hesitate to express their opposition to
federal authorities.  While serving the nation was important, they did not believe they
were disloyal in protecting San Francisco’s economic interests and future economic
potential.  
Not only did city businessmen worry about federal restrictions undermining their
ability to import and export goods, they also had to compete with other Pacific Coast
cities vying for a piece of the foreign markets.  In this area, San Francisco’s foreign
tradesmen perceived their greatest rival to be Seattle.  Compared with other West Coast
 San Francisco Chronicle, 2 November 1918, 14.
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ports, Seattle’s share of the markets had grown exponentially in just a few years.  In 1910,
San Francisco shipped 36 percent more tonnage than Seattle.  When the shipping figures
for 1917 were released, San Franciscans discovered that for the first time Seattle had
handled more shipping tons than San Francisco.  The gap between San Francisco and
Seattle grew wider in 1918 when Seattle’s shipping tonnage was 125 percent higher than
San Francisco.  R. H. Swayne, a city shipping broker, tried to calm concerns about Seattle
by emphasizing that Seattle’s growth lay in its shipping of war materials and supplies
rather than goods more commonly in demand in peacetime.  Swayne perceived San
Francisco’s growth to be the result of carefully planned relationships with merchants in
Asia, the South Pacific, Australia, the Philippines, and the East Indies.  Such
development of trade networks would build permanent ties with Pacific rim governments
and industries that would quickly surpass Seattle’s temporary wartime advantages.   58
Despite such optimistic predictions, maintaining and expanding foreign trade
relations increasingly took on an air of urgency by the end of the war.  Captain Robert
Dollar urged San Franciscans in July 1918 to begin thinking ahead to foreign business
ventures they could cultivate after the war.  “San Francisco must prepare for the fiercest
competition it has ever known once the war is over,” Dollar declared.   The Civic League59
of Improvement Clubs agreed.  The League urged its members, and those of the Chamber,
to pursue every way San Francisco could retain “the prestige of the greatest maritime port
on the Pacific Ocean.”  Unlike Swayne and Dollar, the League did not suggest measuring
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San Francisco achievements based on its ability to surpass Seattle in shipping tonnage. 
Perhaps League members understood that growing Pacific markets meant greater
competition from all West Coast cities with decent harbors, not just Seattle.  By following
Swayne and Dollar’s advice, San Francisco might grab a significant portion of this
shipping fortune, but it would always have to share.  Instead, the Civic League sought a
way San Francisco could sustain a unique maritime identity, one that designated it as the
dominant city on the West Coast.  The Civic League believed this could be accomplished
if the city could entice the War Department to make San Francisco the headquarters of the
Navy’s Pacific Fleet.  It urged San Franciscans to participate in its lobbying campaign to
convince the California legislature to pass an enabling act.  This would allow for the
creation of a commission to prepare a plan to turn San Francisco’s Hunter’s Point into an
attractive harbor capable of serving as the Navy’s headquarters.  60
Despite growing fears regarding the city’s future after the war, many San
Francisco businessmen prospered because of increased trade and expansion of industrial
production that fulfilled government demands.  This helped to swell the holdings of the
city’s banking houses.   The four Liberty Loan drives also helped to expand the holdings
of these banks.  When the government announced its intention to initiate the Liberty Loan
in April 1917, banking institutions rushed to advertise subscriptions to their patrons. 
Isaias W. Hellman, president of Wells Fargo-Nevada National Bank and board chairman
of the Union Trust Company of San Francisco (as well as the Farmers and Merchants




Bank of Los Angeles), promised the directors of both companies that he would make sure
their banks subscribed “liberally” to the loan and Hellman distributed circulars in which
he encouraged clients and shareholders to “permit their subscription to pass through this
Bank, thus enabling us to subscribe for a large block of the war loan.”   The Bond &61
Goodwin branch at 454 California Street mailed postcards to customers announcing its
“pleasure in placing at your disposal all the facilities of our organization, either in
securing prompt information regarding this loan or in attending to the details of your
subscription.”   62
The Bank of California also used mailers to pressure patrons to contribute,
reminding them that “everyone is expected to do his or her share.”  Along with the letter,
the Bank of California included a blank Treasury Department bond application that the
bank recommended that patrons fill out and mail back to the bank “because you are on
the list and the authorities in charge of the distribution want to know what you do.”  63
Although there was no legal penalty for not buying government bonds, the Bank of
California’s letter suggested that San Francisco’s wealthy elite had a responsibility to
purchase bonds.  The proper authorities would know if, and how much, they contributed. 
Such information might finds its way into print and if that happened they could face
public ridicule and social embarrassment.  Worse, it could negatively affect their
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economic and political prospects.  No one would want to associate with disloyal
businessmen. Voluntary investment was a far more attractive option.
Banks also had economic incentives to promote government bonds aggressively. 
According to Hellman, failure to make liberal subscriptions to the Liberty Bond drive
might result in fewer government deposits in the future.   The bankers who generously64
contributed might also receive immediate rewards.  Hellman’s Wells Fargo-Nevada
National Bank oversubscribed its portion of the loan by 133 percent.    As a result,65
Hellman received personal letters from both the president of the San Francisco Federal
Reserve Bank, Archibald Kains, and Treasury Secretary William McAdoo thanking him
for “unswerving loyalty, enthusiasm and industry.”   For his efforts, Hellman received66
personal praise and a seat on the Liberty Loan Advisory Council for the Twelfth Federal
District while his banks experienced financial benefits.   The people coming into the67
bank to buy bonds also conducted other transactions and business customers frequently
required advice on such “war-time perplexities” as how much merchandise to hold and
the impact of possible price regulations.  As a result, the bank increased its customer base
and financial assets.  The bank also invested in the Liberty Bonds, purchasing $3 million
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in the third and fourth drives in 1918.  The 4.5 percent per annum interest on the bonds
meant future profits for the bank.   In a letter to Kains, Hellman humbly expressed his68
belief that he was simply doing his “duty towards our country and our government in the
Liberty loan matter.”   Nevertheless, Hellman also improved the economic conditions of69
Wells Fargo and the other banks under his guidance in San Francisco and Los Angeles by
advertising the bond drives and contributing time and money to the cause.
While Hellman urged his banks’ patrons and employees to invest in bonds, he also
demanded that the banks under his control be cautious.  The war created uncertainty in
the money markets, which reduced the willingness of bankers to take risks.  In late 1917
Hellman chastised the loan officers at Farmers and Merchants in Los Angeles for being
“very liberal in making loans.  I think money will become more stringent and I advise
going slow.”  He ordered bank workers not to allow their cash reserves to dip lower than
their current mark.  In these unpredictable times, Hellman wanted to prepare his banks for
whatever the government might require next of its financial institutions.   As government70
restrictions on certain industries tightened in early 1918, combined with the drive for the
third Liberty Bond, Hellman insisted that “it behooves us to be careful and conservative. 
Avoid all business of a speculative nature even to good clients and be ready to assist our
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Government when called upon.  Such should be our aim while the War lasts.”   By the71
summer of 1918, Hellman reported to the Wells Fargo directors that the bank was no
longer opening new accounts that required large lines of credit and was only offering
loans to regular customers who required “temporary financing for absolutely necessary
business needs.”   This conservative fiscal policy was not limited to the banks under I.72
W. Hellman’s management.  Hellman reported to an individual in Los Angeles inquiring
into San Francisco’s loan policies that there were no savings banks in the city “taking
mortgages on outside property at present.  Loanable funds have become quite scarce on
account of our Government requirements.”73
Despite Hellman’s worries about the wartime financial markets, his banks
experienced tremendous growth.  At the end of 1916, the Well Fargo-Nevada National
Bank holdings stood at a little less than $44.5 million.  By September 11, 1917, the bank
held deposits of a little more than $53 million, which Hellman recognized as “by far the
highest point in our history.”   By the end of the year, the figure was more than $5574
million and by the end of June 1918 close to $57 million.   This trend was consistent75
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with banks across the city, which registered $1.1 billion more in October 1917 than they
had at the same time in 1916.   This growth translated into an increase in Wells Fargo-76
Nevada’s yearly earnings, which rose from $464,884 in 1916 to $705, 213 at the end of
1917.  Hellman attributed this growth to war-related factors, including the demands of
clients who held large government contracts, government expenditures, and the need to
conserve rather than spend profits on luxuries.   77
The need for more customer service representatives required Wells Fargo-Nevada
to hire seventy-four additional employees in 1917, most of them women.  Wartime profits
paid for the construction of an additional floor at the bank’s Montgomery and Market
Street headquarters.  Administration offices were moved to the new floor to make more
room for customer relations on the lower floors.   The war required Hellman and the78
banks he managed to work diligently to provide services to patrons and meet the federal
government’s monetary demands.  At the same time, their wartime expansion made
apparent San Francisco’s continued strength in the financial sector.  For a city seeking to
identify itself as superior to its economic rivals, the wealth stored in San Francisco’s
banks – and the commercial relationships that represented – served as an important
indicator of continued economic strength.
While the Chamber advertised the financial successes of its members and
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promoted the present and future potential of the city, they sought to defend their class
interests from attacks by San Francisco’s labor unions.  The wartime profits earned by
businessmen like Isaias Hellman and shipping operator Robert Dollar made them
susceptible to attacks that the Great War, like previous conflicts, was a rich man’s war
and a poor man’s fight.  On several occasions in the early months of the war, union
leaders published articles comparing the city’s businessmen with Germany’s Junker class,
expressing their perception that neither nations’ economic elite functioned with the best
interests of their country in mind.  Editor Olaf Tveitmoe frequently attacked the city’s
businessmen for considering their money and their land more sacred than the lives of
their employees – both in the factory and on the front lines.   79
Such attacks reflected growing tension between San Francisco’s businessmen and
the city’s labor unions.  This conflict, dormant during the PPIE, erupted in June 1916
when the city’s longshoremen had gone on strike, the first significant walkout since the
exposition.  In response, the Chamber of Commerce created a subcommittee known as
the Law and Order Committee.  The Law and Order Committee began as a five-person
subcommittee whose creation was approved by two thousand merchants, ostensibly to
quell violence associated with the longshoremen’s strike.  The Chamber’s Board of
Directors, however, had been contemplating action against the city’s unions for months
and the three stated goals of the Law and Order Committee reflected the long-term plan
of the Board.  They charged the Committee with the “maintenance of law and order” and
creating a business atmosphere in San Francisco that supported “contractual relations”
Organized Labor, 28 April 1917, 5;  Organized Labor, 12 May 1917, 1.
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and the “principle of the Open Shop.”   80
This mission might have gone unredeemed if the Committee had collapsed after
the longshoremen strike ended a week later, but the Preparedness Day bombing served as
Koster’s justification for expanding the Committee (see Chapters One and Five).  On July
26, 1916, six-thousand businessmen voted to increase the size of the Committee to one
hundred, “picked from the best stock San Francisco could produce in an hour of need.” 
The men selected were business leaders from the wealthiest families in San Francisco,
including William H. Crocker, A. P. Giannini, Jesse Lilienthal, William Sproule, and
Isaias Hellman, Jr.  The fear of further bombings created an atmosphere much like the
one that fostered San Francisco’s 1856 vigilante movement.  In both cases, businessmen
depicted their opposition as dangerous criminals bent on the moral and physical
destruction of San Francisco.  
The Law and Order Committee did not limit its attacks to radicals like Warren
Billings and Thomas Mooney, the men indicted for the bombing.  The Committee
depicted any labor union that denied the right of employers to choose their own workers
as part of a conspiracy to intimidate the city’s businesses with violence and anarchy.  By
labeling unions as antithetical to law and order, at a time when many in San Francisco
feared for their safety, the Chamber managed to win enough support to kill a culinary
craft strike in the fall of 1916.  They also lent financial support to the Retail Lumber
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Dealers Association and the city’s steel operators who both faced walkouts on the heels
of the longshoremen strike.  The Chamber’s financial assistance, along with the Law and
Order’s passionate ads that portrayed the employers as the victims struggling against
union tyranny, eventually forced retail lumber employees and steel workers to call off
their strikes.  As with the culinary workers, the lumbermen and steel workers failed to
secure union recognition and employers were free to hire non-union employees.   The81
Chamber effectively harnessed the public’s fear of radicalism in its drive to destroy
unionization efforts in the fall of 1916.  
The Chamber and its one hundred man Law and Order Committee used the
charged atmosphere to develop two initiative petitions that would curtail labor activities. 
The initiatives, one that made picketing illegal and the other requiring street speakers to
obtain a city permit, passed by slim margins in November 1916.  In both cases, working-
class districts rejected the measures 2-to-1 while the Committee’s campaign resonated
strongly with the wealthy of Pacific Heights and Nob Hill and modest support from the
middle class in the city’s western districts.  While campaigning for the measures, the
Chamber encouraged businessmen to join the association.  In the past, the Chamber had
advertised itself to businessmen as way to make social and economic connections and
promote their industries.  Now, the Chamber sent out six hundred members to canvass the
city, encouraging owners of small and medium-sized businesses to join as a way to save
their businesses from union domination.   In reaching out to entrepreneurs who had seen
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the Chamber as a haven for the elite, the Chamber united many in the business
community, expanding their membership roster from 2,474 to 7,940 by November 1916.  82
Such a precipitous increase, combined with the unifying goals of the Law and Order
Committee, meant that the city’s labor unions would face a more powerful opposition in
the coming years.  In winning its initiatives and quashing the strikes of 1916, the
Chamber showed that organized effort on the part of business leaders could undermine
labor’s strength.  
By the time the United States entered the Great War, a jury had convicted both
Billings and Mooney, sentencing the former to life and the latter to death.  Although San
Francisco unions placed considerable distance between themselves and the convicted
bombers, the Chamber continued to drum up support for its open shop plan by using
residents’ fears of more terrorist attacks sparked by labor unrest.  Federal and state
crackdowns on union radicals prevented the Committee from assuming a role as law
enforcers as the vigilantes of 1856 had done.  However, in portraying itself as a defender
of law and order, the Committee developed the discourse necessary to overthrow labor’s
power in San Francisco.  During and after the war, the Chamber of Commerce succeeded
in establishing or maintaining the open shop when it could convince San Franciscans that
unions were dangerous to the city’s economic future and traitors to their city and nation.  
This advantage was greatest when San Francisco’s labor unions engaged in strikes
that escalated into violence.  The Committee’s campaign against the closed shop waned
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until August 1917 when the bastion of the open shop, United Railroads, needed its help. 
The men employed by United Railroads were attempting union organization and initiated
a walk out.  Just as it had before, the Law and Order Committee condemned city leaders
for failing to provide adequate law enforcement personnel and vowed to lead the charge
to protect United Railroad employees and patrons from violent attacks by striking
workers.  After someone killed a U.R. strikebreaker on August 23, the Committee issued
a public statement attacking Mayor Rolph for failure to perform his sworn duty to protect
his constituents.  Koster did not threaten action against the popular mayor, but did
demand that Rolph act to prevent violence.  In describing the strike, Koster and the Law
and Order Committee portrayed United Railroad’s president Jesse. W. Lilienthal and his
strikebreakers as the victims.  They insisted that U.R. had gone to great expense to import
competent operators who were unarmed, and therefore the strikebreakers were the
murderers.  83
Despite Rolph’s calls for peace, the violence continued throughout September and
the Committee mobilized many of the city’s business clubs and associations to denounce
the failures of the municipal government in allowing the lawlessness to continue.  They
promised funds and personal service to “protect our city.”  Although they never overtly
expressed a patriotic message, they labeled the strikers as a lawless element, reminding
residents of the radicals and anarchists currently held by federal authorities in local and
national I.W.W. raids.  While law enforcement was evidently handling the I.W.W.




situation, the Committee believed that the U.R. strike injured San Francisco’s national
reputation.  The Committee and its supporters insisted that if municipal officials refused
to act, the Committee would have to assume control in order “to show that our citizens do
not countenance these acts and that they will take steps to stop them in the future.”   The84
Committee feared that the lack of action would damage the city’s economic future.  If the
Carmen’s Union closed another industry, it would make it more difficult to attract
businessmen who would prefer Los Angeles’ open shop policy.  
Mayor Rolph retorted that the Law and Order Committee did nothing but stir up
“industrial unrest and class hatred” and compared Koster to the Russian tsar.   Rolph did
not believe that the strength of the city’s unions would affect future business prospects –
the continued existence of a private railroad company in San Francisco would.  While the
striking carmen had support from individuals like Mayor Rolph, they failed to get union
recognition.  Many men returned to work after a month of unemployment, realizing that
U.R. was easily replacing them with strikebreakers.   Lilienthal recruited more than one
thousand strikebreakers.  He banned them from carrying weapons, lending credence to the
Committee’s claims that these were peaceful professionals.  As a result, the strike slowly
died and by early December the Carmen’s Union turned in its charter.   U.R., with the85
support of the Law and Order Committee, maintained the open shop principle.  It had also
helped to continue the debate over which organizations in San Francisco had the best
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interest of the city’s economic future at heart.  While many residents had supported the
Carmen’s Union when the strike began, they were also concerned about the negative light
the strike violence shed on San Francisco.  Labor rights had always been important, but
during the war, portraying San Francisco as a patriotic metropolis took precedence. 
 In early 1918, the city’s two largest union organizations, the Building Trades
Council and the Labor Council, pledged to work with employers to prevent strikes.  This
significantly reduced the tension between labor and employers, and the lack of violence
gave the Law and Order Committee little ammunition to continue its attack on the closed
shop.  This did not prevent Frederick Koster from occasionally reminding residents that
law and order was still an essential component of the Chamber’s duties to its members
and the city as a whole.  In various addresses before the Chamber and other civic
organizations, Koster expressed his vision of a postwar San Francisco.  In these speeches,
Koster did not describe a war between labor and owners, retreating from the fiery rhetoric
with which the Law and Order campaign had begun.  Instead, he described San Francisco
as a city in which everyone’s rights would be respected, but not a city where labor unions
had “more rights than any other group of persons and thereby set themselves above the
law.”  For Koster, law and order meant developing mutual respect, and “rights in
accordance with the basic laws of civilization itself.”   86
Koster’s more conciliatory approach reflected the abating of tensions between
labor and business during the last months of the war, but it also suggested the future
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strategy of the Chamber of Commerce in its campaign for the open shop.  Strikes would
return at war’s end, and the Chamber wanted San Franciscans to see it as the defender of
law and order, the one institution capable of saving San Francisco from the subversive
elements lurking in its midst.  The Chamber’s quest for law and order through the open
shop united businessmen in a common cause and gave them an organization that inspired
confidence.  For the Chamber and its members, the future of San Francisco lay in its
ability to encourage new investors and residents.  They envisioned San Francisco, as they
had during the PPIE, as an international destination for work and leisure.  Such a
cosmopolitan city would foster an entrepreneurial spirit, encouraging new businesses that
would not have to accept the closed shop or worry about politics dominated by unions. 




“Labor’s voice must be heard and heeded”: San Francisco’s Organized Labor
The San Francisco Bulletin described the city’s Labor Day festivities of 1917 as
one of the most unique commemorations of the holiday in the city’s history.  Unions had
for years provided scheduled events for working class residents, celebrating the special
occasion with all the fervor of the Fourth of July.  Organized labor did not cancel their
fete because of the war, but the war certainly subdued the mood.  Labor Day in 1917 also
coincided with the notification of men chosen in the first round of the draft.  They would
soon be leaving San Francisco for military training facilities.  In San Francisco, the war
was not the only reason for the change in humor.  Tensions between the Carmen’s Union
and United Railroad had boiled over and workers had gone on strike a week earlier.  As a
result, United Railroads, which had always provided additional cars on its lines to
accommodate Labor Day revelers, was forced to cancel all services.  Only Municipal
Railroad trains and jitneys transported the city’s workers to the activities at Golden Gate
Park.  
Labor also continued a policy of not marking the day with a big public parade.  In
1914, the city’s unions had banned the traditional street parade, announcing that “labor
has walked long enough.”  Instead, the day’s organized activities began with a sports
program in which athletes from the Olympic Club, Amateur Athletic League, the
University of California and the Y. M. C. A. entertained the working-class spectators.  
Next, the Municipal Band treated the crowd to a concert of popular and patriotic tunes. 
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John Francis Neylan, an attorney with a long history of supporting labor rights, gave the
day’s keynote speech.  In it, he expressed the wartime concerns of the city’s unions.  The
Labor Council had proclaimed “Unity” the slogan of the day, but Neylan did not believe
the war was a time when workers could find common bonds with the business class. 
Businessmen, he proclaimed, did not really care about whether America won the war,
only their own ability to profit from it.  Neylan conceded it was possible that capitalists
would suppress their “selfish and autocratic power” and do what was best for the nation,
but such sacrifices would require them to accept the role of unions in the workplace. 
Neylan thought it was more likely that businessmen would languish in their avarice,
undermining the nation’s war efforts and proving once and for all their true nature. 
Although the U.S. had been engaged in combat for only a few months, Neylan believed
San Francisco’s businessmen had already proven their unwillingness to repress greed. 
The reason United Railroad workers had chosen to strike, he insisted, was not because
laborers lacked patriotism or were led by anarchists, but because the company refused to
treat workers equitably.  San Francisco’s unions were engaged in two wars – one against
German despotism and one against employer tyranny.  Both wars would ultimately lead to
“a new industrial realignment . . . men who cannot see that other adjustments have to be
made are blind and mere trailers along the march of progress.”   1
Neylan’s Labor Day speech reflected the war being fought by labor within the
confines of the city.  As they had before the war, workers sought to retain union power by
protecting the closed shop and facilitating the creation of new unions in companies and
Organized Labor (San Francisco), Special Labor Day Edition, 1 September 1917, 1-5.
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industries where it had previously proven unsuccessful.  Wartime pressures to increase
production and delay any actions that might interrupt such works made fulfilling these
goals more difficult.  Ignoring these long-term goals, however, was not an option.  Labor
faced stiff competition from open shop advocates, like the Law and Order Committee and
D.A. Charles Fickert, who used wartime fears of violent insurgents in their campaign
against unions.  To combat attacks from San Francisco’s political and business
conservatives, labor fought back.  Unions challenged their opponents’ assertions that their
support of Mooney and use of strikes made them disloyal to the United States.  They
argued that if Americans were fighting for global democracy in France, they were fighting
for that same democracy in San Francisco.  
For organized labor, San Francisco was a safe haven for union activity and they
took pride in their successful defense of workers’ rights.  By early 1918, the wartime
atmosphere had forced San Francisco labor unions to become more conciliatory toward
employers.  Rather than assaulting the greedy actions of the economic elite, they focused
on advertising the patriotic actions of their members.  In doing so, they sought to protect
their previous gains and prepare for postwar challenges.  This wartime strategy also
legitimized efforts to win Thomas Mooney a new trial.  Ignoring his previous affiliation
with radical organizations, the Labor Council and Building Trades Council emphasized
the unseemliness of sentencing a man to die based on perjured testimony when the nation
was fighting a war to rid the world of such tyrannical practices.  
Despite the graft trials, the power of San Francisco unions had diminished little
since the election of Union Labor Party mayor Eugene Schmitz in 1901.  The Union
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Labor Party controlled municipal politics for all but two years between 1901 and 1911,
and many unions supported James Rolph’s bid for mayor although the incumbent was a
member of Union Labor.  Rolph was not a party member, but he had shown his
willingness to support labor unions by accepting the closed shop in his own business and
by resigning from the Shipowners Association of the Pacific during the 1906 waterfront
strike.  As a politician, Rolph had to recognize the importance of winning support from
the two largest labor organizations in the city, the Labor Council and the Building Trades
Council.  The Labor Council, formed in 1892, was a loose federation of unions over
which the Council had little direct control.  While they did not always agree on specific
tactics, most of the affiliated unions recognized the need to maintain a unified front
against employers.  In 1915, the Labor Council included 150 affiliated unions,
representing approximately 50,000 San Francisco workers.  The Building Trades Council
had only 16,000 dues-paying members in 1916, but its control of urban construction gave
it considerably more power than its numbers suggested.   During the PPIE, both
organizations – along with an additional 30,000 unionists not directly attached to the
larger associations – agreed to adopt the exposition’s harmonious image of San Francisco
and banned the use of strikes.  Unions considered this a temporary moratorium and
longshoremen, suffering from higher costs of living caused by the European war, went on
strike June 1, 1916.  The strike lasted only six weeks, but it reopened the conflict between
union labor and businessmen, who retaliated by forming the Law and Order Committee.    2
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The chief reason the Law and Order Committee outlasted the longshoremen’s
strike was the destruction – of life, property, and a sense of security – caused by the
Preparedness Day bombing.  In the months following the July 22 attack, which killed ten
and wounded forty, the Law and Order Committee consistently linked organized labor to
the bombing conspirators.   Both the Building Trades and Labor Council vehemently3
denied any connection to the five arrested conspirators.  They insisted that Thomas
Mooney and Warren Billings, the supposed ringleaders, were transient anarchists with no
ties to San Francisco’s mainstream labor unions.  Such assertions were easier for labor
organizations to make about Warren Billings than Thomas Mooney.  Oakland police had
arrested Billings in the summer of 1913 carrying a suitcase of dynamite.  He was
convicted and spent two years in Folsom Penitentiary.  Mooney’s past ties to San
Francisco unions, however, was possible to find.   He was most notably associated with
San Francisco’s radical fringe, helping Edward Nolan and Alexander Berkman establish
the anarchists’ journal Blast in January 1916.  However, Mooney also attempted to
establish more closed shop industries in San Francisco, giving him a common cause with
the Labor Council.  After the PPIE ended, Mooney devoted his attention to organizing a
Carmen’s Union among United Railroad workers. Eight times since Patrick Calhoun’s
defeat of the Carmen’s Union in 1907 workers at United Railroad had unsuccessfully
Era (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 1987), 29, 235;  David F. Selvin,  Sky Full of Storm:  A Brief
History of California Labor (San Francisco:  California Historical Society, 1975), 37, Issel, William Issel
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The five indicted for the Preparedness Day bombing were Warren Billings, Thomas Mooney,
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attempted to win union recognition.  Before he could lead a handful of carmen on strike
in June 1916, Mooney was arrested for suspicion of dynamiting a high voltage tower
outside San Francisco that provided power to United Railroad.  He was out on bond at the
time of the Preparedness Day bombing.    4
Of the five indicted by a grand jury in August 1916 for the bombing, Warren
Billings was chosen to stand trial first.  In September, a jury convicted him of murder and
sentenced him to life in prison.  The city’s labor unions ignored Billing’s case, believing
that an anarchist, previously convicted of possessing dynamite, was obviously not a part
of the city’s mainstream unions.   In the fall of 1916, San Francisco unions were busy5
with more pressing matters.  They ultimately lost the fight to expand union membership
in the culinary, lumber, and steel trades and unsuccessfully prevented passage of an anti-
picketing ordinance.  The victor in these contests was the Law and Order Committee.  To
celebrate, members published an account of the organization’s origin and achievements in
January 1917.  The pamphlet espoused the Committee’s efforts to protect San Francisco,
the Constitution, and the “spirit of human liberty” from the subversive forces of labor.  6
In its scathing critique of the pamphlet, the editor of the Building Trades’ weekly
newspaper, Organized Labor, urged residents to see the document for what it was – an
attempt by the business elite to “attract non-union and anti-union capitalists and
employees to the city.”  Despite its loses in late 1916, or maybe because of them, the
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Building Trades continued to challenge the Law and Order Committee’s real intentions,
and in doing so, they had to maintain as much distance between organized labor and the
accused bombing conspirators.   When a jury found Thomas Mooney guilty of complicity7
in the bombing on February 9, the city’s union-run newspapers supported the verdict. 
Before a judge sentenced Mooney to death on May 17, however, some residents of San
Francisco began to wonder if their previous assertions about Mooney had been correct.  8
One of the primary reasons Mooney received the death penalty and Billings was
given life in prison was the power of the testimony provided by Frank C. Oxman, an
Oregon cattleman.  After the national publicity given to the Billings trial, Oxman notified
San Francisco District Attorney Charles Fickert that he had seen Billings and Mooney on
July 22, placing a suitcase on the sidewalk at the site of the explosion.  D. A. Fickert
brought Oxman to San Francisco to testify for the prosecution in the Mooney case,
providing the first eyewitness information that put the men at the exact scene of the
crime.  To strengthen Oxman’s credibility, Fickert also brought in F. Edward Rigall, an
associate of Oxman, from Illinois.  Rigall testified that he had spent part of July 22 with
Oxman in San Francisco.  However, Bulletin editor Fremont Older was suspicious of
these two outsiders who conveniently came forward in time for Mooney’s trial.  His staff
began investigating the two men and, in the process, obtained correspondence between
the two that they had written before their arrival in San Francisco to testify against
Mooney.  The letters, which the Bulletin published on April 11, 1917, suggested a
Organized Labor (San Francisco), 3 February 1917, 7;  Organized Labor, 6 January 1917, 4.
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conspiracy to frame the bombing defendants.  Based on the material in the letters, a grand
jury was called to investigate Frank Oxman.  During those hearings, Rigall confessed that
he had never been to San Francisco before Fickert had called him to testify in Mooney’s
trial.   Oxman had encouraged his friend to lie to Fickert so Oxman’s claims would
appear more reliable.  Rigall also claimed that Oxman had confessed to him that he had
not been anywhere near the Preparedness Day parade at the time of the bombing.  On
April 18, Police Court Judge Matthew I. Brady issued a warrant for Oxman’s arrest for
subornation of perjury.  However, these revelations did not stop Judge Franklin Griffen
from sentencing Mooney to death a month later.   9
The perjured testimony, and Judge Griffen’s refusal to acknowledge the
information, raised serious doubts for Fremont Older and some in the Labor Council and
Building Trades about the guilt of Thomas Mooney and the others supposed conspirators. 
If the Bulletin could uncover the truth about Oxman, why didn’t D.A. Fickert figure out
his star witness was a liar – or did he know and ignore the information to get a
conviction?  The possibility that Fickert was using the Mooney case to aid the business
community it its quest to portray all unions as subversive seemed more probable when the
Law and Order Committee began expressing their overwhelming support for the actions
of the district attorney.  On April 28, the Law and Order Committee took out full page ads
in the city’s papers, except the Bulletin.  The advertisements claimed that anarchists were
attempting to thwart justice by attacking the prosecution in the Mooney case.  This was




union associates.   This public attack on organized labor – and the refusal by Judge10
Griffen, D. A. Fickert, and the businessmen of the Law and Order Committee to consider
Mooney’s trial invalid – led many laborers to suspect a wider conspiracy against labor
and a concerted effort to bypass the judicial process.  
Almost overnight, many union members came to believe that Thomas Mooney’s
case was their own.  Organized Labor called the Law and Order Committee the “usurper
of municipal government.”  San Francisco’s most prominent unionists and political
supporters countered the Law and Order ad with a full-page ad of their own.  In it, they
appropriated the Committee’s oft-repeated phrase:  “we affirm our belief in Law and
Order.”  The advertisement characterized labor’s actions as democratic.  It compared the
open and public nature of labor union meetings, most notably the recent meeting called
by the Labor Council to discuss aid for Mooney’s defense, with the covert gatherings of
the Law and Order Committee.   In making this comparison, they intimated that
corruption thrived in such backroom meetings. This fit with labor’s assertion that the Law
and Order Committee was just the public face of a larger conspiracy by San Francisco
business leaders to undermine the advancements of the working class.  The ad demanded
a full investigation “in accordance with the law” into the Mooney case.  In proving that
they were not the subversives, the ad’s authors insisted that they were the ones
demanding public action to protect law and order.  In emphasizing that point, fifteen local
union leaders signed the proclamation, representing the affiliated and autonomous unions,




District Congressman John I. Nolan and Speaker of the California Assembly C. C.
Young.11
Armed with this new information regarding Oxman’s perjured testimony, labor
organizations across the state mobilized to defend the five bombing conspirators.  Paul
Scharrenberg, State Federation of Labor president, had previously denounced Mooney as
a traitor.  Now, Scharrenberg defended him, arguing Mooney was a pawn in the
Chamber’s attempt to destroy support for labor.  Scharrenberg took charge of raising
money for Mooney’s defense at the state level while the San Francisco Labor Council
requested that all affiliated unions assess their members one hour of pay for the fund.  In
making the request, the Council reminded union members that the Chamber of
Commerce had raised one million dollars for the Law and Order Committee “for the
express purpose of fighting Labor Unions.”   The high cost of living would make such12
donations difficult, but the Labor Council considered such sacrifices to be just as
important as war related ones.  Labor had to be able to defend its interests from the
growing strength of the Chamber of Commerce.  
Despite the developments in the Oxman case, District Attorney Fickert proceeded
with the trial of Rena Mooney.  Although just months earlier the paper had denied the
five indicted bombers had anything to do with the city’s unions, Organized Labor now
warned that trying Rena Mooney would “fan the ever smoldering fires of social unrest.”  13
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During the trial, the California State Federation of Labor started a letter writing
campaign, urging members to contact State Attorney General U. S. Webb’s office and
demand a full investigation of Oxman’s relationship to Fickert.  The State Federation
expressed concern that the Oxman case threatened to erode the confidence of San
Franciscans in their judicial system, which was “becoming enveloped . . . in the fog of
doubt and distrust and that no ordinary man of the people will longer expect an even
chance at the bar of justice.”   Without Oxman’s testimony, a jury voted for acquittal.14
Rena’s attorney hoped the verdict would ease working class fears that they would not
receive a fair trial if their “legitimate efforts for betterment arouse the enmity of
employers.”   15
Such statements reflected the shifting argument made by labor in defense of the
bombing conspirators.  Thomas Mooney’s imprisonment was not the result of his prior
anarchist views but because he had attempted to unionize United Railroad carmen.  By
associating him with organized labor’s prime directive, unionization, Mooney became a
part of the mainstream labor movement.  William Billing’s former conviction, however,
made him more difficult to redeem and claim as their own.  Therefore, the Building
Trades and Labor Council did not consider Billings a suitable martyr for labor’s cause. 
After Rena Mooney’s acquittal, the unions assumed the prosecution would dismiss the
remaining charges against Rena, Israel Weinberg, and Edward Nolan.  This would allow
them to concentrate on winning a retrial, or the release of, Thomas Mooney. 
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District Attorney Fickert, however, had other plans.  Instead of releasing Rena
Mooney, Fickert sent her back to jail to await trial on one of seven other indictments
brought against her by the original grand jury.  Robert Minor, writing for Organized
Labor, believed the tactic was meant to drag labor defendants into court as often as it
would take “to wear down the treasuries of the Labor Unions that support the defense.”  16
For unionists, the continued detention of Rena Mooney and the trial of Israel Weinberg,
which began in October 1917, reflected the corruption within the district attorney’s office
and his connection to those businessmen of the city who sought labor’s destruction.  Ed
Gammons of Organized Labor declared: “This IS a fight for the life of trades Unionism
in San Francisco.  We accept the gauntlet!”  At the beginning of Weinberg’s trial, Judge
Emmet Seawell noted the tension between unions and employees had risen to dangerous
levels, preventing either side from maintaining objectivity.  As a result, the judge did not
allow any labor union or Chamber of Commerce members on the jury.   After a seven-17
week trial in which the prosecution presented no new evidence, the jury took twenty-three
minutes to find Weinberg not guilty.  Like Rena, Weinberg returned to jail to await trial
on the other seven indictments.  The District Attorney’s office announced it would begin
the trial of Edward Nolan next.  18
It was at this point that San Francisco’s labor organizations, along with other
residents who believed the district attorneys office was catering to special interests, began
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a campaign to recall Charles Fickert.  In the recall debate, both sides used the war
atmosphere, using fears that keeping or losing Fickert would seriously undermine San
Francisco’s patriotism and national reputation.  Fickert charged that the money used to
defend the bombing conspirators came from German sources and was funneled through
the city’s unions.   Fickert had local papers print a telegram he sent to Theodore
Roosevelt, meant to earn the former president’s endorsement.  In it, Fickert insisted that
his recall would bring “woe and destruction upon our beloved country” in its time of
greatest danger.  In response, the editor of The Daily News, Eugene Maclean, insisted that
residents had to recall Fickert because his rejection of the law would undermine
America’s relations with its wartime allies.  These allies expected the United States to
uphold the standards it required of everyone else.   19
Attorney Charles Sweigert campaigned to replace Fickert should the recall prove
successful.  Sweigert brought two vocal forces together in supporting his bid – organized
labor and moral reformers.   Sweigert catered to labor by declaring that Fickert was
willing to violate the law for the sake of his wealthy business supporters.  The war made
the situation even more serious, Sweigert argued, because the nation expected the San
Francisco district attorney to do everything in his power to protect the soldiers “from the
evils of liquor and vice.”  While others in the city blamed law enforcement, Sweigert
“flayed” Fickert for failing to prosecute offenders.   In attacking the opposition, Sweigert20
and Fickert publicly displayed the divisions, usually kept hidden, within San Francisco. 
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They also advertised to the nation an image of the city as lawless and corrupt.  For a brief
moment, the Chamber of Commerce and labor unions failed to advertise San Francisco as
a city that had left its wild past behind.  
The recall exposed fissures within labor’s ranks.  Some trade unionists still
considered Mooney an anarchist and agreed with Fickert’s prosecution of the five
defendants.  Labor Council president Arthur Brouillet was one of those individuals.  He
had allowed the Council to collect money but had refused to allow any public rallies for
the defendants, believing that despite the Oxman evidence, Mooney was guilty.   During
the State Federation of Labor convention in late October, Brouillet got into a verbal
altercation with Mooney supporter Selig Schulberg.  Schulberg had suggested that the
convention send a resolution to President Wilson showing support for the President’s
recent decision to have the Justice Department investigate the Mooney case.  Brouillet
rejected the idea and threatened to give Schulberg an even greater beating than the one he
had received from Charles Fickert a week earlier.  Fickert had punched Schulberg in the
face and claimed he had acted in self-defense.  Also during the convention, Brouillet
called Fremont Older  a “dirty skunk” for publishing the Oxman and Rigall letters.  The
verbal attacks on Schulberg and Older were too much for the rest of the Labor Council’s
executive committee.  At the end of the state convention, they voted to suspend  Brouillet
and elected vice president Daniel Haggerty to replace him.   Brouillet was not alone21
among union members in his belief that the bombing conspirators had nothing to do with
organized labor in the city and that their previous ties to radicalism were enough proof of
Frost, The Mooney Case, 273-276.
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their guilt.  However, the Labor Council executive committee’s ability to remove
Brouillet from office reflected the limited strength of Brouillet’s argument within the
Council and its affiliated unions. By removing Brouillet, the Labor Council had made its
choice to stand in solidarity with Thomas Mooney and against Charles Fickert.
Sweigert won considerable support from members of the Labor Council and
Building Trades, along with reformers like Rev. Paul Smith, but 62 percent of voters
rejected the recall of Fickert.   Several factors led to Fickert’s success.  First, wealthy22
businessmen and political conservatives financially supported Fickert.  Both the Chamber
of Commerce and the Civic League of Improvement Clubs endorsed Fickert and urged
their members to campaign on his behalf.  Wealthy residents of the Pacific Heights and
Nob Hill districts voted overwhelming for Fickert.   Fickert also received votes from23
people who had supported Theodore Roosevelt in his 1912 presidential race.  Thanks to
San Francisco attorney Charles Hanlon, who had personal ties to the former president,
Fickert received a public endorsement, which the Call and Post published.  Most
important, the night before the recall election, a bomb exploded in front of the governor’s
mansion in Sacramento.  With San Francisco papers announcing the attempted
assassination of the governor as people headed to the polls, citizens from the city’s
wealthier neighborhoods came out in surprising numbers.  Those who agreed with the
propaganda of the Law and Order Committee immediately concluded that such anarchic
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actions were the work of individuals tied to unionism.  In voting for Fickert, they believed
his aggressive tactics in the bombing trials was proof he would fight against radical and
dangerous elements no matter the personal cost.24
The conviction of Mooney and Fickert’s recall challenge were not the only
occasions in 1917 that organized labor had to worry about being labeled subversive. 
Walking a fine line between defenders of democracy and disloyal workers, San Francisco
unionists struggled with the appropriate use of one of their most effective tools – the
strike.  The acrimonious relationship between unionists and the city’s leading
businessmen that developed during the 1916 strikes intensified the difficulties in
successfully carrying out a strike.  After the war declaration, the first question for
potential striking unions was whether they even had the legal right to strike.  The
Advisory Labor Committee, a subcommittee of the National Council of Defense,
struggled to create a policy regarding strikes that provided the right balance of patriotism
and protection for workers.  The committee, consisting of labor leaders and businessmen
from around the country, created a vaguely worded compromise that rejected any
“material or big change in the existing status between employers and workers.”  It did not
expressly forbid strikes.   John H. Walker, president of the Illinois State Federation of
Labor and member of the Advisory Labor Committee, explained the details of the
committee’s agreement in a letter to Organized Labor.  He stated that wages could, and
should, keep pace with the rising cost of living during the war.  However, Walker
admitted that he was not sure that workers should still employ strikes.  Instead, he
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encouraged workers to make their employers aware of their financial struggles, believing
that patriotism and wartime prosperity would sway them to raise wages.25
Rising inflation made it difficult for San Francisco unions to wait for employers to
decide it was in everyone’s best interest to increase wages.  The cost of living in the Bay
Area rose 29 percent in the two years prior to American entrance into the war.  Figures
published in Organized Labor in June 1917 showed that dairy prices had risen 84 percent
in two years.  Labor organizations encouraged workers to boycott companies charging
unfair prices and praised women’s groups that formed consumers’ leagues to study ways
they could conserve food.  Olaf Tveitmoe hoped that as workers learned to conserve
foodstuffs, thanks to the Food Administration guidelines, there would be a reduction in
consumer prices that would prevent workers from having to strike for higher wages.  26
However, like many longtime unionists in San Francisco, Tveitmoe could not deny the
rights of non-union workers to organize even during a world war.  While Thomas
Mooney had failed to organize carmen in 1916, a number of platform men working for
the United Railroads renewed the union’s charter in the summer of 1917.   United
Railroad president, Jesse Lilienthal, refused to raise wages to adjust for the higher cost of
living. For the platform men, the dangers of being branded disloyal for striking during the
war paled in comparison with their declining purchasing power.  United Railroad, the
bastion of the open shop since the days of Patrick Calhoun, was the perfect target for
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union action.  For over a decade, Calhoun and his successor had thwarted all unionization
efforts, hiring spies to keep tabs on workers and immediately firing anyone with union
sympathies.  If the Carmen’s Union won, it would go a long way to reversing the losses
organized labor had suffered the previous year.   27
  On Sunday, August 12, 1917, approximately fifteen hundred United Railroad
platform men walked off the job, tying up 80 percent of United Railroad’s street cars.
Lilienthal and the Law and Order Committee immediately went on the offensive.  
Lilienthal tried to garner sympathy by declaring that his company, faced with competition
from the city’s Municipal Railroad line, could not pay workers more.  Chamber of
Commerce members donated the funds needed to pay for armed guards hired to protect
United Railroad’s strikebreakers.   These strikebreakers were migratory outsiders whom28
the company quickly hired, not checking for criminal histories.  This worried residents
who feared the motives of these transients.  Public fears seemed confirmed when police
began arresting strikebreakers days after their arrival for illegally carrying weapons. 
Police also raided several United Railroad car barns and arrested men for not registering
for the draft.    A telegram to Mayor Rolph from one San Francisco resident visiting29
family in Truckee warned that he had seen three hundred strikebreakers on their way to
the city and “nearly all are armed. . . . These men are not good citizen [sic].”   Lilienthal30
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rejected the idea that his company was intentionally hiring gunmen to run his streetcars,
but arrests of armed strikebreakers continued.    31
The image of the lawless strikebreakers stood in stark contrast to the peaceful
rallies at the Labor Temple.  Striking workers paraded peacefully down Market Street,
with wives and children in tow, publicly displaying banners and wearing buttons that
called for $3.50 an hour and an 8-hour workday.  The State Federation of Labor, San
Francisco Labor Council, and the Building Trades Council all supported the actions of the
new union.  They encouraged their locals to assess members fifty cents each to help
defray the expenses of the strike.  The Labor Council urged all San Franciscans to support
the strikers by boycotting the United Railroad lines.  Labor Council secretary and State
Council of Defense member John O’Connell met with Mayor Rolph.  He requested
enforcement of a city ordinance requiring new platform men to have a week’s training
before operating a street car.   In doing so, O’Connell performed two functions: 32
advertising union concern for the safety and well-being of all residents and fulfilling his
duties as part of the state’s wartime defense organization.  Peaceful demonstrations and
efforts to show that the Carmen’s Union and its labor supporters were the defenders of
law and order successfully deflected, for a time, the attacks of disloyalty by the Chamber
of Commerce.  Unfortunately, peace was not easy to maintain.  
 On August 22, people at four different United Railroad stops in the Mission
District threw stones at the cars, leading the strikebreakers to disembark and attack.  This
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action made it difficult for even the pro-labor Daily News to put the blame squarely on
the strikebreakers.  The paper noted that the strikebreakers had been “spreading riots and
disorder as they went,” but most of the article portrayed the strikebreakers as victims.  In
several cases that day, strikebreakers had been dragged from their cars and beaten, while
others were kidnaped and taken to the Labor Temple.   Despite the violence, residents in33
general were slow to give up their support of the Carmen’s Union.  United Railroad’s
history of corruption and the fact that the men on strike were residents of the city – not
transients like the strikebreakers – led many to hope for a quick resolution in favor of the
Carmen’s Union.  O’Connell played to these assertions by urging residents to compare
the motives of both sides:  “Mr. Citizen are you with the URR and its colleagues, or with
the man seeking a decent wage?  The URR is the corporation which debauched and
bribed our city officials in years gone by.  Its substitutes are thugs, gunmen and slackers.” 
To diffuse suggestions that the strikers caused much of the current violence, O’Connell
assured residents that the Carmen’s Union had already told their members that if they
were caught with a concealed weapon or under the influence of alcohol the union would
expel them.  He also insisted that, despite the recent spate of violence, none of the men
arrested were card-carrying members of the Carmen’s Union.    While it is unclear34
whether O’Connell’s claim was accurate, many residents were inclined to believe the
Carmen’s Union was doing its best to maintain law and order within its ranks.  Instead of
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calling for an immediate end to the strike when the violent attacks began, most residents
stopped riding on United Railroad streetcars to avoid being caught in the crossfire.
The Carmen’s Union’s attempts to resolve the strike through arbitration lent
credence to O’Connell’s assertion that the union wanted a quick resolution to the strike
without resorting to violence.  The Carmen’s Union offered to return to work without
wage concessions if the company allowed United Railroad workers to vote for or against
the closed shop.  The carmen argued that this request was the best way to protect
workers’ long-term needs while getting them back to work quickly.  With no wages,
hours, or other issues to negotiate, workers would be back to work as soon as Lilienthal
approved the vote.  Although carmen would be forgoing immediate relief from inflation,
they believed that once workers had the opportunity to vote for the closed shop they
would have the power necessary to compel change.  Despite this carefully crafted
perception of carmen willing to sacrifice immediate gains for the good of the city, the
Labor Council’s quest for expanded unionization was evident.  Not surprisingly,
Lilienthal rejected this attempt to thwart the open shop movement, refusing to recognize
the union and insisting there was nothing to arbitrate.  As a result, the arbitration
committee had no choice but to end its efforts.  O’Connell again used the opportunity to
attack the company and place any subsequent violence squarely on United Railroad’s
shoulders.  “Whatever happens,” O’Connell declared,” we want the public to place the
responsibility where it rightfully belongs – upon Jesse W. Lilienthal.”  35
Robert Edward Lee Knight, Industrial Relations in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1900-1918
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Lilienthal’s refusal to resolve the matter through arbitration helped the Carmen’s
Union maintain public support and some notable municipal employees spoke out on the
union’s behalf.  Mayor Rolph, in a letter to the Board of Police Commissioners about the
strike violence, endorsed labor in the matter.  He believed that the city’s labor leaders and
“good Union men” had nothing to do with the actions of a “small group of lawless men”
engaged in “cold-blooded criminal assault.    Police Judge Morris Oppenheim handled36
many of the strike violence cases, including the murder trials of six strikers accused of
killing a strikebreaker on August 23.  The six strikers did not appear to be union members
and Judge Oppenheim told the grand jury the Carmen’s Union was not on trial and that
they should not blame the union for the violence.  He insisted that the attacks were the
result of United Railroad’s disregard for safety and careless hiring of “the worst
characters that could be found in the slums of Eastern cities.  Nothing could be more
vicious.”   Timothy Reardon, head of the city’s Board of Public Works, joined striking37
carmen at the Labor Temple where he publicly challenged Lilienthal’s reputation as a
charitable citizen.  He urged Lilienthal to resign so arbitration had a chance of moving
forward.  He also warned the strikers to distrust those who advocated violence because
“you will find they are not working for you, but for the United Railroads in whose pay
they are in.”38
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The municipal and public support for the Carmen’s Union suggested that, despite
the war, San Franciscans would not react negatively to laborers who used strikes to
improve their conditions.  On September 15, the Iron Trades Council’s (ITC) contract
with the California Metal Trades Association (CMTA) and the California Foundrymen’s
Association (CFA) expired.  The twenty-five unions affiliated with the Iron Trades
Council wanted an increase in wages that reflected not only the rising cost of living, but
also the tremendous growth in profits the shipbuilding companies earned thanks to war
contracts.   The two sides failed to reach an agreement by the end of the contract but39
hoped that the U.S. Shipping Board would quickly intervene to prevent a strike in a
crucial wartime industry.  However, the Board did not act fast enough.  On the morning
of September 17, thirty thousand employees in the iron trades failed to report to work or
walked off the job.  The Daily News reported that the “Mission [District] was black with
men,” as striking iron workers joined the striking carmen milling about their
neighborhood.  This new influx of strikers led to a spate of violence against United
Railroad strikebreakers, leading Lilienthal to declare it the bloodiest day since the start of
the carmen’s strike.  Lilienthal responded by cancelling all night service in the South of
Market and Mission Districts.40
The strike by carmen, while significantly disruptive to urban mobility, became
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secondary to the strike of thirty thousand shipyard workers.  The iron workers strike in
San Francisco occurred at the same time as shipyard strikes in Seattle, Portland, and Los
Angeles.  This work stoppage on the Pacific Coast held up about 12 percent of the
government’s ship construction.   Because of the serious repercussions to the nation’s war
effort, officials with the U.S. Shipping Board scurried to find an agreement that the
strikers would quickly accept.  Federal authorities also immediately dispatched two
Marine companies from Mare Island to protect San Francisco’s Union Iron Works and
shut down saloons within a half mile of the plant.  Federal officials considered the
streetcar strike to be a local matter and not essential to wartime production.  In the case of
the iron workers, Washington made it clear that they would “settle the wage question by
speedier methods than an endurance test between labor and employers.”    41
Compared with the local carmen strike, which disrupted metropolis transportation,
the iron workers’ strike had the potential to disrupt the nation’s ability to win the war.  As
a result, accusing the iron trade unions of disloyalty was easier for employers.  The
owners, as part of the Metal Trades Conference Committee, claimed that they had sought
a compromise with the unions before the strike began, recognizing the “vital necessity of
keeping shops operating on account of the national crisis.”  The owners did not directly
question the Iron Trades Council’s patriotism.  Instead, they made it clear that the ITC
had made the conscious decision to strike and that the nation “would be the principal
sufferer on account of the cessation of work.”   
The Iron Trades Council retaliated with its own statement.  It argued that the
San Francisco Chronicle, 18 September 1917, 1, 3.
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strike was necessary and its workers were more loyal than the employers:  “We do not
think it fair to ask the workers to starve themselves to show their patriotism, while the
employers wax fat and rich on war contracts.”  In making its case that workers, even on
strike, were more patriotic than employers, the ITC recited the oft-repeated union refrain
– greed prevented industrialists from sacrificing for the greater good.  While the members
of the California Metal Trades Association reaped wartime profits, workers sacrificed. 
Not only did they build the ships in record time, they donated to war drives despite the
lack of pay incentives.  Even with the high cost of living, the employees at Union Iron
Works had purchased $621,000 worth of Liberty bonds in the first drive, averaging
$70.25 per worker.    ITC used the same tactics as the Carmen’s Union and labor42
organizers who fought to save Tom Mooney.  In each case, they could easily link the
rights of workers to receive equal treatment - whether that meant a fair share of the
nation’s prosperity or fair treatment in the courts - to the nation’s efforts to promote
democracy and progressive ideals.
 While it is difficult to determine how much was gained by attacking the
opposition’s loyalty, the iron workers and carmen paid a heavier price as a result of the
increasing street violence.  Letters to the San Francisco Chronicle editor before the iron
workers’ strike reflected general support for the Carmen’s Union.  Two days after the iron
trades’ strike began, the letters-to-the-editor columns were filled with demands that both
strikes end quickly.  Residents who wrote into the newspaper demanded the mayor step




up the police presence in the Mission District and have officers riding the United Railroad
cars to protect passengers.  They began to blame union leaders, rather than employers, for
the strikes.  One anonymous author believed the officers of the boilermaker unions had
gone on strike just to incite violence, suggesting that at least some residents had adopted
the Law and Order Committee’s argument that the city’s unions were filled with
anarchists.   The Chronicle’s editor also feared that the violence would significantly43
harm San Francisco’s chances of winning future government contracts.  With two major
strikes and millions of dollars at stake, the editor believed that the city’s rivals would use
the situation to their advantage to lure contracts away.  He urged the mayor and the police
to do their duty and urgently declared:  “Let this violence stop!”   No matter how44
convincing the Iron Trades Council and Carmen’s Union was in labeling their rich
opponents as disloyal villains, the violence led most residents to demand an immediate
resolution to the crisis.  They did not care who won or lost so long as the city streets were
safe and workers quickly resumed the crucial war production in the shipyards.  Many
residents supported the labor organizations’ vision of San Francisco as the bastion of the
closed shop.  However, the heightened tensions caused by the war and the armed conflict
on their residential thoroughfares led residents to believe that now was not the time for
unions to take an aggressive stand against employers.    
Although the two sides in the carmen’s strike remained unmoved, the
government’s intervention in the iron worker’s strike resulted in a quick settlement.  On
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September 23, an arbitration  committee worked out a temporary agreement to get the
men back to work while the newly created U.S. Emergency Fleet Corporation developed
a permanent wage rate for all shipbuilders on the coast.    The committee reached its45
agreement soon after it received a telegram from President Wilson.  In it, the president
promised that the government would treat workers fairly in any new wage agreement.  He
also urged the arbitration committee to resolve the matter quickly for it would “be most
gratifying to Washington in view of the effect it would have on the labor troubles in
Seattle, Portland and elsewhere.”  The president’s telegram, published in the Daily News
and the San Francisco Chronicle, made it clear that San Francisco’s resolution would set
the standard for other Pacific Coast cities.    Labor ideology might divide employers and46
employees, but an opportunity to make the city stand out as the bastion of harmony on the
West Coast brought the two sides together.  Both sides would benefit from portraying San
Francisco as a city where labor and business might disagree but could compromise for the
sake of the nation. 
While the thought of showing that San Francisco was the “City That Knows How”
to the rest of the Pacific Coast galvanized workers and owners, divisions among unionists
in the Bay Area threatened to keep the iron workers’ settlement from going forward. 
Despite the tentative agreement, the iron workers did not return to work as quickly as
expected.  Thirteen of the seventeen ITC unions approved the temporary agreement on
San Francisco Chronicle, 21 September 1917, 1; San Francisco Chronicle, 23 September 1917,
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September 26, claiming that while they were not in full agreement with the settlement,
they accepted it to “demonstrate the patriotism of the workingmen of the San Francisco
bay counties.”  However, not all agreed that loyalty should trump the workers’ immediate
needs.  Several men who attended the ITC vote told the San Francisco Chronicle that
Oakland and Alameda union members overwhelming voted against the agreement while
San Francisco laborers voted “unanimously for acceptance.”   47
The newspaper’s reporting of the votes did not uncover the divisions on both sides
of the bay.  Three of the East Bay unions who rejected the agreement voted to accept the
majority decision, but the Oakland Boilermakers’ Unions refused to return to work,
voting against the settlement almost four to one.  San Francisco delegates were fairly
evenly divided on the proposal and quite a number of union members did not attend the
vote.  The problem for the Boilermakers lay in the settlement’s acceptance of shipping
company usage of materials from non-union lumberyards.  Historian Robert Knight also
believed that East Bay union members also used the vote as an opportunity to protest their
opposition to the fact that San Francisco union leaders dominated the arbitration
committee.    48
In an attempt to smooth over the bay rivalries, leaders from both sides of the bay
called for another vote on September 28.  This time, more San Francisco unionists
participated and only 503 voted against the settlement, most from the East Bay.  With the
majority in support, R.W. Burton, ITC president, instructed everyone to return to work
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the next day.   For the most part, the Boilermakers accepted the verdict and returned to49
work, but the rift between the bay city unionists remained.  A week later, Olaf Tveitmoe
chastised the East Bay Boilermakers for delaying ship construction beyond what was
necessary, considering it detrimental to the nation’s ability to fight the war effectively. 
Tveitmoe was angry with the Boilermakers for rejecting the original decision by the ITC
majority:  “How absurd it appeared for a few hundred Boilermakers to attempt ruling or
ruining an organization involving thousands.  That might be consistent with I.W.W.
propaganda, but it is not craft or trade unionism.”   While Tveitmoe did not espouse the50
Law and Order Committee’s rhetoric that all unionists were anarchists, he did believe that
the East Bay unions’ unwillingness to compromise with the government called their
loyalty – to their union brothers, their country, and their Bay communities – into question. 
The rift within the boilermaker’s unions ultimately led the East Bay unions to
charter their own separate local the following year, allowing them to challenge not only
the ITC but also the permanent shipbuilding agreements made in late 1917.   In51
November 1917, the Emergency Fleet Corporation issued a new wage scale for all
shipbuilders on the Pacific Coast.   The new agreement did not satisfy all the Iron Trades52
Council’s original demands, but instead of going on strike again, ITC sent two San
Francisco delegates to Washington.  As a result of their negotiations, V. Everitt Macy,
head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, announced a supplemental wage increase of 10
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percent on December 10, 1917.  The settlement ended the possibility that a strike would
threaten shipbuilding in San Francisco. 
However, the fight over acceptance of the temporary agreement in September
1917 illustrated the significant ideological differences between the unions of San
Francisco and the East Bay.  While iron workers in San Francisco did not threaten to walk
off the job for the rest of the war, the Boilermakers’ Local 233 in Alameda threatened
several strikes and staged one-day walkouts throughout 1918.   For San Francisco at53
least, the iron workers succeeded in their September 1917 strike.  However, the division
with unions across the Bay made evident the increasingly precarious position of San
Francisco organized labor.  They had managed carefully to craft an image of their laborers
as patriots unified to protect workers and do their part for the war.  However, in reality
labor unions in the Bay Area were not resolutely in support of the same goals.  San
Francisco unions could now no longer expect to have East Bay unions wholeheartedly
back their efforts to maintain the closed shop, undermining their strength in the region.   
While the iron trades’ strike led to a compromise solution with federal authorities,
the Carmen’s Union strike ultimately failed.  Sporadic violence continued, but according
to a later report by the police department, there were fewer disturbances during the
carmen’s strike than in previous city strikes.   Most San Franciscans did not reject the54
strikers or their goals, nor did most question labor’s patriotism in holding the strike.  The
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reason the strike failed lay more in the union’s inability to keep United Railroad cars from
running.  By early October, the more migratory strikebreakers who had been paid to come
to San Francisco from New York or the Northwest headed home or kept a much lower
profile while driving the streetcars.  City officials indirectly aided the company by
ordering police to remove inexperienced carmen from cars, disarming strikebreakers, and
raiding the carbarns and arresting draft slackers.   Despite the number of men who55
walked out in August, one-third of the experienced United Railroad workers remained on
the job and as the strike wore on, another two hundred returned to their jobs.  Combined
with the strikebreakers who stayed in San Francisco long enough to learn the trade, it was
not long before United Railroad could resume normal schedules.  On November 22, the
Carmen called off the strike and within several weeks they turned in their charter.   56
The war had given iron workers an effective bargaining tool, but the same was not
true for the carmen.  The failure of the Carmen’s Union to sustain a permanent union and
the lack of a unified labor front in the Bay’s iron trades forced the Labor Council and
Building Trade Council to withdrawal their support of strikes for the war’s duration. 
Although they had deflected charges of disloyalty, the loss by the Carmen’s Union
undermined morale among the city’s labor unions.  Unwilling to try another strike for fear
of weakening unions further, labor organizers turned to activities that they believed would
help them win back the favor of San Franciscans and show that they, more so than city
business leaders, were the trusted defenders of democracy and justice.
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As 1918 began, the Labor Council and its affiliated unions focused on winning a
retrial or acquittal for Thomas Mooney whom they had come to see as the symbol of the
injustice wrought by the city’s Chamber of Commerce and conservative politicians.  The
forced resignation of Arthur Brouillet, the conservative president of the Labor Council,
sparked “more energetic action” by the Labor Council in its aid to Mooney and the other
defendants still being held in jail.  Led by Daniel Haggerty, the Labor Council sought
ways to refute the claim made by the Chamber of Commerce and D.A. Fickert that all
unionists were radicals.  On March 20, the State Supreme Court gave the supporters of
the bombing defendants a significant victory when it overruled a lower court decision that
had allowed Israel Weinberg to be held without bail.  The International Workers’ Defense
League posted his bail and ten days later, Rena Mooney was also released on bail.  While
the California Supreme Court’s decision paved the way for the resolution of Mrs. Mooney
and Mr. Weinberg’s cases, the same month the Court denied Thomas Mooney’s regular
appeal for a new trial.  They argued that they lacked the ability to set aside the ruling in
the case unless there was evidence of error, which they did not see.  According to the
Court, the only one who could save Mooney was Governor William Stephens, who had
the power to pardon the condemned man.   With a gubernatorial election slated for57
November 1918, Mooney’s case became another opportunity for labor and business to
battle over the political future of the state.
In a letter to Governor William Stephens, Andrew Furuseth, president of the
International Seamen’s Union, urged the governor to pardon Thomas Mooney and retry
Frost, The Mooney Case, 256-297.
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him on one of the other seven charges to prove his guilt or innocence.  As other union
leaders had done the previous year, Furuseth compared the injustices done to Mooney
with the actions of men like Kaiser Wilhelm, describing Mooney’s imprisonment as the
“autocratic act of an irresponsible monarch; it cannot be the act of the free State of
California.  The State cannot do this and remain a free State in the true sense of
freedom.”   When Furuseth wrote his plea, San Franciscans well understood that the58
United States was fighting abroad for democracy and an end to tyranny.  Organized
Labor had published Wilson’s Fourteen Points on the front page of its January 12, 1918
edition.  The paper proclaimed jubilantly that accomplishing these goals would allow
“working people of every nationality [to] assert their power,” replacing the “days of
double dealing diplomacy and secret compacts.”   If the United States was fighting for59
democracy abroad, then San Francisco’s workers should protect that democracy at home
as well. 
A public display of support for the release of Thomas Mooney came at a mass
meeting in the Civic Center Auditorium on April 16, 1918.  The crowd that gathered in
defense of Mooney reflected the divisive background of Mooney’s supporters and the
precarious position the city’s moderate labor unions found themselves in while
supporting Tom Mooney.  Speakers included radical activists like Mother Jones, who
pledged that labor would “no longer be content with the crumbs which fell from the
master’s table.”  Mrs. Hannah Sheehy-Skeffington, the wife of one of the Easter
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Uprising’s martyrs, struck a Marxist tone by stressing the importance of international
labor, including Bolshevik Russia, in winning Mooney’s release.  All workers, she
believed, must work together to make sure America provided justice, even to laborers.  60
At the time of the mass meeting, California authorities were cracking down on dissenters,
most notably the Industrial Workers of the World.  Governor Stephens had encouraged
employees of the state’s Division on Immigration and Housing to spy on labor activities,
including the Mooney rally.  J. Vance Thompson, reporting for the CIH, believed that
only about 20 percent of the nine thousand attendees at the Mooney rally were average
citizens.  The rest were anarchists and socialists.  
However, Thompson also had to concede that most workers who supported
Mooney were not radicals.  While extremists had infiltrated the International Workers
Defense League, which had handled all the contributions for the bombing defendants, the
organization could not be considered disloyal.  Many organizations, including the Labor
Council, had donated money to the Defense League.  Thompson believed that members
of these organizations had come to the rally because they felt “that a great wrong has been
perpetrated.”  He hoped the League would manage to weed out the subversives and
protect their patriotic image. Despite the radical dominance of the meeting that
Thompson observed, Olaf Tveitmoe, stated that the meeting itself had not been deemed
unpatriotic in any circles with whom he had spoken.  The only criticism he heard about
the mass meeting concerned a single woman in the audience who failed to stand during
Organized Labor, 20 April 1918, 5.
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the “Star-Spangled Banner.”   As it had the previous year, unions that supported Mooney61
had to be clear that they supported the convicted bomber because his views reflected their
own.  Mooney’s radical past was to be feared, and repressed publicly if possible.  
The Defense League was more successful in connecting Mooney’s cause with
organized labor during its July 28 meeting that commemorated what unions across the
country called “Mooney Day.”  Despite national support, San Francisco’s labor unions
still worried about putting on a rally that supported their cause without giving their
opponents the ammunition needed to brand them unpatriotic.  During a Labor Council
meeting the night before the rally, delegate Selig Schulberg explained that the greatest
question facing the city’s organized labor was “What can labor do?  How far can it go
without embarrassing the government war program, to prevent the judicial murder of
Tom Mooney?”  Without expressly stating it, the delegates of the Labor Council
determined that the answer lay in continuing to promote the responsibilities of labor to
the war effort while challenging the patriotism of those making a profit during this time
of sacrifice.   62
The six thousand people who attended the July meeting at Dreamland Rink
personified the reputable element of San Francisco’s unions.  Chief Justice McCoy and
several unnamed members of Congress were in attendance.  John H. Walker, now a
member of President Wilson’s Mediation Commission that had recommended a new trial
for Mooney, was the featured speaker.  Walker’s speech portrayed D. A. Charles Fickert
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as disloyal to his country and his president.  Fickert had attacked Felix Frankfurter,
secretary of the Mediation Commission, for supporting a retrial for Mooney.  In calling
Frankfurter, a man appointed by the president, a Bolshevik, Walker believed Fickert had
crossed the line of decency and had indirectly assaulted the patriotism of the president. 
While Walker only insinuated that Fickert had violated the Sedition Act, he directly
accused Fickert of connections to C. C. Crowley, a man convicted in the Hindu-German
plot (See Chapter Six).  Walker whipped up the crowd with his statement (printed in bold
type in the Bulletin): “We’ve got to lick the army of the Kaiser, and we’ve got to lick his
army that’s working under cover over here–many of them with a flag wrapped around
them, sworn to uphold justice and administer the law.”  Walker urged workers to continue
to show their support for Mooney in ways that also supported America’s war effort and
did “not cast discredit on this cause or jeopardize the men in the trenches.  Build up your
organizations and fight and agitate for five years, if necessary, instead of five months, and
you will not only make it impossible for Mooney to be hanged illegally, but you will
make it impossible for anybody else to do anything like that to a man in the ranks of the
workers.”   63
The actions of Governor William D. Stephens the day before the Mooney Day
rally led to intensified efforts on Mooney’s behalf.  Stephens granted Mooney a stay of
execution until December 13, 1918, a month after the gubernatorial election.  The
reprieve, however, only delayed Stephen’s decision on the matter and did not satisfy San




Francisco unionists or labor organizer across the country.  On July 30, delegates from the
American Federation of Labor attempted to meet with President Wilson.  The delegation
included officers from nineteen different AFL affiliated unions, along with San
Franciscans Fremont Older and Andrew Furuseth.  While the President did not meet with
the delegates, they left a written plea for the President’s assistance.   64
At the time, few knew all of the steps President Wilson had already taken to try to
win a new trial for Mooney.   In late January 1918, the President’s Federal Mediation
Commission privately issued its report to the president.  In it, the Commission questioned
the fairness of Mooney’s trial.  The Commission’s report, and Wilson’s subsequent
correspondence with Governor Stephens on the matter, was not published until Stephens
won reelection and had commuted Mooney’s sentence to life in prison.  At that time,
Stephens revealed the three telegrams he had received from the President in January,
March, and June – each requesting the commutation of Mooney’s death sentence and a
new trial.   Each telegram emphasized the significance of Mooney’s case to America’s
international relations.   With workers around the world rallying to support the cause of65
Thomas Mooney, President Wilson did not need a case in which the United State
appeared to be putting a worker to death on invalidated testimony.  Just as San
Francisco’s unionists had argued in their mass meetings, President Wilson believed the
Great War required America apply its democratic principles at home if it were to spread
those ideals to nations liberated in war. 
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The Mooney case permitted organized labor to attack its opponents as disloyal to
the nation while the unions sought to show residents the strong patriotism of their
members.  With the stabilization of inflation and the general rise in wages in 1918, most
San Francisco workers were more confident in their personal economic situations.  In this
more prosperous climate, union leaders felt that committing their members to patriotic
fund raisers was easier than it had been the previous fall.  This is evident in the different
emphasis labor put on the two major Red Cross drives during the war.  During the first in
June 1917, Organized Labor advertised the importance of giving to the Red Cross by
reminding its readers of how the organization helped San Francisco after the earthquake
and fire, not with accolades for Red Cross’s current war work.   While the paper insisted66
that President McCarthy and the Building Trades Council were showing their enthusiasm
for the local drive, the Council at the end of the drive had to add from its budget to make
the total Council contribution $500.   With sixteen thousand members in 1916, the fact67
that they raised such a small amount suggests the difficulties workers faced due to the
high cost of living.   It also reflects the fact that Building Trades Council leaders had yet68
to determine the positive effects the wartime drives could have on labor’s cause.  
  By the time of the second Red Cross drive in May 1918, the Building Trades
Council leaders had realized that the publicity they earned from supporting this patriotic
cause could aid their efforts to cast themselves as defenders of democracy.  They also
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believed that by advertising the sacrifices of workers, they could show the stark contrast
between their laborers, who gave everything they had, and their employers, who might
give more money but really sacrificed less.  Olaf Tveitmoe published his letter to the
chairman of the San Francisco Chapter of the America Red Cross, in which he gave the
drive the full support of the Building Trades Council and its affiliated unions.  A quarter
page advertisement in the paper encouraged workers to give to the Red Cross War Fund
by using the organization’s slogan: “If you knew a day’s pay would save a Life – would
you give one day a month?”69
Building Trades Council president P. H. McCarthy served as organized labor’s
most devout fundraiser and brought citywide recognition to union efforts to do their bit. 
As a Captain in the Red Cross army of volunteers, he encouraged members of the City
and State Building Trades Councils to rally their affiliated unions.  McCarthy also led
Division I of the Third Liberty Loan Drive, consisting of six groups of unionists who
canvassed the city subscribing workers to buy bonds.  Organized Labor proudly
announced the efforts of both of McCarthy’s teams, boasting that in the Liberty Loan
Drive the labor division “secured more individual subscribers than any other,” though the
paper did not provide the exact figures.   In the Red Cross drive, McCarthy’s efforts were70
front page news as Organized Labor proudly announced union victory when the labor
district team won the award for being the first group “over the top” in meeting its Red
Cross goal.  At the end of the drive Red Cross officials awarded McCarthy and his
Organized Labor (San Francisco), 18 May 1918, 1, 7.
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unionists a cup for their accomplishment.  Unlike the paltry $500 total the year before, the
Plumbers’ Union alone voted to provide a $1000 donation, which averaged out to a day’s
pay per member.  The article ends by praising the work of the Building Trades affiliated
unions and reminding all of their patriotism: “Union labor of California and America has
shown in the war emergency to all the world that they are neither anarchists, slackers or
seditionists.”71
Labor took these drives seriously and failure to participate in these public displays
of war support resulted in serious repercussions.  The Municipal Car Repairers and
Trackmen notified Mayor Rolph after the Third Liberty Loan drive that it had voted
unanimously to expel two trackman who had “persistently refused” to subscribe to the
bond drive despite being financially able to contribute.  That the men could subscribe,
and refused, threatened the image of the union – a union that had granted the mayor an
honorary membership.  As if the expelling of the two members was not enough, the letter
concluded by reminding the mayor that the members had purchased about $5,000 in the
multiple bond drives and had “voted to empty its entire treasury if needed.”   Although72
not as wealthy as their employers, labor showed that they could express just as much
loyalty, if not more, advertising their importance in winning the war in the factory and
with their financial sacrifices.
San Francisco’s labor unions also strongly supported the War Saving Stamp Plan
in 1918.  According to John S. Drum, state director for Northern California’ War-Savings
Organized Labor (San Francisco), 1 June 1918, 1.
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Stamp (W.S.S.) committee, the plan was meant to provide “every man, woman and child”
with the opportunity to do their part for the nation and served as “an appeal for economy
and thrift as a patriotic duty.”  Of all the wartime drives, the War Savings Stamp had a
particular appeal for the working class.  Each thrift stamp cost only twenty-five cents. 
Sixteen thrift stamps constituted a complete War Saving Stamp.  The minute cost of
joining in this endeavor enabled many to make daily or weekly investments in the plan,
allowing them to show their willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of the nation and
its fighting forces.  
The Labor Council endorsed the War Savings Stamp plan and requested that their
affiliated unions send the W.S.S. Committee a list of employers in their industry so they
could provide literature for the workers’ pay envelopes.  The Council promised to
admonish those unions who did not provide the reports, insisting the “slackers can be
easily prompted to make quicker returns.”  The term “slacker,” seen frequently in the
papers when rebuking men who failed to registrar or meet the draft, was also used by
Organized Labor to identify those who failed to purchase stamps. “At the present time
there is hardly a person in America who has not one or more relatives or acquaintances in
uniform. . . . Bear in mind that any person who can do anything at all to support these
men and does not do it is a slacker.”   The War Savings Stamp gave everyone the73
opportunity to prove their willingness to sacrifice luxuries to support American soldiers,
John S. Drum to San Francisco Labor Council, 27 December 1917;  San Francisco Labor
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despite the meager funds of working class families and small unions and associations.  74
True loyalty in wartime, Organized Labor insisted, required people not just to refrain
from saying anything disloyal, but required action.  Producing as much as possible in the
factories was just one way to act.  War Savings Stamps provided another.  75
Sacrifices for the war ultimately led the city's major labor unions and their leaders
to accept a more conciliatory approach toward local businessmen.  They hoped that unity
of action could bring the two sides closer together than they had been before.  At a March
1918 Chamber of Commerce luncheon, P.H. McCarthy addressed a crowd that a year
earlier he would have considered labor's enemy:  "I do not live in the past," McCarthy
told the city's businessmen, "I want this nation and our allies to so live.  Let us unite the
business and professional and working men of this country and the Prussian ideals cannot
live."   This desire to work together as a community for the promotion of war industries76
led union organizations to limit the actions of their members involved in war work.  In
June 1918 the Labor Council adopted a resolution pledging that its affiliated unions
engaged in food production, manufacturing, and distribution would not cease or interrupt
work without first attempting to resolve the matter with Ralph Merritt, California Food
Administrator.  Merritt had suggested a resolution, but left it to the officers of organized
labor do decide if it were “wise and proper.”  Merritt believed, and the Labor Council
must have agreed in passing the resolution, that “organized labor would do a patriotic and
Organized Labor, 27 April 1918, 1.
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unprecedented service” by agreeing to such a measure.   The Building Trades Council77
also accepted a similar agreement with the Emergency Fleet Corporation the following
month.  It required employers with government contracts to pay union scale, but did not
require a closed shop.   78
The pledges by the two largest labor organizations in the city show the evolution
of labor policies as the war progressed.  In the fall of 1917, both groups had supported the
Carmens’ Union strike for its attempt to gain a closed shop and argued that strikes were
necessary to protect workers.  At that time, attacking the open shop tactics of United
Railroads and its supporters in the Chamber appeared to be the best way to preserve
labor’s vision of San Francisco as a city in which labor’s voice was “heard and heeded.” 
However, the failure of the Carmen’s strike and the Chamber’s victory in thwarting D.A.
Charles Fickert’s recall forced organized labor to reassess its tactics.  By the time the war
entered its fourteenth month, labor leaders realized that to win their future demands they
had to embrace their role in fighting this war.  Whether that meant adhering to the
requests of government agencies, pledging their loyalty through oaths and financial
donations, or accepting the temporary suspension of strikes, San Francisco unionists
sought ways to prove their importance in this national crisis.  
At the same time, the discovery of Oxman’s perjured testimony meant that San
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Francisco’s organized labor continued to put pressure on the Chamber of Commerce and
others as they sought justice for Thomas Mooney.  To retain an image of national loyalty,
unions had to ignore Mooney’s radical past and concentrate on the crux of America’s
wartime crusade – democracy.  Without democracy, they argued, America’s judicial
system would crumble and no one would feel safe in their ability to get a fair and
impartial trial.  This opposition to actions that threatened American democracy served as
a rallying point for San Francisco’s working class during the war.  The emphasis on
democracy allowed unionists the ideological space necessary to denounce unfair practices
without appearing disloyal.  Olaf Tveitmoe believed that organized labor’s efforts during
the Great War – its promotion of democratic ideals and personal sacrifices – had won it
respect that would lead to significant future rewards.  “Awakened giants of Labor will be
present at the next peace conclave.  Their voice is already heard above the roar . . . and
the Giants of Labor will shout in clarion tones around the Globe–‘WE WIN.’”79
Organized labor believed America’s victory over tyranny abroad would spell victory at
home as well.




“There is no longer a hyphen . . . ”:   Living in a City of Immigrants
Three months after the United States declared war, San Franciscans celebrated
Independence Day in a way residents had not experienced since the Spanish American
War.  More than ten thousand marched from the Ferry Building to City Hall.  It took over
an hour and a half for all to complete the trek.  Mayor James Rolph, grand marshal of the
parade, served as head of the first division.  This included city officials, parade committee
members, high-ranking army officers, and members of the consuls of Russia, France, and
Italy.  Next came the military division, composed of regiments of the Coast Artillery,
national guardsmen, and the California Home Guard along with five hundred Boy Scouts. 
The final division included bands and members of the Native Sons of the Golden West,
with one hundred men hoisting an American flag over their heads.  Just behind the
American flag marched a contingent of civilians invited to participate in the parade
because they represented America’s allies in the Great War.  This group included
residents of San Francisco born in France, Russia, Italy, England, Serbia, China and
Japan.  
At the conclusion of the parade, San Franciscans made their way to the Civic
Auditorium for a rousing series of speeches in which patriotism and the wartime role of
the city’s immigrants took center stage.  The ceremony began with young girls whose
families had immigrated to San Francisco from the allied nations, reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance.  Next, a Chinese boy read the Gettysburg Address.  Mayor Rolph then gave
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the keynote address entitled “America: The Melting Pot of the Nations.”   For Rolph, San
Franciscans stood united behind their president and the nation’s call to arms, no matter
where residents’ forefathers called home.  After Rolph’s speech the audience heard from
five San Francisco residents, each born in one of the five most important nations allied
with the United States: Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia and Japan.  According to a
reporter with the San Francisco Chronicle, these five men’s speeches verbalized what all
patriotic Americans felt as they expressed “their devotion to Liberty and their hope for its
preservation by American arms in this war.”  Italian F. M. Andreani declared “there is no
longer a hyphen among the Italians in America.  The hyphen now connects Italy and
America.”   1
For Mayor Rolph, the son of immigrants, the war required all San Franciscans to
serve the United States and it alone.  However, the pronouncement by Andreani expresses
a more complicated vision of what it meant to be an American patriot and an immigrant
living in San Francisco.  Italians and other foreign-born immigrants found themselves
bound to their adopted nation like never before, but they were also still connected to their
homeland.  While Rolph sought to convey a message to residents and the nation that San
Franciscans stood united, two of the city’s largest immigrant groups, the Irish and
Germans, played no part in the day’s exercises.  It is easy to see why parade organizers
did not request their participation in a Fourth of July celebration that emphasized the
importance of immigrants as allies.  German-born residents who had not become
naturalized citizens were now alien enemies, a designation that made them antithetical to
San Francisco Chronicle, 5 July 1917, 9.
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the American image the ceremonies displayed.   While the Irish were not alien enemies,
their message also did not resonate with the patriotic support for the United States and its
allies that the city leaders sought to convey.  Irish marchers and speakers would have
undermined the image of America’s greatest ally, Great Britain, with cries of
independence for Ireland.   
Although parade organizers’ decision to reject inclusion of the Irish and Germans
in Independence Day activities appears logical, it sat in stark contrast to the iconic picture
of San Francisco as a city of immigrants.  Part of the city’s charm to visitors and residents
alike lay in its long tradition of accepting the diversity of its immigrant populace and
giving them a safe environment to express their cultural differences.  By comparing the
city’s three largest foreign-born populations – the Italians, Germans, and Irish – one can
examine the different circumstances San Francisco immigrants faced during the Great
War.  In part, that experience was determined by whether the federal government defined
their homeland as an ally, an enemy, or a diplomatic problem.  The fact that they were
residents of a diverse metropolitan city like San Francisco proved important to that
experience as well.
The immigrant experience has undergone more historical analysis than any other
single topic on the American homefront during World War I, particularly the limits
placed on civil liberties and violent action toward German-Americans.  Starting with H.C.
Peterson and Gilbert Fite’s Opponents of War in 1957, historians have frequently
highlighted the “American Reign of Terror,” the mass hysteria that led to the banning of
all things German and physical attacks against German residents suspected of unpatriotic
226
behavior.  Peterson and Fite described the burning of German books, the defacing of their
property with yellow paint, and repeated incidents of mobs forcing Germans accused of
disloyal utterances to kiss the American flag.  They considered Southern Illinois, where a
mob lynched German citizen Robert Prager on April 4, 1918, the most “mob-ridden” area
of the country as wartime hysteria reached its zenith in mid-1918.  Only after a local jury
in Collinsville, Illinois found Prager’s suspected murderers not guilty in July did
President Wilson publicly denounce vigilante justice.  It was only then that the number of
reported attacks began to abate.   2
Although the Prager case appears to be exceptional, many local and state histories
have also related hostile actions by nativists who sought to force the assimilation of
ethnic minorities and eradicate radical unionism which they associated with immigrants. 
There are a number of such case studies from the American West.  For example, one
historian found that Utah immigrants carried Liberty Bonds for protection and
occasionally these slips of paper saved them from lynching.  Other immigrant
communities suffered economically as native-born Americans refused to patronize their
businesses.  A study of South Dakota’s immigrants shows that many German Hutterites
migrated to Canada during the war because other residents refused to frequent their
businesses after they refused to swear allegiance to any country.  In these case studies,
researchers place the emphasis on the rampant nativist hysteria caused by the war and
how it helps to explain the subsequent 1919 Red Scare and the immigration legislation of
H.C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918 (Madison: University of
2
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the 1920s.   While San Francisco had a history of employing vigilante methods, and the3
creation of the Chamber’s Law and Order Committee in 1916 suggested an attempt to
rekindle the passions of 1856, San Franciscans during the Great War did not resort to
violent means.   A few reports of individuals confronting immigrants they suspected of4
disloyalty appear in local newspapers, but these were fandom, isolated incidents.
Residents expected enforcement of federal legislation by law officers and the courts,
believing law and order was best left to the professionals.  
There are three reasons those with foreign accents or surnames failed to incite
hysteria in San Francisco.  First, the size of the foreign-born population, and their native-
born children, were in the majority in San Francisco.  In 1910, the U.S. Census reported
that 31 percent of the city’s residents were foreign-born whites, and in 1920 foreign-born
immigrants still comprised 28 percent of the population.  According to the 1920 census,5
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there were 23,924 Italian-born San Francisco residents, 17 percent of the total white
foreign-born in the city.  German-born inhabitants came in second place with 18,513 (13
percent)  and the Irish just slightly behind with 18,257 (13 percent).    Despite the6
decrease in the overall number of foreign-born San Franciscans, the immigrant experience
continued to influence the city’s population.  The 1920 census showed that 39 percent of
the native-born white population reported that both of their parents had been born outside
the United States.  Another 16 percent indicated that one parent was foreign-born. 
Having at least one foreign-born parent often meant a direct link to that foreign culture,
whether in traditions passed down or extended family still living in foreign lands.  When
one adds the number of foreign-born or with at least one foreign-born parent the
percentage of San Franciscans linked by blood to foreign lands is significant.  As of 1920,
64 percent of San Francisco’s residents fell into one of the categories noted above.  7
Native-born residents with two native-born parents were a minority in San Francisco.  
The second factor that limited widespread hysteria in San Francisco was the
dispersion of its foreign-born populace.  The Italians, the most recent arrivals in the city,
were the only noticeable exception.  Forty-nine percent of the city’s Italian residents lived
in the North Beach district in 1920.  For the German and Irish immigrants, the financial
status of the family contributed more to the location of their residence than their ethnic
United States Bureau of the Census.  Fourteenth Census of the United States taken in the year
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origin.  In 1920 not one of San Francisco’s thirteen assembly districts had more than
1,900 German-born residents, but every assembly district had more than 800 German
residents.  About 30 percent of the German-born inhabitants lived in the Western
Addition, Richmond District, and the neighborhoods of Eureka, Dolores, and Buena
Vista.  All five of these neighborhoods had seen a rising number of apartments since
1906, but in the 1910s they were still characterized by middle and upper-middle class
merchants and professional who had followed the streetcar lines west out of downtown. 
The Irish were only slightly more concentrated in certain neighborhoods than the
Germans.  Ten out of thirteen assembly districts had more than 1,100 Irish immigrants
and only one of those had more than 2,000 Irish residents.   Most German and Irish8
immigrants, therefore, lived in neighborhoods with people from many different nations
and a growing number of native-born Americans.  The immigrant enclaves, which
frequently became targets of wartime hysteria in other parts of the country, were limited
to the Italians and the Asian community in Chinatown.  Since both Italy and China were
American allies in the Great War, the isolation of these groups did not pose the same
threat as in other areas of the country that had neighborhoods heavily-populated with
alien enemies.
Finally, public hostility and violence toward immigrants failed to overtake San
Francisco due to the foreign-born’s significant contributions to the development of the
city.  Longtime residents took pride in the fact that their city had been built by immigrants
United States Bureau of the Census.  Fourteenth Census of the United States taken in the year
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and continued to be molded by immigrants.  Marco Fontana, born in Genoa, founded Del
Monte and later served as president of the California Fruit Canners Association, which
operated thirty factories by the First World War.  German immigrants arrived in large
numbers starting in the 1860s, many of whom served in skilled trades and rose to
prominence in retail and commerce.  Born in Bavaria, Isaias Hellman founded a banking
house in Los Angeles in the 1860s and moved to San Francisco around the turn of the
century where he served as president of Wells Fargo-Nevada National Bank.  Many of the
city’s political leaders had immigrant roots.  German-born Julius Kahn had served in
several public offices in San Francisco since 1898 and during WWI was the
representative for California’s Fourth District.  Irishman Patrick McCarthy was a former
mayor and longtime president of the Building Trades Council.  The native-born children
of San Francisco’s immigrant founders continued to pronounce publicly their immigrant
heritage.  Senator James Phelan’s father was from Ireland, and during World War I he
frequently delivered messages from Irish associations to President Wilson.  The three
sons of German-born Claus Spreckels, who founded the California Sugar Refinery,
continued to pursue business interests in the city.   San Franciscans did not question the9
loyalty of men like Rudolph Spreckels or Senator Phelan or members of any other
prominent immigrant families.  They served as models of what San Franciscans believed
all immigrants could achieve if they showed initiative and resourcefulness.  As a result,
most of San Franciscans with ethnic ties continued to feel comfortable expressing their
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foreign heritage.  They continued to see San Francisco as an urban environment that
accepted the ethnic diversity of its residents and took pride in its moniker, the City of
Immigrants. 
In other areas of the country, nativist fears of German spies – whom they believed
had infiltrated their communities – triggered the physical and verbal attacks against those
whose name or accent suggested German origin.  While many reports of German spy
rings turned out to be nothing more than rumors, San Francisco was center stage for a spy
drama that included actors from three continents.  In February 1916 a federal grand jury
in San Francisco issued indictments against German Consul-General Franz Bopp and five
other consular employees.  More indictments were to follow, targeting American
supporters of Bopp, including owners and agents of several shipping firms, customs
brokers, San Francisco merchants, and crewmen on the steamship Sacramento.   Federal10
prosecutors based their case on the confessions of one man who testified that those
indicted planned to bomb ships and trains carrying Allied war supplies in the United
States and Canada.  The strongest evidence was against Bopp and the five employees of
the German consul.  In January 1917 a San Francisco jury convicted them of conspiracy
to violate the portion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that made restraining interstate trade
a federal offense.   In sentencing the defendants, Judge Hunt declared that “neutrality11
carries with it affirmative obligations.  The United States canot [sic] be supine and permit
its laws, designed to protect neutrality, to be disregarded by the subjects of any foreign
San Francisco Call and Post, 8 February 1916, 1; San Francisco Calla and Post, 9 February
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ruler with whom the United States is at peace.”   Judge Hunt’s decision gave U.S.12
Attorney John W. Preston the legal grounds necessary to prosecute other cases in which
America’s neutrality had been threatened, most notably by Germans and German-
sympathizers.
From the evidence obtained in Bopp’s trial, U.S. Attorney Preston built a wider
case related to the smuggling of weapons to India by the German government, a
conspiracy known as the German-Hindu plot.  By July 1917, a federal grand jury in San
Francisco had indicted ninety-eight members of this conspiracy, “from the millionaire
capitalist to the lowly Hindu laborer, and located in nearly every section of the world.”  
Courts in Chicago and New York handled conspirators in their districts.  In San
Francisco, the prosecution tried Bopp, Vice-Consul Eckhardt von Schack, several
shipping brokers, and several Indian nationalists, including the editor of San Francisco’s
Hindustan Gadar, Ram Chandra.   The case hinged on the British confiscation of arms13
and ammunition bound for India aboard ships paid for by the German consulate in San
Francisco.  The trial made public a worldwide German conspiracy to instigate revolution
in British colonies. The jury convicted all but one of the defendants who stood trial, with
Bopp and von Schack receiving the heaviest sentences of two years in prison and a
$10,000 fine.   The German-Hindu plot captured the city’s attention, and many residents14
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wondered if other German spy networks had yet to become known.  As one anonymous
writer for Town Talk put it, the war required “a kind of alertness bordering on
suspiciousness.”   It did not, however, warrant hysterical reaction against Germans living
in San Francisco.  15
The conviction of individuals who had lived in the city for years, and in some
cases married San Francisco natives, could have ignited fears of resident Germans, but
the aforementioned factors prevented residents from going on a hunt for other potential
German spies.   Even the federal government’s policy toward alien enemies did little
more than increase awareness of the number of non-naturalized Germans living in the
city.   In the weeks after the war declaration, the Wilson administration ordered all
German citizens to surrender any firearms.  The government also prohibited them from
entering restricted zones of one-half mile around docks, factories, and arsenals considered
vital to the war effort.  In San Francisco, the restricted zones included Fort Miley, the
Presidio, Fort Mason, the State Armory, and Union Iron Works.   In December 1917, the16
federal government announced that all male Germans and Austro-Hungarians over
fourteen years of age had to register with local police.  By the beginning of April 1918
San Francisco had 3,793 registrants.  That number increased over the summer as the
federal government expanded its scope to include female alien enemies and American
Town Talk: The Pacific Weekly (San Francisco), 17 February 1917, 6.
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women married to alien enemies.   In each case, registration meant that police monitored17
the person’s whereabouts.  If the individual wanted to move, he or she had to report those
plans to authorities and receive permission.  They could receive special approval to live
or work in the restricted zones, but authorities could revoke those passes if there was even
the slightest suspicion of shady behavior.   18
Overseeing alien registration, investigating complaints, and granting various
permits to aliens prompted Police Chief D. A. White to create the Neutrality Squad,
consisting of German-speaking officers.  The oath sworn by registrants only required that
they “conform to the laws of the United States.”  However, the Neutrality Squad also
required proof of registrants’ patriotism to demonstrate that they were not a threat to
America.    The Neutrality Squad investigated the overall attitude of the registrants,19
along with their subscription to the Liberty Bond drives, war thrift stamps, Red cross
fund-raisers and any other patriotic drives.    Failure to show support for the American20
war cause was grounds for revoking permits, jail time, and in the most extreme cases
deportation.
Having every aspect of their loyalty questioned by police and federal law
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enforcement officials meant becoming publicly marked as suspicious individuals. 
However, San Franciscans considered the actions of the Neutrality Squad sufficient
institutional oversight of the alien’s in San Francisco.  Residents considered it their
patriotic duty to inform the Squad of suspicious actives, but they left the investigation and
the assigning of punishment to law enforcement officials.  In the case of Kurt Kauffman,
a porter at the Buena Vista Café, the police had granted him a permit allowing him to
work in the restricted zone because an American citizen had vouched for his character. 
Kauffman then celebrated this accomplishment by bringing liquor to work, which
violated the dry zone around the Presidio.  Upon realizing this, his employer reported the
matter to the Neutrality Squad.  Rather than firing Kauffman, or removing him from the
premises by force, his boss turned the matter over to authorities who revoked the permit
and Kauffman lost his job.   The Buena Vista Café owner gave the authorities the21
information they needed and left it to the Neutrality Squad to handle the incident.  Other
cases in San Francisco show a similar pattern of behavior by residents.   When someone22
violated the law, alien immigrant or not, they alerted the police.  The existence of the
Neutrality Squad strengthened residents’ confidence in their police department’s ability to
handle potential German subversives, preventing wartime hysteria from taking hold as it
did in other areas of the country.
There is no doubt that having their actions monitored by the city’s Neutrality
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Squad undermined the civil liberties of German citizens, but the sense of security most
residents felt in having the Squad allowed aliens to maintain relatively normal daily
routines.   The case of Frederick G. Schiller, director of the San Francisco Municipal
Orchestra, illustrates the support San Franciscans provided fellow residents designated
alien enemies.  Schiller had taken out his first citizenship papers in 1914 but had not
applied for the final papers before the war declaration when the federal government
halted all final applications.  Schiller and his American-born wife lived within the half-
mile restricted zone around Fort Mason.  Rather than impose on one of his American
friends to vouch for him, Schiller moved out of the zone in May 1917.   At the time,23
Schiller was in the middle of the Municipal Orchestra’s inaugural season and at no time
did anyone suggest the city replace him.  Newspapers lauded Schiller’s directorial talents
and praised the Orchestra’s cultural contributions and promotion of a kind of musical
democracy in San Francisco.  The Labor Clarion believed the Orchestra was a way for
San Francisco to stand apart from other American cities.  The orchestra was “conclusive
proof of San Francisco’s distinctiveness among American municipalities, when 10,000
persons, representing every walk of life, will attend and show their appreciation of really
good music, played by a really good orchestra, at the nominal cost of 10 cents.”   The24
Bulletin called the orchestra a “musical democratizer” for serving all citizens the best
musical concerts.   25
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Schiller created a monthly Municipal Orchestra schedule that all residents could
appreciate.  Each concert included popular songs, requested by previous audiences who
filled out forms clipped from their concert programs.  It also included more highbrow
selections performed by notable professional musicians from the area.  Music was thus
chosen by Schiller, the audience, and performers and included German compositions. 
These German pieces did not generate negative reaction from the audience, the media, or
the Board of Supervisors who oversaw the concerts.   26
The Municipal Orchestra’s 1917 season was considered a success and plans were
underway for a second season in the Spring of 1918.  However, in early 1918 the Board
of Supervisors unanimously adopted a resolution that the city could employ no alien
enemy in any capacity.  They insisted that this was not personal, but a more precise
reading of the city’s charter that stated that municipal employees had to be citizens.  27
Evidently, the Board of Supervisors had ignored this part of the charter when hiring
Schiller.   When Supervisor Emmet Hayden made the rest of the Board aware of the
discrepancy, everyone realized the necessity of working within the charter.  
While the Board of Supervisors claimed that Schiller’s firing was simply a matter
of complying with the city charter, several articles in the San Francisco Chronicle
San Francisco Municipal Orchestra Programs, 1917-1918, San Francisco Public Library, San
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suggested otherwise.  In making the Board aware of the city charter’s stipulation, Hayden
– chair of the Supervisor’s Auditorium Committee – sought to reduce the budget of the
Municipal Orchestra.  At the end of the first season, Supervisors had voted to double
Schiller’s salary.  This reduced the municipal funds available for other musical
performances Hayden believed were just as important as the Municipal Orchestra.  The
war demands on the city budget also prevented Hayden from getting an increase in funds
for Civic Auditorium events.  With Schiller gone, the Board of Supervisors decided to
suspend the 1918 season of the Municipal Orchestra, citing the “conservation policy of
the government.” They argued that the city’s other music opportunities, such as the
Municipal Band and the privately-sponsored Symphony Orchestra would provide
sufficient entertainment for residents.   Although Frederick Schiller lost his job due to28
his alien enemy status, it was not the result of pressure by San Franciscans that led to his
dismissal.  Just being labeled an alien enemy by the federal government was not enough
to cause San Franciscans to reject what the city’s immigrant populace had to contribute.
San Franciscans praised the work of Franz Schiller because he brought to the city
a musical experience that accepted class differences.  The Municipal Orchestra provided a
wide array of music; everything from the recently released popular war tunes to the
classical compositions more commonly performed by the highbrow Symphony Orchestra. 
Residents believed that all music could be socially beneficial, whether it was boosting
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war morale or refining residents’ cultural tastes.  While Germany was the enemy, many
San Franciscans defended German and Austrian-born performers and the culture they
expressed because they believed in the music’s uplifting qualities.  In April 1917,
renowned Austrian violinist Fritz Kreisler was touring California.  Kreisler, a soldier in
the Austrian army in 1914, was wounded on the Eastern Front and spent most of the war
in America with his wife.  The editor of the Bulletin, Fremont Older, encouraged San
Franciscans to support Kreisler’s tour because he was a shining example of the “friendly
cosmopolitan phases of his countrymen’s personality.”  While Fremont noted Kreisler
was an alien enemy, he marveled at the power of his music to move “the hearts of
humanity.”  He regarded Kreisler’s gift to the people of San Francisco as far more
significant than his nationality.   The people of San Francisco generally agreed with such29
sentiments and Kreisler’s San Francisco concerts were well-attended.   30
Singer Ernestine Schumann-Heink, who had one son fighting in the German navy
and three serving in the U.S. Army, also received a warm reception in San Francisco. 
Despite being born in Austria, the San Francisco War Camp Community Service asked
the celebrated contralto to headline a concert for the troops at Camp Fremont in June
1918.  Surrounded by ten thousand singing soldiers, Schumann-Heink opened her part of
the program with Bach’s “My Heart Ever Faithful.”  The WCCS approved Schumann-
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Heink’s selections and did not believe there was anything disloyal about an Austrian
singer opening with a well-loved German song.   The song, according to music critic
Walter Anthony, was the perfect selection to set the emotional tone of Schumann-Heink’s
set.  The “Bachian simplicity and directness are singularly suited to an assurance which
carries with it so much which should cause us deepest gratitude.”    As was the case with31
Schiller, San Franciscans considered the musical attributes of Kreisler and Schumann-
Heink to be more important than their ethnic origin.  Each provided San Franciscans the
highest quality experience from a world-renowned performer.  That was far more
important than the fact that their homeland was America’s enemy.
The support for German-born musicians and the acceptance of music by German
composers reflected the efforts of San Franciscans to differentiate between positive
German attributes and German characteristics that had caused German aggression. 
Fremont Older expressed this sentiment the day President Wilson singed the war
declaration.  He encouraged all German-Americans to show their allegiance to the United
States.  However, he insisted that such loyalty did not “require them to give up the
attempt to plant in American the nobler part of German civilization,” built on the cultural
achievements of “poets, novelists, musicians, philosophers, scientists and inventors” who
had “helped to humanize and beautify the world.”  What America was fighting, Older
argued, was the Germany of “agrarian, industrial and military autocracy.”  For Older, the
venerable German qualities would serve as the foundation of a new Germany after the
war.  They should not, therefore, be destroyed along with what he described as the
San Francisco Chronicle, 10 June 1918, 9.
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savagery of Prussian militarism.    32
Unlike other parts of the country, and even other communities in California, San
Franciscans sought to define and preserve elements of German culture they considered
noble.  In May 1918, the State Board of Education authorized the barring of the German
language in the state’s high schools.  Three weeks later, the state’s high school principals’
association voted to support the Board’s resolution.  However, in San Francisco there was
a genuine desire to keep teaching German in the schools.  The San Francisco Teacher’s
Association believed that only the night classes, taught by the German American Alliance
(whose national leadership was under investigation by the Senate), should be cancelled. 
Those German language courses taught by the regular faculty must continue.   They
insisted that “yielding to prejudice and hysteria” would deny students the opportunity to
learn a language that would “be a most helpful contribution toward the final overthrow of
the military masters of Germany.”   City teachers received support from the Civic33
League of Improvement, which argued that “the language itself was not dangerous” and
had “distinct advantage when put to patriotic uses.”   Members of the Civic League, as
they looked to San Francisco’s economic future, believed German speakers would be
crucial in developing business relations with postwar Germany.  They argued that the
only materials that should be excluded from the public schools were those that promoted
German militarism and loyalty to the kaiser.   These arguments reflected the desire by34
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32
The Bulletin (San Francisco), 21 May 1918, 9;  The Bulletin, 14 April 1917, 7;  The Bulletin, 24
33
April 1918, 5;  San Francisco Chronicle, 24 April 1918, 5.
Civic League of Improvement Clubs and Associations of San Francisco 4 (May 1918), 8.
34
242
many in San Francisco to divorce Germany’s current government from its past cultural
achievements and the future necessity of aiding Germany in implementing democracy. 
While not every resident of the city agreed with the Civic League or the Teacher’s
Association, the fact that two citywide organizations publicly refused to become
intolerant of all things German denotes the relative security in which residents of German
descent lived during the war.  German books were not burned and musicians were not
attacked for singing songs by German composers or speaking in the German tongue.
It is impossible to know how many San Franciscans opposed the continued use of
the German language or made derogatory comments to their German neighbors about
their ethnic background.  A handful of letters to Mayor Rolph suggests that at least some
individuals were suspicious of those whose last names sounded German.  However, there
is no evidence that they physically attacked those neighbors or threatened them in any
other way.   A few individuals with German surnames chose to change their names during
the war, as did German associations and businesses.  However, the reasons given for the
changes did not indicate significant pressure from other San Franciscans.  Irving Kaiser
changed his name because he was going to be drafted and did not think a patriotic soldier
in uniform should answer to the name Kaiser.   Joseph Jacob Rosenthal changed his35
name to Rosedale as a display of loyalty, but admitted that his German name had never
hindered him from “being one hundred per cent American.”   36
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For each person who changed his or her name, many others saw no need to do so
and did not feel pressured by neighbors to do any more than they were already doing for
the war effort.  Fred Boecken, superintendent of the Municipal Railway, told Mayor
Rolph that it had never occurred to him that his last name “might be construed as
German” and had not felt pressured to “advertise in any way” his contributions to the war
effort.   Some businesses, like the German Savings and Loan and the German Hospital,37
omitted the word German from their names.  They replaced the word with something that
reflected their institution’s commitment to the United States.   Executive officers may38
have undertaken the change to show support for the American cause, but both businesses
were still firmly entrenched in the German community.  Franklin Hospital received
significant funding from German societies, while German-born directors still ran the San
Francisco Savings and Loan and had German -born depositors.  San Franciscans did not
equate all things German as treasonable during the war, as some historians looking at the
national trends toward German-Americans suggest.   They accepted the German heritage39
of residents as part of the cosmopolitan nature of their city. 
Living in San Francisco also afforded protection to the city’s largest ethnic group,
the Italians.  Because most Italians were recent immigrants, they faced scrutiny from state
and federal authorities, partly the result of changes in California’s political culture just as
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37
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America entered World War I.  When Hiram Johnson, Sr. refused to give up his
gubernatorial seat until the beginning of the Senate’s emergency session in March 1917,
he created a permanent rift between the state’s Progressives and the new Republican
governor, William D. Stephens.  Stephens could be considered a nominal reformer and
supporter of progressive ideals, but his desire to create a political machine independent of
Hiram Johnson and northern California progressives led him to develop an increasingly
conservative administration during the war.  Stephens used the threat of radicals,
particularly the I.W.W., to draw power away from northern California and the
progressives whom he insisted had allowed anarchists to conduct activities for years.  
This war on radicalism became an effective tool for anyone aspiring to state
political office well into the 1920s.   The work of the state’s Commission on40
Immigration and Housing is a case in point.  Under Governor Stephens directives, the
CIH spent the war targeting those whom they considered the most likely radicals – recent
immigrants.  When investigating these potential threats to national security in San
Francisco, the CIH targeted the Italian communities because many were recent immigrant
and because the large concentration of Italians in the ethnic enclave of North Beach
suggested a lack of assimilation.  The CIH determined that the best way to thwart
radicalism in San Francisco and throughout the state was through Americanization
programs and infiltration of radical organizations.  However, San Francisco’s Italian
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community resisted outside pressure to Americanize.  They sought to adopt only those
American attributes that they felt were essential to personal advancement and rejected
efforts to eliminate their ethnic identity.  
In June 1913, the people of California voted to create the Commission of
Immigration and Housing.  The progressive agenda of the CIH was to “make full inquiry,
examination and investigation into the condition, welfare and industrial opportunities of
all immigrants arriving and being within the state.”  CIH pursued this goal by developing
opportunities for immigrant education, inspecting working and living conditions, and
making sure that employers did not exploit immigrants by violating the state’s labor
laws.   Although not directly authorized in the CIH act, CIH agents infiltrated labor41
organizations like the A.F.L. and I.W.W. in order to understand the grievances of
immigrant laborers better.   After the United States entered the war, the CIH feared that42
the conservative element in the state, who opposed the social work of the agency, might
try to shut down the CIH under the guise of wartime efficiency.  Ironically, in their
attempts to defend the agency, CIH members abandoned much of their social work for the
duration of the war.  Instead, they emphasized their role in creating an Americanization
program and reporting potential security threats to state and federal authorities.
The first part of the CIH’s wartime strategy utilized its traditional role as student
of the immigrant condition to launch a statewide Americanization program.  The State
Commission of Immigration and Housing, “Americanization,” (Sacramento: California state
41
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Council of Defense, led by Los Angeles businessman A. H. Naftzger, requested CIH help
in explaining the war situation to the state’s immigrant populace.  The State Council of
Defense wanted CIH to hire foreign speakers who could educate recent immigrants
regarding their wartime responsibilities.  The Council of Defense questioned the loyalty
of people who had yet to assimilate into American culture and sought to provide
educational opportunities that would create 100 percent Americans.  In May 1917, CIH
and San Francisco city attorney George L. Bell helped Mayor Rolph and the Board of
Education launch a free night school that included English and citizenship classes.   Bell43
also worked with San Francisco’s “Literary Exercises” Committee, a subcommittee of the
Federation of Women’s Clubs, that organized women volunteers willing to teach
Americanization classes in their neighborhoods.   Rather than emphasizing its44
progressive mandate to provide oversight of immigrant living and working conditions, the
classes illustrated the reinvention of the CIH as a commission formed to “bring about a
more rapid assimilation and Americanization of foreign-born people within the State.”  45
During the war the information they gathered had little to do with how immigrants lived. 
Instead, they focused on how best to make them loyal American citizens. 
During the war, CIH’s agents imbedded in the state’s labor unions became an
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important source of information regarding radical activity in the state.  The CIH
employed J. Vance Thompson, chairman of the Alaska Fishermen’s Union, to infiltrate
the I.W.W. in the Bay Area.  At the beginning of the war, Thompson found few dues-
paying members of the I.W.W. in San Francisco.  However, he believed that the radical
union had the “ability to grasp opportunities to spread.”  Thompson believed the Italians
in North Beach were most susceptible to I.W.W. propaganda for two reasons.  First,
Thompson noted that since 1910, the number of Southern Italians in San Francisco had
risen significantly.  North Beach leaders, most of them from Northern Italy, perpetuated a
stereotype of Southern Italians as having a lower intelligence, less formal education, and
less financial resources.  Thompson accepted this stereotype when he expressed concern
that fishing captains and canneries were unknowingly hiring German and Austrian aliens,
posing as Scandinavian immigrants, who could easily manipulate the feeble minds of
Italian fishermen and cannery hands.  He believed that subversives had encouraged
Italians to abandon fishing vessels the day before a ship was set to sail, leaving the ship
without a full crew and delaying by weeks the sailing of the fleet.  By delaying when
ships sailed, these ignorant Italians reduced the nation’s food supply and severely
undermined the nation’s economic security.  Thompson also feared that anarchists had
begun to infiltrate the canning factories of the Bay.  He believed such activities would
eventually result in attacks on vital war-related industries by Italians too gullible to
understand the consequences of their actions.46
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The second reason Thompson considered the Italian community the most likely
target of I.W.W. recruitment was their acceptance of jobs that prevented them from living
in the city year round.  Agricultural workers and sailors frequently spent their off season
in San Francisco, but their impermanence thwarted the San Francisco Labor Council’s
attempts to unionize these laborers.   This lack of organization indicated a lack of47
permanent ties to the city or their labor, both of which concerned Thompson and others
during the war.  Thompson paid close attention to the general movement of transients in
the Bay Area, reporting to CIH officials any time he noted a “jungling up” of such
workers.  Thompson believed such enclaves, whether rural or urban, were safe places for
Wobblies and other radicals to hide, blending seamlessly into the transient populace. 
Thompson considered these radicals to be far more dangerous than members of the
I.W.W., who publicly professed their loyalties by attending meetings at local headquarters
across the state.  For Thompson and those who read and responded to his reports, the
unknown identities and intentions of migratory workers required constant surveillance. 
Thompson helped to intensify fears of immigrants among the transients by claiming many
were really Austrian and German spies who ran their covert operations so far
underground that their names and identities were unknown, even to those who did their
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bidding.       48
Under the auspices of the Espionage Act, state and federal authorities raided
I.W.W. headquarters across the country on September 5, 1917.  Federal marshals
collected evidence in the two I.W.W. offices in San Francisco – the headquarters on Third
Street and the Latin Branch on Stockton Street.  Other raids took place in Oakland,
Sacramento, Stockton, and Fresno.  They sent materials taken from the offices to Chicago
to aid the Federal Grand Jury’s investigation into the national headquarters, which was
closed with the arrest of 125 individuals.   While no arrests occurred in San Francisco on49
September 5, another raid of the Latin Branch the following day led to fives arrests.  The
head of the Latin Branch, Louis Parenti, was one of those arrested.  J. Vance Thompson
had already reported that Parenti was a leading I.W.W. agitator in the Bay Area,
organizing Italians in both San Francisco and Oakland.   50
Parenti and four others in San Francisco were among ten men extradited from
California to Chicago to stand trial in December 1917.  In supporting this extradition,
U.S. Commissioner Francis Krull argued that there was no reason to keep the ten men in
the state because “these men were not really residents of California.”    In Parenti’s case,51
there was no evidence that he had ever made any steps toward American citizenship. 
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Krull used this lack of commitment to the United States as evidence of disloyalty.  While
Parenti was the only one from the Latin Branch sent to Chicago to stand trial, San
Francisco newspapers noted that the other Italians arrested in the raids were dangerous
because they too refused to become American citizens.   Before the war, many Italians52
had considered their American residency as temporary, hoping to make enough money to
live a better life in Italy.  Between 1908 and 1923 60 percent of Italians in the United
States returned to Italy.   Therefore, many Italians living in San Francisco made no effort53
to become naturalized citizens.  However, during the war this lack of permanency, and
lack of American citizenship, added to concerns about Italian loyalty and their ties to
radical groups.
Governor Stephen’s blamed the December 1917 bombing of the governor’s
mansion in Sacramento on the Wobblies. Two months later a federal grand jury in
Sacramento indicted fifty-three members for violation of the Espionage Act.  With these
indictments, the state and federal government believed that they had arrested the
leadership of the state’s Wobblies.   Law enforcement personnel continued to undermine54
the I.W.W. by arresting individuals for passing out handbills without a permit or on
charges of vagrancy.  They also joined with the Department of Justice in persistent raids
on local headquarters.  By Spring 1918, Thompson conceded that such efforts had driven
many “wise wobs” and “footloose rebs” underground or to new “haunts,” where their
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activities might go unnoticed.   The intense scrutiny by law enforcement prevented unity
and Thompson perceived no impending plots.  Instead, what he observed were
individuals gathering in “Bohemian” groups to discuss their “‘ists and ‘isms.”  55
Thompson spent most of 1918 following the activities of migrant workers in Stockton,
San Jose, and the East Bay, “with their large Socialist populations, and pro-German
elements.”   Thompson did not believe the radicals had been purged from San Francisco,56
but the city was not a haven for radicals with plots to overthrow the government.  This
lack of imminent danger, along with a poorly organized Americanization plan, allowed
Italians in San Francisco to define assimilation for themselves. 
Part of this freedom to pick and choose what elements of American culture to
adopt resulted in the CIH’s failure to implement a unified Americanization plan.  In San
Francisco, George Bell struggled with a committee – consisting of educators, labor
representatives, and businessmen – that wanted to form an independent San Francisco
City and County Committee on Americanization.  Bell urged the committee to adopt the
CIH’s Americanization plan, which allowed CIH to appoint county directors they felt
most qualified to handle the job.   However, the committee did not readily accept Bell’s57
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insistence, and soon afterwards Bell accepted a position with the National Labor Board in
Washington, D.C.  With Bell gone, the CIH’s Americanization program in San Francisco
languished.  The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce tried to assume control of the
city’s Americanization efforts, but it was no more successful in getting the various urban
associations to accept a comprehensive directive.  The CIH did eventually unveil a
statewide Americanization plan – after the war ended.   This lack of organization and58
centralized direction allowed immigrant groups like the Italians in San Francisco to
develop their own brand of Americanization; one that allowed them to choose the
elements of American political and social culture they believed best suited their Italian
traditions. 
Despite fears that San Francisco Italians might succumb to the radical ideologies
of transients in their midst, the ethnic enclave remained relatively impervious to attacks
on their loyalty.  The community’s leaders, the prominenti, had arrived in San Francisco
before the swell of Italian immigrants after 1900.  Many established manufacturing firms
in and around the North Beach district had hired recent arrivals from their homeland.  The
prominenti maintained their leadership in North Beach by dispersing the least skilled and
most transient Italians to agricultural areas outside the city and preventing their own
workers from unionizing.  While the prominenti’s power in North Beach did not abate
with the war, their workers wrestled some control away from them.  During the war, each
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side in the labor struggle crafted a public image of respectability and enhanced loyalty to
their adopted nation as ways to protect the entire community.  Laborers fought to
unionize, working to establish respectability among the city’s strong labor unions by
rejecting the stereotype of themselves as radicals and transients.  Prominenti displayed
loyalty to the United States through their financial sacrifices while expressing the vitality
of their Italian traditions.  These images of the Italians as loyal residents of America
protected the Italian majority and allowed them to maintain their Italian heritage without
the anti-immigrant hysteria and repercussions that existed elsewhere.  59
One area in which San Francisco Italians separated themselves from the specter of
radicalism was in the food canning industry.  In July 1917, cannery workers in San Jose
and San Francisco established the first cannery workers’ union through the A.F.L.
affiliate, Toilers of the World.  The new union then voted to strike, demanding an
increase in pay, an eight-hour workday, and safer working conditions.  The California
Fruit Canners Association, led by Italian-born Marco Fontana, attacked the workers as
radical foreigners.  In a telegram to President Wilson, Fontana insisted that this was not a
strike over wages, but a “conspiracy to stop fruit and vegetable packing resulting in
destruction to large quantities of food products absolutely necessary for use of our Army
and Navy our Allies and the country at large.”   J. Vance Thompson reported to the CIH60
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that the more efficient Chinese and Italian cannery hands were being scared off and
replaced by Germans and Austrians who had instigated the strike.    Many of the five61
thousand striking workers were immigrants, but there is no evidence to support
Thompson’s claim that alien enemies or radicals instigated the strike.  The Italian cannery
workers vehemently rejected the accusation that syndicalist rage fueled their motives. 
They had originally formed the Toilers of the World for agricultural workers who wanted
to distance themselves from the Agricultural Workers’ Industrial Union, which was part
of the I.W.W.   By joining the A.F.L., the Toilers clearly aligned with more moderate62
union ideals, as espoused by A.F.L. founder Samuel Gompers.  
In their attempt to win respectability, the striking cannery workers used their
affiliation with a patriotic union, and their long-term residency in the Bay Area.  One
Italian worker in San Jose, flanked by his wife and eight children, reported to journalist
Fred Williams that he and most of the cannery workers had lived in the valley for
upwards of twenty years and had no connections to radicals or German spies.  They were
law-abiding residents whose loyalty lay with their adopted country.  Just like the United
Railroad carmen in San Francisco who went on strike in August 1917, they were
suffering from the effects of wartime inflation (see Chapter Five).  Most had never been
on strike before and were shocked when the Canners’ Association branded them as
I.W.W. traitors and threatened to hire private guards to drive the strikers out of town. 
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The newly organized cannery union challenged the power of the Canners’ Association by
portraying itself as an organization of devoted residents.  They were not the stereotypical
transient laborers that Fontana claimed were thwarting the patriotic endeavors of the
cannery owners.  “Drive us out of town?, “ the man with eight kids said.  “Why, man this
is our home.”   63
Although their strike threatened to hamper the nation’s ability to feed its troops,
the actions of the Italian canners proved to the public that their cause was a respectable
one.  Union workers showed solidarity by traveling from San Francisco to San Jose where
they peacefully rallied.  Their speeches and demands showed a lack of radical discourse,
focusing instead on basic labor demands.  The inclusion of women at the rally in San
Jose, and the women’s interviews with arbitrators, lent respectability to the union and the
strike.  In expressing their demands, the women stressed the improprieties of their male
supervisors and the cruel treatment they received.  They described the cannery
supervisors as “vile and insulting” and heartless men who forced them to label boiling hot
jars with their bare hands.  Such descriptions drew public support for the strike and
prevented residents from considering the strike an attempt by radicals to disrupt
America’s war effort.  The need to get canned food to the Allied soldiers prevented a
prolonged battle in the canneries.  The council of arbitrators secured a wage increase for
all cannery workers and the California Industrial Welfare Commission promised to
resolve the women’s complaints regarding working conditions.  The Canners’
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Association also agreed to take back all striking workers.   Italian cannery workers won64
their demands by proving that their cause was valid and by deflecting attacks aimed at
labeling them disloyal.  Many San Franciscans regarded them as respectable union
members and permanent residents of the urban metropolis. 
Italians also had the opportunity during the war to celebrate publicly their heritage
without fear of attack for appearing less than 100 percent American.  Since Italy was an
American ally, Italians could show patriotism for America by promoting the glories of
Italy.  Their patriotic efforts suggest that there were elements of American culture that
they were willing to adapt, but they controlled the level of their assimilation.  The Vittoria
Colonna Club, an exclusively married Italian women’s organization, knitted and sewed
for the Red Cross.  It also sponsored cooking demonstrations that taught Italian women
about food conservation and canning.  At the same time, these women did not
Americanize their meals for the sake of the war effort as was encouraged by the Food
Administration.  Instead, they learned to prepare wheatless pastas and polenta dishes and
adapted other conservation practices to their traditional Italian cooking.   In both 191765
and 1918 citywide celebrations marked the anniversary of Italy’s entrance into the war. 
Italians incorporated into these fetes plenty of patriotic songs and speeches made in
English by non-Italians and Italians alike.  However, the crowning achievement of these
events, for Italians and other San Francisco patrons, was the inclusion of Operatic acts
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performed by the San Francisco Grand Opera Company.  Louise Taber considered the
opera company to be a significant venture for all San Franciscans.  It was a “popular-
priced” opera house, filled with professional artists that provided the city with high
caliber performances.   66
As with the German-Americans in San Francisco, the cultural offerings of the
Italian community were supported because they were considered important to the city’s
cosmopolitan identity.  Despite the war, foreign traditions added social flavor and had the
ability to refine the tastes of those who cared to listen or participate.  For Italian residents,
the war provided an opportunity to promote their heritage as part of the larger patriotic
exercise.  They did not define their celebrations as purely American or entirely Italian but
as a melding of the best both cultures had to offer.  Such efforts before and during the war
sought to unite San Francisco’s Italians in a common cause: a better, and permanent, life
for Italians in America.  What they wanted was not a wholly American experience but a
more “grandiose Italian life” in San Francisco.   Despite anti-immigrant rhetoric from67
Governor Stephens and attempts to label Italians as saboteurs and radicals, the Italians of
San Francisco maintained their colonia.   Through their patriotic displays and their
insistence that their residents were permanent, they claimed to be a part of San
Francisco’s loyal constituency.   
The Irish in San Francisco faced a unique situation during the Great War.  Ireland,
as part of Great Britain, was an American ally and as such Irish-Americans did not face
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the regulations imposed on German citizens.  However, the 1916 Easter Uprising in
Ireland forced Americans of Irish decent into a precarious position.  In supporting their
homeland’s quest for independence, they directly challenged America’s strongest ally in
the war.  Unlike the Italians, the Irish in San Francisco were strongly entrenched in
positions of urban leadership that protected them from serious questions regarding their
loyalty to America.  Irish San Franciscans could interlock their goals of an independent
Ireland with America’s wartime patriotism, giving them the ability to criticize the British
government and still be American patriots.   President Wilson’s vision of the Great War
as a battle for global democracy gave credence to their cause of Irish independence and
gave them the confidence to challenge those who suggested anything other than complete
sovereignty.  However, the prosecution of a small number of San Francisco’s Irish
residents illustrates the repercussions for individuals who refused to ally the cause of
Ireland with that of the United States.
While the Italians of San Francisco were mostly recent emigrants, the city’s Irish
population had contributed to the urban ethnic make-up from the very beginning.  In 1880
one-third of San Francisco’s populace was Irish.   In comparison to eastern cities,68
frontier dynamics allowed these first generation Irish San Franciscans to easily establish
leadership positions in politics, unions, religion, and law.  By the time World War I
began, Irish-Americans were employed in every municipal government department.  They
made up most of the city’s police officers and municipal office workers.  A number of the
Charles Wollenberg, Golden Gate Metropolis:  Perspectives on Bay Area History (Berkeley: 
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city’s Supervisors, most notably Andrew Gallagher, came from Ireland or had Irish
parents.  Gallagher also served in the leadership of the Labor Council, which fellow
Irishman John O’Connell presided over.   In the city’s Catholic Archdiocese, Father Peter
C. Yorke consistently championed labor’s cause and sovereignty for his homeland.   69
Yorke and many San Franciscans of Irish descent used their leadership positions to rally
their fellow compatriots – both Irish and American – to support the independence of
Ireland.  They believed the freedom of Ireland to be intrinsically linked to the American
fight for democracy.  In pressing this cause, they frequently found themselves espousing
ideas that others considered bordering on treason.  However, with so many residents of
Irish descent and so many San Francisco Irish in positions of economic and political
power, attacks on their loyalty died out as quickly as they appeared.
In the year after the 1916 Easter Week Uprising, Irish residents rallied to support
Ireland’s independence.  Attorney Daniel O’Connell, through the American Independence
Union of California, encouraged San Franciscans to raise money for the families of those
arrested during the rebellion.  Five thousand attended one rally, adopting a resolution
urging President Wilson to condemn British attempts to quash the rebellion.  At the same
meeting, Father Yorke handed out membership forms for a new national organization,
Friends of Irish Freedom.   During a mass at St. Patrick, Father Barrett prayed for the70
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uprising’s martyrs, whose “death is an act of glorious reparation which will wipe out the
crimson stain left by those Irishmen who betrayed their motherland by fighting for
England.”   Though it is unknown how many parishioners rejected Barrett’s assessment71
of Irish volunteers as traitors to their homeland, his willingness to make such a public
expression reflected that San Francisco’s Irish residents were not afraid to mark Great
Britain as their enemy.   Their opposition to British rule led many to hope for a German
victory.  They believed that was the quickest way to undermine Great Britain’s power and
give Ireland the chance to win independence.  Men like Daniel O’Connell supported
German aid for the Irish rebellion and several Irish citizens were part of the greater
German-Hindu conspiracy that led to the indictments of ninety-eight individuals in late
1916.   Once America entered the war, a noticeable fissure developed among the city’s72
supporters of Irish independence.  On one side were people like O’Connell, who saw
America’s participation in the war as a hindrance to the cause of independence.  On the
other were people like Father Peter Yorke, who came to see America’s entrance as an
opportunity to expedite the cause of Irish freedom.
The United States declared war shortly before the first anniversary of the Easter
Rising.  San Francisco’s Irish societies used both momentous occasions to make the case
for Irish independence again.  Father Yorke, local president of the Friends of Irish
Freedom (FOIF), organized an April 26 rally to fuse Wilson’s vision of postwar peace
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with that of Irish sovereignty.  Wilson’s address to Congress included a call for self
determination, which Yorke and others believed would be applied to Ireland after the war. 
 Unlike Father Barrett, members of the FOIF believed the Irish had to fight side by side
with the British in this war if they wanted to earn independence. For Irish-Americans,
they should see the war as an opportunity to express their “undivided loyalty” to America
and convey to President Wilson the necessity of sovereignty, not Home Rule for Ireland.  73
President Wilson did pressure the British government to resolve the “Irish
question,” leading Parliament in late 1917 to organize an Irish Convention to discuss the
future of Ireland.   The FOIF believed it was doing its patriotic duty when it sent a74
resolution to President Wilson explaining that the Convention was unsatisfactory.  In
their telegram, the FOIF described the Irish Convention as “flagrantly unrepresentative of
the people of Ireland.”  They believed it might lead to Home Rule for Ireland, which they
considered unacceptable.  They reiterated the president’s own creed of self-determination,
arguing that Ireland had just as much right to “absolute freedom from foreign rule” as
Poland.   For members of the FOIF and other Irish societies in San Francisco, attacking75
the actions of the British was in no way disloyal to the United States.  The FOIF’s
discourse with Wilson was unapologetic.  They considered their anti-British stance to be
an expression of support for Wilson’s democratic ideals. 
Not everyone in San Francisco agreed with FOIF’s quest for Irish independence
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and challenged the organization’s definition of loyalty to America.  U.S. Attorney John
Preston was the first to question the loyalty of Irish-Americans in the summer of 1917. 
He claimed to have received an anonymous letter outlining treasonous behavior by Irish
Americans and turned it over to several local papers.  The letter claimed those Catholic
priests serving with the armed forces had sent military secrets to the Germans and that the
Irish population of America could not be trusted.  Preston believed this information was
proof that the federal government needed to monitor the Irish, like German-Americans,
and curb their organized activities.    76
Preston’s anti-Irish position was shaped by his investigations surrounding the
German-Hindu plot.  Lawrence de Lacey, an Irish citizen and editor of the local
newspaper, The Leader, had been indicted along with ninety-two others in the German-
Hindu conspiracy.  Due to a lack of evidence, Preston knew he could not try De Lacey
with Counsel General Bopp and the other major conspirators.  According to British
informants who had infiltrated Irish organizations in the city, De Lacey bragged that he
would escape prosecution.  He also claimed he planned to help Franz Bopp and E. H.
Von Schack escape to Mexico.   With this information, Preston indicted De Lacey in77
early September 1917 for planning to help the Germans interred at Angel Island escape. 
De Lacey, in an attempt to use Preston’s attack on the Irish community to his advantage,
testified that the charges were Preston’s way of exacting revenge on the Irish societies of
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San Francisco who challenged the validity of Preston’s anonymous letter.   However,78
this defense did not sway jurors.  Judge William Van Fleet sentenced De Lacey to
eighteen months at McNeil Island Penitentiary in Washington State.  While De Lacey’s
conviction may have given Preston proof of Irish disloyalty, Van Fleet quashed any
public attempts to hold De Lacey up as representative of San Francisco’s Irish
community.  In his instructions before deliberations, Van Fleet made it clear to jurors that
ethnicity should not play a factor in the jury’s decision:  “Neither a man’s parentage,
blood, religion nor affiliations have anything to do with the offense charged in this case.” 
Van Fleet reiterated his point during sentencing, declaring that the vast majority of the
city’s Irish-Americans would have intervened to prevent De Lacey’s actions had he told
any of them what he planned.79
Several days after De Lacey’s trial, Preston began prosecuting attorney Daniel
O’Connell and several others for obstructing the draft.  O’Connell, a strong supporter of
Irish independence, also had connections to the Hindu-German conspiracy.  He had raised
money from German-Americans to pay for the publication of the American Independent,
a magazine dedicated to Irish independence through German victory in the war.   On80
August 7, 1917, he claimed conscientious objector status.  The next day he was arrested
at a meeting of the People’s Council of America in San Francisco.  Led by former
Stanford president Dr. Starr Jordan, the organization did not oppose the war but wanted
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to make sure the Wilson administration kept the spread of democracy at the forefront of
wartime policy decisions.  O’Connell, like many Irish San Franciscans, saw such groups
as helpful to the cause of Ireland.  Also in attendance at the meeting was former senator
John D. Works.  He called O’Connell’s arrest a “disgrace to the American people and is
done for the purpose of intimidating thinking people.”   81
However, O’Connell was not arrested for his support of democracy in America
and Ireland.  His arrest occurred because he also denied that either Great Britain or the
United States had the right to conscript men into service.  He was a founding member of
the American Patriots, an organization that challenged the constitutionality of the
Selective Service Act.   O’Connell and the American Patriots’ view on conscription went
far beyond the acceptable parameters of the People’s Council, which believed men had to
fight to promote democracy.  As a result, O’Connell received no support from the
People’s Council during his trial for obstructing the draft.  O’Connell and four other
members of the American Patriots were tried for violating the Selective Service Act tin
late September 1917.  O’Connell served as the attorney for himself and the others.  His
defense hinged on his argument that the American Patriots were not an unpatriotic group. 
He insisted that only true patriots would sacrifice their freedom for their belief that an act
of Congress defied the U.S. Constitution.    82
A jury did not find O’Connell’s argument compelling.  The jury convicted all five
men of obstructing the Selective Service Act and also found O’Connell guilty under the
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Espionage Act.  In sentencing O’Connell, Judge Van Fleet did not address O’Connell’s
ethnicity.  He called him a traitor and revoked his right to practice law in Federal District
Court.   While Van Fleet had defended the city’s Irish during the De Lacey case, he saw83
no need to deny O’Connell’s connections to the city’s Irish-Americans.  De Lacey, in
aiding the Germans, acted on a general sentiment that many Irish had held before the U.S.
entered the war – the belief that a German victory would aid the Irish cause.  Van Fleet
considered O’Connell’s conscription views as radical enough that no one would confuse
O’Connell’s sentiments with those of the majority in the city who supported Irish
independence.
Preston’s attacks on the loyalty of San Francisco Irish, and the trials of De Lacey
and O’Connell, did not cause Irish societies to apologize for their previous utterances or
retreat from public discussion of their views on Irish freedom.  Instead, the Irish retaliated
against Preston and others who questioned Irish character and patriotic service.  Various
Irish associations vehemently protested the allegations found in District Attorney
Preston’s letter and attacked Preston personally.  The Ancient Order of Hibernians took
time out of their Fourth of July celebration to compose a telegram to President Wilson.  In
it, they charged Preston with a “sinister attempt to hamper the interests of America” by
creating doubts about Irish-American loyalty when none really existed.   The Ulster-84
Celtic Benevolent Association’s chairman intimated that Preston wrote the letter himself
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to stir up anti-Irish sentiment for his real employer, the English aristocracy.   These two85
organizations, along with the FOIF and others, immediately sent telegrams to
Congressmen and Senators, demanding federal authorities look into the matter.  They
insisted that at the very least Preston’s superiors should reprimand him for his actions.  
The political influence of San Francisco’s Irish community resulted in a rapid-fire
succession of responses from Attorney General T. W. Gregory, Congressman Julius
Khan, and Senator James Phelan.  Each assured the Irish societies that the matter was
under investigation.    D.A. Preston apologized for his hasty decision to have the letter86
published and did nothing else to hamper Irish societies’ public activities.  When
Preston’s term expired a year later, Attorney General Gregory did not renew it, as had
been the case since 1913.  Instead, he offered Preston another position in the Justice
Department, overseeing the investigations of enemy aliens in the Far West.  On July 25,
1918, the Justice Department promoted Assistant District Attorney Annette Abbott
Adams, who had worked in the prosecution of Bopp and the Hindu-German conspiracy,
to replace Preston.    Preston’s apology and eventual removal from the Northern87
California District vindicated the Irish-American community.  Preston had been unable to
convince others that the Irish were a threat to the nation and his unsuccessful attempt
encouraged them to continue professing their desires for Irish independence.  They
considered themselves the “highest type” of citizens and rejected any assertion that they
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could not be loyal to America while exercising their support for a free Ireland.  
Another vocal opponent of San Francisco’s Irish population was the son of Irish
immigrants, attorney Garret McEnerney.   In April 1918 T.P. O’Connor, member of
Ireland’s Nationalist Party and a member of Parliament, came to San Francisco to
promote his party’s vision of Irish Home Rule.  During a reception for O’Connor,
McEnerney expressed his distaste for the FOIF and any other Irish society in San
Francisco that attacked Great Britain’s efforts to resolve the Irish question.  McEnerney
believed that the Irish independence movement, led by the Sinn Fein organization, was
pro-German and therefore anti-American.  He believed that anyone who expressed anti-
British sentiments was a traitor and should be arrested for violating the Sedition Act.  88
Unlike members of the FOIF and other Irish societies that considered loyalty to the
United States as distinct from loyalty to the nation’s allies, McEnerney considered
anything that might demoralize the Allied war effort to be treasonous.  McEnerney, like
Preston, sought to force public discourse on whether residents of Irish descent were 100
percent American.  Both men believed that any expression of support for Irish
independence challenged such assertions.   
McEnerney’s statements against the Irish in San Francisco led to a passionate
response by Father Peter Yorke.  In his fifty-page pamphlet, America and Ireland, Yorke
not only rebuked McEnerney, but, more importantly provided an extensive rationalization
for Irish-Americans who wanted to support both Ireland and America.   First, Yorke
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chastised McEnerney for attending a reception for O’Connor.  As a member of the
Nationalist Party, O’Connor represented what Yorke considered a small minority in
Ireland, those who wanted Home Rule rather than sovereignty.  For Yorke, such
concessions to the British made McEnerney a traitor to his parents’ homeland and did
nothing to aid America in winning the war.  Yorke argued that the creation of a sovereign
Ireland would strengthen the Allies by allowing the British to move their soldiers
stationed in Ireland to the front lines.  While he wished the British would grant Ireland
independence sooner rather than later, he recognized that it might not be possible to
complete this until after the war.  Therefore, by supporting the United States’ efforts to
win the war, Irish in America could help shorten British rule in Ireland.  For Yorke, there
was no division of loyalty for Irish-Americans.  The United States was fighting a war for
democracy and Ireland would be one of those democracies.   89
The United Irish Societies, consisting of sixty-four San Francisco Irish
organizations, strongly supported Yorke’s viewpoint and rejected McEnerney, who they
insisted did not speak for the Irish of San Francisco.  The condemnation by the Irish
societies significantly diminished McEnerney’s standing within his own ethnic
subculture.   For Yorke and the United Irish Societies, the threat of being branded90
disloyal did not prevent them from publicly expressing their support for Irish
independence, even if it meant disputing the actions of the British.  The political,
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economic and social connections afforded the Irish in San Francisco a level of protection
from challenges to their loyalty.  Their desire for a free Ireland as part of America’s
patriotic vision of a democratic world also provided them with a powerful ideological
weapon they could use against those who assailed their heritage.
As a city of immigrants, San Franciscans took pride in cultural diversity and
showed support of German, Italian, and Irish residents who conveyed a passion for their
European heritage.  However, they did expect those individuals to show respect for their
adopted country.  The war generated a more intense feeling of patriotism that made all
foreign-born residents of San Francisco targets of suspicion, but this suspicion did not
lead to mob violence or physical retaliation.  Residents of the city were more aware of the
actions and utterances of their foreign-born neighbors, and might report their suspicions
to local law enforcement officials.  All three of the largest immigrant groups became
targets of suspicion as anyone could behave in a way that undermined the war effort. 
German citizens were legally bound to a nation that was at war with America, leading to
restrictions under the Alien Enemy Act.  Italians were under suspicion because they were
among the most recent immigrant arrivals, and therefore, the least assimilated.  At the
same time, their concentration in low-paying factory work led some to see them as
potential radicals linked to the Wobblies.  Irish activities were not interpreted as a
significant threat to America’s war effort but could undermine Rolph and other city
leader’s efforts to evoke urban unity.  Their anti-British stand also questioned the actions
of America’s greatest ally, making their speeches for Irish independence just as disloyal
as a German’s public pronouncement for the Kaiser.  
270
Despite these questions of loyalty, the wartime atmosphere did not force
immigrants to alter their personal perceptions as a member of an ethnic group.   All three
were in various stages of assimilation, melting into the pot that Rolph described in his
Fourth of July address, but living in San Francisco gave them the opportunity to retain
just as much of their ethnic traditions as they chose. Some found that they had to alter
public displays of their ethnic identity to incorporate American democratic ideals, but
they were not forced to abandon their heritage.  Residents continued to congratulate
themselves for their acceptance and support of diverse social activities and ethnic
traditions that made San Francisco the city of immigrants. They took pride in the cultural
expressions of their immigrant populace.  No matter what side of the war their European
homeland was on, San Franciscans overwhelmingly embraced the inclusion of these
foreign symbols of culture as vital to the identity of their city.
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Conclusion
“Keep alive the memory of sacrifices”:  San Francisco’s New Identity
Just after midnight Monday, November 11, 1918 San Francisco telegraph offices
and telephone switchboards conveyed news of the end of the Great War.  Fire Chief
Murphy proceeded to City Hall where he turned in a general alarm and soon all the
church bells in town began ringing.  People in various stages of dress left their homes and
began parading toward City Hall.  The celebrations surrounding the armistice continued
for twenty-four hours.  Twenty thousand shipbuilders commemorated the event with a
parade Monday morning, making their way to City Hall where they surged into Mayor
Rolph’s office.  The mayor was busy producing a flurry of congratulatory telegrams for
Generals Pershing and Foch, President Wilson, and the commanders of San Francisco’s
363  Infantry Division and 347  Field Artillery Division.  Rolph, “ignorant of the plotrd th
that had been hatched [by the shipbuilders]” was hoisted above their heads and carried
out of City Hall.  “With an arm thrown around a toil-stained jumper on either side and
with a body guard of thousands of cheering workmen,” Mayor Rolph led them down
Market Street to the Ferry Building and back to the Civic Center.  
Meanwhile, San Franciscans gathered throughout the city to commemorate the
day the Great War ended.  In North Beach, young musicians with guitars and concertinas
danced and sang through the streets.  Revelers packed the neighborhood cafes, all toasting
the victory of the Allied forces.  Bulletin reporter Louis Stellman described women
playing ring-around-the-rosy like little girls, while “old businessmen” made drums out of
272
dishpans and kerosene cans. Well into the night San Franciscans danced down Market
Street, trampling confetti thrown throughout the day and “blowing all manner of horns,
manipulating every noisemaking engine that ingenuity could contrive.”  An anonymous
writer for Town Talk explained that the extended festivities resulted from the
wholehearted way that San Franciscans had sacrificed during the war.  “Workingman and
capitalist, poor widow and society girl – all San Francisco was heart and soul in the war. 
And so, when the war was over, San Francisco celebrated with her usual gay abandon. 
San Francisco had earned the right to cut up.”    1
The unified celebrations at the end of the Great War were even more boisterous
than the activities surrounding the opening of the PPIE almost four years earlier.  Both
events represented San Franciscans’ endeavors to prove to themselves and to the nation
that the City by the Golden Gate had survived the earthquake and fire and bloomed into a
mature metropolis.  Both the exposition and the war provided residents the chance to
showcase their talents, and in the process express urban characteristics they believed were
essential to a modern urban identity.  The PPIE gave San Franciscans the chance to
advertise themselves as residents of a city that had made considerable progress in a short
period of time.  The city that had emerged out of the ashes was no longer a frontier town. 
It was also not like its West Coast competitors who were just entering their adolescent
phase, still overwhelmed by growing pains.  The refinement that came with maturity was
reflected in the harmonious design of the exposition and planners’ who attempted to
The Bulletin (San Francisco), 11 November 1918, 1-2;  Bethlehem Star (San Francisco), no. 4
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reduce the imagery of the frontier West in favor of ancient culture.  The city PPIE
organizers imagined, and residents supported, was one in which unified action dominated
factionalism.  If San Francisco could be perceived as a cosmopolitan city – wholly
American, but with Old World style – it could lay the foundations of a new urban identity
for residents still grappling with how to define their city in light of its recent physical
devastation.  The problem with the PPIE image of San Francisco was that it was little
more than an illusion, an interpretation of an ideal city that did not exist.  Once the PPIE
structures were torn down, San Franciscans were left divided on how to create a real
Jewel City.  
Without a common goal after the PPIE closed, the grand ideals of progress,
harmony, and refinement faded into the past.  By the summer of 1916, residents faced
uncertain times.  The Longshoremen’s strike in June of that year triggered the strongest
opposition from businessmen, led by the Chamber of Commerce, in more than a decade. 
The creation of the Law and Order Committee signaled the beginning of a concerted
effort by the Chamber to improve economic opportunities for businessmen.  They
believed this could only be done by eliminating the closed shop and thereby attracting
businesses away from rivals like Los Angeles.  The short-lived longshoremen strike did
not give the Chamber the chance to put its full weight behind the Law and Order
Committee.  Without another significant incident, the Chamber’s subcommittee would
have collapsed.  However, the Preparedness Day bombing in July provided the impetus to
keep the Law and Order Committee going indefinitely.  Labeling all unionists as potential
bombers, the Committee used San Franciscans’ fears of violent attacks to win support of
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its anti-labor initiatives.  The Chamber more than tripled its membership roles in the
process.  
By early 1917, the issues that divided San Franciscans were more apparent than
the ones that brought them harmoniously together.  The Chamber’s successful actions had
significantly weakened labor unions’ confidence in their ability to win strikes.  At the
same time, San Francisco’s working class struggled to make ends meet as due to war-
related inflation.  The municipal government also faced mounting pressure from purity
crusaders.  While the police had done their best to close the Barbary Coast and
Tenderloin districts during the PPIE, they had grown lax in enforcing the laws after the
exposition closed.  In early 1917 Rev. Paul Smith initiated attacks on behalf of moral
reformers against Rolph – as well as property owners and businessmen who profited from
the illicit activity.  President Wilson had urged Americans to be neutral in thought and
action, but for many San Francisco residents that proved impossible.  Many had family
members who still lived in Europe, fighting for either the Allies or Central Powers.  After
the Easter Uprising in 1916, many Irish San Franciscans suggested that Great Britain’s
defeat would be the best way to win Ireland’s sovereignty.  This put them at odds with
pro-British residents of the city.  San Francisco appeared to be plunging deeper into
factionalism.  The harmony emphasized during the PPIE was lost.  That was until the
American declaration of war against Germany on April 6.
America’s entrance into the war silenced most debate in San Francisco over
whether the United States should fight and most residents quickly adjusted their views
and actions to support the war effort.   The Great War provided San Franciscans with
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another commonly shared experience, just as the dual disasters and the PPIE had done
before.  The Great War temporarily eliminated discord and channeled energies toward
unified action for the common good.  The war stirred nationalistic fervor as residents
sacrificed for America’s glory.  Again, San Franciscans saw a chance to express a shared
identity as the “City That Knows How.”  The desire to outshine their competitors drove
residents to proclaim that they were, by far, the most patriotic city in the West.  Most
residents professed to believe in the old PPIE slogan, but their actions in the name of
civic and national pride varied.  These variances reflected the fissures that could not be
entirely wiped away, no matter how fervently they believed in the ideal. 
The start of the war in Europe made clear to many in the U.S. War Department the
need for a larger, more efficient navy.  The Navy Act of 1916 paved the way for
expansion of the Pacific fleet.  San Francisco was an optimal choice, thanks to its
strategic location and large harbor.  The war disrupted the War Department’s immediate
plans but gave San Franciscans the opportunity to prove the suitability of their city as a
naval headquarters.  Tens of thousands of men came through San Francisco for
processing or training.  The existing military encampments, like the Presidio, Fort
McDowell, and the Naval Training Station, created temporary camps to house the new
soldiers.  Meanwhile, the Quartermaster Corps at Fort Mason struggled to provide
supplies to the growing contingent of soldiers in the Western District.  The construction
of Camp Fremont in Menlo Park added significantly to the number of men in uniform
looking for a good time in San Francisco.  
However, it was readily apparent that if San Francisco relied on the entertainment
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of its notorious past, the War Department would not allow its citizen soldiers near the
city.  The War Department, desperate for western training camps, would turn to other
communities, denying San Francisco wartime gains.  If the city could not properly handle
an emergency, it would not suit postwar military needs.  This led residents to work with
the Commission on Training Camp Activities to establish entertainment options that
would boost morale and encourage moral behavior.  Residents donated their time and
money to the cause of wholesome entertainment.  Some developed personal relationships
with the men, inviting them to their homes, sending their daughters to dance with them at
chaperoned dances, and volunteering at the local service mens’ clubs.  Many soldiers and
sailors were not local boys, but San Franciscans worked together to take care of these
men and treat them like part of the communal family.  Patriotism drove these efforts, but
residents also recognized that these wartime visitors could be San Francisco boosters,
advertising the hospitality found in a big, cosmopolitan city.  
While the War Camp Community Service sought to protect the men in camps, and
in turn protect San Francisco’s reputation, soldiers like Charles Swope tried to protect
their families from wartime uncertainties.  The federal bureaucracy was not fully prepared
to take on the challenges of raising a four million man military, leaving soldiers and their
families to cope with the uncertainties.  Some civilians, like Hiram Johnson, Jr., clashed
with local draft boards when it became clear that parts of the Selective Service Act,
particularly the part about exemptions for married men, were open to interpretation.  For
those soldiers with dependents, the government’s delays in processing allotment requests
and sending out the promised allowances left families without a steady income.  This
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forced women like Gretchen Swope to seek out employment opportunities in order to
provide for themselves.  In accepting a position with the Army band, and by serving as a
freelance photographer for the men at Fort McDowell, Charles Swope did what many
new soldiers attempted to do – find ways to make their military service pay.  Faced with
deployment overseas, Swope and others soldiers tried to provide their families with the
financial resources they might need for the foreseeable future, while all involved braced
for the possibility that their loved ones might not return.
As mayor of all the people, James Rolph wanted to throw his office’s full support
behind the soldiers training in San Francisco and those residents of the city who joined
the colors.  His failure to win majority support for a charter amendment guaranteeing
municipal funds for military dependents reflected residents’ opposition to redundant relief
organizations rather than significant resistance to Mayor Rolph’s ideas.  Rolph’s greatest
successes during the war were the result of his ability to pair the needs of federal officials
with his goals for civic improvement.  Despite a reduction in supplies that slowed or
halted some public works, Rolph continued his quest for municipal ownership of utilities,
particularly transportation.  For the first time in its short history, the Municipal Railroad
turned a profit, thanks to the Twin Peaks tunnel, the Municipal Railroad tracks on Market
Street, and the expansion of lines to Union Iron Works and the Presidio.  The war also did
not stop the city’s quest for reliable drinking water.  Michael O’Shaughnessy’s ability to
get the Eleanor dam completed before the issuance of wartime restrictions protected the
Hetch Hetchy project.  Desperate for the electricity generated from the Lower Cherry
River plant, the federal government granted the project access to supplies denied most
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public works’ projects in the last year of the war.  The war also forced Mayor Rolph to
directly address the vice question.  While a proponent of regulated prostitution, with
Health department oversight of brothels, the war forced Rolph and Police Commissioner
Roche to close the Barbary and Tenderloin districts.  Working with military police, the
municipal government sought to keep soldiers fit to fight and protect the city’s
partnerships with the military. 
If Mayor Rolph was San Francisco’s leading civic champion, then the Chamber of
Commerce served as the city’s largest booster organization.  Both Rolph and the
Chamber leadership recognized how important it was to advertise San Francisco’s
positive attributes to the federal government, as well as prospective businessmen and
residents.  However, Rolph rarely agreed with the Chamber’s methods of attaining that
goal.  The creation of the Law and Order Committee inspired businessmen to unite to
force the city to accept the open shop so San Francisco could fulfill its economic
potential.  The war provided the Chamber with new opportunities to promote its city to
international investors and publicize its vision of what the city could be – the economic
epicenter of the West Coast.  Some businessmen reaped huge profits from the surge of
troops, federal contracts, and trade with the Pacific Rim.  Such gains had to be tempered
with public displays of patriotism.  The holdings of banks like Wells Fargo-Nevada
National Bank swelled, while its president Isaias Hellman urged fiscal responsibility
through Liberty Bond subscriptions.  Only by establishing a public perception that its
members were making significant sacrifices could the Chamber justify its defense of class
interests.  When federal agencies threatened to undermine San Francisco’s international
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trade networks, Chamber members did not consider their formal protests disloyal attacks
on the government.  Rather, they were civic patriots acting in the best interests of the city,
denying coastal competitors the chance to undermine San Francisco’s economic potential. 
Vital to the Chamber of Commerce’s vision of a profitable metropolis was its
ability to eliminate the closed shop.  However, the city’s unions would not go down
without a fight.  The beginning of the war coincided with revelations that testimony used
against Thomas Mooney was seriously flawed. The lack of credible witnesses – combined
with continued attacks on the city’s unions for what the Chamber labeled disloyal or
treasonous actions –  required a strong response from organized labor.  The Building
Trades Council and the Labor Council incorporated patriotic rhetoric into their appeals
for Mooney’s retrial and support of District Attorney Charles Fickert’s recall.  They
believed that the nation, and San Francisco in particular, was fighting two wars against
tyranny – one at home and one abroad.  
In supporting the carmen’s strike against United Railroad in August 1917, the
Labor Council did not emphasize the issue of national loyalty as strongly as it did in
proclaiming the injustices to Mooney.  They assumed that residents, who had vilified
United Railroad for a decade based on its connections to the city’s political corruption,
could easily spot the local tyrants.  The Labor Council sought to resolve the strike in the
most democratic way possible – arbitration.   However, the carmen’s demands did not
reflect the Labor Council’s portrayal of workers victimized by wartime pressure and
corrupt businessmen.  Instead of asking for a wage increase, the carmen demanded United
Railroad accept the closed shop, reducing public sympathy for the carmen.  This also
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gave United Railroad’s president, and Chamber member, Jesse Lilienthal more reasons to
resist.  The carmen’s strike became a side note when 30,000 iron workers went on strike
in September.  The Iron Trades Council used the same arguments initiated by the carmen,
insisting that iron workers should be compensated for the high cost of living and the
tremendous war profits made by the ship building companies.  The iron workers were
successful because their services were critical to the nation’s success in the war and
federal authorities quickly negotiated a settlement.  The carmen were not vital to the war
effort and traditional strikebreaking tactics crushed the union.  Once new recruits were
trained, United Railroads could operate all of its lines without interruption, leaving
strikers nothing with which to negotiate.  
After the failure of the carmen’s strike, and the unsuccessful attempts to win
Mooney a new trial, many of the city’s labor unions retreated from the battleground. 
Both the Building Trades Council and the Labor Council conceded that protecting their
image, and that of their affiliated unions, was more important than continued attacks on
the patriotism of the Chamber and its members.  In pledging to work with businessmen
for the sake of the war effort, organized labor sought to protect its reputation.  Bolstered
with evidence of their patriotic sacrifices, unions prepared to resume their war against the
open shop when the Great War ended.   
Many members of organized labor were foreign-born or first generation
Americans, but that part of their identity typically caused them less trouble during the war
than their support for the closed shop.  During the war, communities around the country
witnessed significant tensions between nativists and recent immigrants whom they feared
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were disloyal by the nature of their foreign birth.  In places where this tension boiled over
into hysteria, people violently retaliated against immigrant residents, forcing those
individuals to conform to prescribed notions of proper American behavior.  In San
Francisco, such attacks did not occur because a majority of the populace was, at most, one
generation removed from the immigrant experience.  Also, the city’s confined geography
prevented the division of its neighborhoods into ethnic enclaves except for Chinatown
and North Beach.  In San Francisco, immigrants were scattered in every district,
employed in every business field, and founders of the city’s most elite social and
economic dynasties.  Attacking ethnic heritage might have been acceptable in
communities where political and business leaders were the grandchildren of native-born
Americans, but most San Franciscans respected cultural diversity and did not seek to
impose cultural conformity. 
Residents during the war, however, were not always comfortable with ethnic
views that did not promote San Francisco as a city of immigrants, harmoniously working
together to win the war.  The German-Hindu conspiracy and the federal restrictions on
alien enemies fueled suspicion of German-born residents, but did not result in anything
close to hysteria.  While a few German residents and businesses chose to adopt more
Anglo-sounding names, those changes were the result of personal preference and did not
stem from peer pressure or public threats.  Many San Franciscans recognized that the
German attributes they appreciated before the war were just as redeeming during the war.  
Efforts to support the continued teaching of the German language in the public schools
and the attendance of residents at the concerts of Ernestine Schumann-Heink and Alfred
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Hertz reflected the desire of residents to protect Germany’s classical culture while
fighting to eradicate its political traditions.  The fact that many of San Francisco’s
German population had been in the United States for many years may have also prevented
suspicion that they were tied to the more recent explosion of European radicalism.  
While their native homeland was an American ally, the recent Italian arrivals to
San Francisco faced scrutiny from state officials who used wartime fears of radicalism to
ensure their political futures.  The Commission of Immigration and Housing, attempting
to protect itself from wartime cutbacks, redirected its agents to organize city and county
Americanization efforts.  They spent the war investigating organizations that might
harbor dangerous radicals, particularly Italians living in San Francisco’s one European
enclave.  Most of North Beach’s residents were working class people whose lack of
formal education, and attempts to unionize the cannery industry, made them suspect.  
The CIH ultimately found little evidence of subversive activity among San Francisco
Italians.  Despite internal divisions between prominenti and their laborers who sought to
unionize, Italians accepted the need to show respect for their adopted country.  North
Beach residents financially supported the war drives, volunteered with the Red Cross, and
followed Food Administration conservation guidelines, like any other San Francisco
neighborhood.  At the same time, Italian tradition influenced each of these actions,
celebrating the cosmopolitan nature of their adopted city.  
For Irish residents who supported the Easter Uprising, the war created a complex
situation that required them to explain how they could be patriotic Americans and loyal
supporters of Irish sovereignty.  Once the United States entered the war, most Irish San
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Franciscans expressed the belief that America’s quest for global democracy would
ultimately lead to Irish independence.  The actions of a few Irish immigrants, including
Daniel O’Connell, called into question the loyalty of San Francisco’s pro-independence
Irish.  However, the political and economic strength of these residents allowed them to
continue their open support for Irish sovereignty.  As with the German and Italian
immigrants, the wartime atmosphere in San Francisco never resulted in a hysterical
reaction against groups expressing their ethnic identity.  People believed the proper
authorities would deal with individuals whose actions threatened to disrupt the
harmonious cultural balance, or threatened the reputation of San Francisco as a loyal
American city.         
The Great War occurred at a time when Americans were beginning to see the
nation’s cities not as dangerous outposts, but as the center of a new American culture. 
Before the 1920 census proclaimed America an urban nation, cities had to define for
themselves and everyone else what made the city experience so alluring.  With all eyes
turned on them, urban residents during the war defended their community’s reputation by
“doing their bit” for the war effort.  In the process, urbanites struggled to define what
made their city special and why they should receive national attention beyond their ability
to raise funds for Liberty Bonds and knit socks for soldiers.  In the quest for recognition,
cities found themselves competing with each other for national attention while attempting
to establish for their residents a unique urban identity.  San Francisco’s search for the
economic, political, social, and cultural qualities that would make it a premier city had
been going on since the earthquake and fire of 1906.   Because of the natural disaster,
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residents were more aware than those in other American cities in the 1910s that it was
time to refine their image.  The war was another opportunity, like the PPIE, for San
Franciscans to examine their urban traits for elements that would make their city stand
out above the rest.  What San Franciscans during the Great War did not realize was that
they had already lost the battle to maintain urban supremacy on the West Coast.  Over the
next dozen years, San Franciscans would have to come to terms with the shift of some
economic, political, and military power from their city to coastal competitors.  The ways
San Franciscans chose to commemorate the war reflected their efforts to redefine their
city’s image by reassessing the qualities that made their city a vital destination for
businesses, federal spending, and migration.  
The federal attention, and dollars, that came into San Francisco during the war
encouraged Mayor Rolph and civic boosters to step up their efforts to secure a naval base
for San Francisco.  A 1916 report had listed San Francisco and Puget Sound as the most
strategic areas on the Pacific Coast for new naval bases.   After the war, city leaders
advertised Hunter’s Point as the most logical place for the Pacific fleet’s headquarters. 
San Francisco immediately faced competition from sites across the Bay that saw the
military expansion as a way to reduce their dependence on San Francisco and encourage
relocation to their cities.  The two leading contenders for the naval base were Alameda
and Hunter’s Point.  Cities of the East Bay refused to support a San Francisco base,
fearing that such a step might lead to renewed efforts by San Francisco to push their
consolidation plan known as Greater San Francisco.  The city of Vallejo, and the political
leadership of its Congressman Charles Curry, was also able to hold up construction of a
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Bay Area base.  Vallejo hoped to outlast both San Francisco and Alameda and thereby
win concessions for Mare Island Naval Yard.  Ultimately, Alameda won the naval base
over its area rivals because city leaders were willing to offer the entire site free of charge. 
However, the conflict between Alameda, Vallejo, and San Francisco created stalemate
that lasted until 1933.  This prevented the entire Bay Area from benefitting appreciably
from the postwar military expansion.2
San Francisco also faced challenges from the cities of Southern California.  The
1920 census showed that Los Angeles had surpassed San Francisco in size, moving into
the nation’s top ten largest cities, while San Francisco dropped to twelfth.   Over the next
decade, Los Angeles’ population doubled, with more than 1.2 million residents, placing it
fifth in the nation.  There were several reasons for this rapid growth in Los Angeles.  One
was the fact that L.A. did not face stiff competition from its neighboring communities. 
Unlike San Francisco’s failed consolidation plan, L.A. annexed forty-five adjacent
communities in the 1920s.  People also migrated into L.A. to take advantage of the
tremendous economic growth of the metropolis.  The boom in motion pictures, the
increasing number of national manufacturers (like Goodyear Tire) with regional plants in
L.A., and the discovery of oil in the area drove people to choose Southern California as
their home.  By 1930, Los Angeles led the state in manufacturing and in shipping.   3
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The growing population and economic resources of California’s southern counties
led to a shift in the state’s political culture.  In 1920 James Phelan, fa formerSan
Francisco mayor and tireless supporter of a naval base at Hunter’s Point, lost his
senatorial seat to Los Angeles businessman Samuel Shortridge.  While Phelan had sought
a compromise in the Bay’s division over the naval base, Senator Shortridge allowed the
divisions in the Bay Area to continue.  While Bay communities fought over the financial
resources the U.S. military could offer, San Diego quietly enticed the military to expend
more capital in its city.  In 1917 the Marines began construction on the base that became
Camp Pendleton.  By the end of the war the navy had moved its training station from
Goat Island in San Francisco Bay to San Diego.  During the 1920s, the Navy continued to
increase the number of supply depots and repair stations in San Diego and moved its
submarines from L.A. to San Diego.  Ultimately, the efforts of urban boosterism in
California compelled the Navy to diffuse its potential resources in the inter-war years,
scattering facilities up and down the coast.   As a result of the conflict between Bay4
communities and the competition for military resources from Southern California, San
Francisco’s politicians and civic boosters had to find new ways to define their city and
promote its importance to the region and the nation in the 1920s.  
One such way was to advertise the patriotism of San Franciscans and the warmth
with which they greeted outsiders.  Almost as soon as the armistice festivities ended, the
city prepared to welcome home its men in uniform.  The Army designated the Presidio as
one of thirty regional demobilization centers nationwide.  Their goal was to ease the
Lotchin, Fortress California, 43.
4
287
transition for soldiers by discharging them in cities near their homes.    Camp Kearney in5
San Diego and Camp Lewis near Seattle were the only other demobilization centers on
the West Coast.  All the men who returned from Siberia in 1919 processed through San
Francisco.   The Presidio’s Letterman Hospital, one of the oldest U.S. Army general
hospitals in the nation, admitted 12,900 patients for rehabilitation in 1919.  These
patients, and the families who came to stay with them, hailed from communities
throughout the West, including Alaska and Hawaii.   San Francisco would, therefore, host6
thousands of returning veterans, only some of whom would be local boys.   This meant a
significant number of homecoming activities to plan.  Between December 14, 1918 to
May 18, 1919 San Franciscans witnessed seventeen parades and twenty-five receptions.  7
These activities were not simply patriotic gestures.  City boosters recognized that each
homecoming served as an opportunity to advertise the good qualities of San Francisco to
veterans and their families in hopes of creating loyal visitors or potential new residents.  
To coordinate the homecoming festivities, the Board of Supervisors authorized
the creation of the San Francisco Citizens’ Welcome Home Committee in early
December 1918.  Chaired by Mayor Rolph, the Welcome Home Committee consisted of
more than two hundred members who organized and executed celebrations for the next
six months.  To facilitate the inclusion of the veterans’ families in the festivities, the
Welcome Home Committee developed a Kinsfolk Division, open to all relatives of
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returning servicemen regardless of whether they or the soldiers were San Francisco
residents.  Newspapers throughout the region carried notices expressing San Francisco’s
wish to have the families of returning servicemen present at the ceremonies and
encouraging them to register with the Welcome Home Committee.  The committee would
then in turn issue family members special badges on the day their loved ones disembarked
in San Francisco.  These badges designated them as VIPs, allowing them to pass through
police lines so that they could be the first to great their boys upon arrival.  In the first six
months after the Armistice the Welcome Home Committee issued more than twenty
thousand badges.  While the Kinsfolk Division badges denoted family members, the Red
Cross pinned more than fifty-four thousand ribbons to the uniforms of each soldier and
sailor as he arrived in the city.  Each ribbon read, “The People of San Francisco Welcome
You Home.”    Both the ribbons and badges served as unique mementoes of the special8
occasion.   The badges commemorated the return of loved ones and they, along with the
ribbons, could be kept for posterity.  
The seventy-four thousand badges and ribbons also advertised San Francisco,
reminding these individuals for years to come of the city and its residents that joined them
in celebrating the return of men home from the Great War.   The Welcome Home
Committee also provided other commemorative items to servicemen and their kin.  The
Committee created and published official souvenir booklets for each of the soldiers
serving in the seven largest military units discharged in San Francisco.  These pamphlets,
ranging in size from four to thirty-six pages, included the names of all two hundred
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members of the Citizens’ Welcome Home Committee, the names of that regiment’s
Kinsfolk Division, a regimental history with illustrations, and a personal note from Mayor
Rolph.9
The largest festivities undertaken by the Committee were for “San Francisco’s
Own”:  the 347  Field Artillery and the 363  Infantry, both of which arrived on April 22,th rd
1919.   This day’s fetes illustrated the city’s efforts to construct a set of events that would
rally civic pride among residents and encourage returning soldiers to see San Francisco as
a great place for them and their families to call home.  The soldiers disembarked on trains
in Oakland, where Red Cross canteen workers pinned the Welcome Home ribbons to
their uniforms, designating San Francisco and not Oakland as the welcoming city.  The
Red Cross workers then escorted them to ferries for the trip across the Bay, and once
aboard, they gave each man a pamphlet that carefully outlined the day’s events.  
Once in San Francisco, the Welcome Home Committee had scheduled a reception
at the Ferry Building with family.  A parade down Market Street to City Hall would
follow, along with a reception and a speech by Mayor Rolph.  The festivities would
conclude with the unveiling of a monument to the troops before they marched to the
Presidio.  Despite the meticulous efforts of the Welcome Home Committee the formal
parade march down Market never really happened.   According to a journalist with Town10
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Talk, once the men arrived at the Ferry Building, the crowd turned into a “mad mess of
inextricable and happy confusion.”  Family and friends rushed to greet the returning
troops, forgetting all formalities.  “I saw men kiss men as unreservedly as the women had;
military restraint was powerless in the joy of that glorious welcome, and it seemed as
though the officers had forgotten their commands to march on in the joy of the
moment.”   Mayor Rolph later commented that the surge of people on Market Street was11
an electric experience; “it was the finest and most genuine heart throb.”  Rolph believed
the public display of affection for the men returning from war reflected the spirit of San
Francisco better than any festivity in his lifetime:  “San Francisco is some city, and the
spirit of the San Franciscan beats anything known anywhere else in the world.  It was a
bully party and will never be forgotten, and in the future we will measure things by the
home-coming given our boys.”   For Rolph and many others that day, civic pride12
coalesced with patriotic fervor.  The great parades and celebrations commemorating the
return of the San Francisco residents and men provided a forum for San Franciscans to
express publicly their patriotism and civic loyalty, ideals many hoped would continue to
unify the populace in a common purpose.  
During the war San Franciscans came together to win the war and gain national
recognition for their efforts.  In the 1920s, San Franciscans, often divided by class issues,
would find promoting their city as the epicenter of the Pacific Coast a rare, unifying
endeavor.  Much of the class conflict in San Francisco resulted in the renewed conflict
Town Talk: The Pacific Weekly (San Francisco), 26 April 1919, 8-9.
11
Municipal Record (San Francisco) 12 (24 April 1919), 131.
12
291
between business owners and the city’s labor unions.  The Chamber of Commerce, in an
attempt to strengthen their city’s marketability to national corporations looking for places
to construct regional plants, continued their wartime goal of implementing the open shop
system in San Francisco.  Using the techniques developed by the Law and Order
Committee in 1916, businessmen challenged organized labor when it attempted to resume
the use of strikes after the war.  The Riggers’ and Stevedores’ Union, the organization
whose strike in 1916 had led to the formation of the Law and Order Committee, initiated
the 1919 strikes.  Calling for higher wages and a share in the companies’ profits and
management, the Longshoremen walked out on September 15.  Employers, with the
support of the Chamber of Commerce, depicted the longshoremen as subversives who
were bent on destroying the city’s commercial trade just as jobs became scarcer after the
war.  The employers locked out the workers and formed the Longshoremen’s Association,
which became known as the “Blue Book” union.  They declared that only those workers
who joined the “Blue Book” would be allowed to return to work.  Longshoremen slowly
conceded to the employers demands, eventually killing the Riggers’ and Stevedores’
Union.  In 1921 the city’s shipping companies followed suit after union members went on
strike to protest a 15 percent decrease in wages.  The impact on the International
Seamen’s Union was dramatic.  In 1919 the union boasted a membership roster of more
than 100,000.  By 1923 it had fewer than 16,000 members. 
 In 1921, the Chamber of Commerce, buoyed by its waterfront victories,
challenged the city’s strongest labor organization, the Building Trades Council.  When
affiliated unions threatened to strike in 1920, president P. H. McCarthy, fearing a repeat
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of the loses suffered by the longshoremen and iron trades the year before,  urged the
unions to accept arbitration.  Responding to the pent-up demands for housing after the
war and the increase in unemployment, the three-man arbitration panel recommended a
7.5 percent wage reduction.  When unions refused, the Builder’s Exchanged locked out
the workers.  Bolstered by support from the Chamber of Commerce, the Builder’s
Exchange refused to hire workers who did not accept an open shop.  The Chamber then
organized the Industrial Association of San Francisco and raised $1 million to fund open
shop campaigns across the industrial spectrum.  The Industrial Association called their
plan the “American Plan,” which called for the “right of free contract between men.”  In
declaring the open shop as the way to law, order, and democracy, the Chamber returned
to the language of the Law and Order Committee five years earlier.  
In light of the more politically conservative atmosphere following the Red Scare,
organized labor failed to win public support.  For the rest of the 1920s San Francisco
experienced only a few, limited strikes.  Union membership dropped precipitously and
“many of the associations became mere skeletons of their former selves.”   Organized13
labor’s perception of San Francisco, a bastion of the closed shop, no longer existed. 
Labor, like the civic boosters who had sought a military bounty for the city, had to
discover new ways to define the importance of the city by the Golden Gate.  While the
Chamber of Commerce and organized labor had fought bitterly against each other for
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years, both sides by the mid 1920s feared the rise of Los Angeles more.  Los Angeles,
with its motion picture industry, oil drilling, and manufacturing, threatened to draw
workers and potential new businesses away from San Francisco.  As during the war, both
sides would have to find common ground and support projects that bolstered San
Francisco’s image as a destination for laborers and businessmen. 
The construction of the War Memorial Opera House illustrates the attempt made
by the diverse San Francisco populace to express symbolically what they perceived as the
most important qualities of their past, present, and future.   In seeking these
characteristics, residents sought to explain what set San Francisco apart from other
coastal cities.  In promoting a uniquely San Franciscan experience, residents determined
they must also commemorate the wartime sacrifices of their men in uniform.  Before the
war, the city had completed several parts of its grand civic center complex.  However,
municipal leaders had been forced to scrap a projected opera house due to a lack of
resources needed to develop the property.   In 1915 William H. Crocker proposed raising14
$850,000 in private subscriptions for the music center if the city could raise the other
million dollars needed.  Rolph rejected the idea on the grounds that Crocker wanted
subscribers to manage the opera house rather than the city.  Crocker also believed
subscribers should have “preferential rights to box seats.”   Mayor Rolph did not want to15
see a municipal opera house that catered to the wealthy elite.  However, he conceded that
private donations would be the only way an opera house would be constructed since city
Lewis Francis Byington and Oscar Lewis, eds., The History of San Francisco (Chicago:  S.J.
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revenues were tied up in Hetch Hetchy and the Municipal Railroad.  Rolph could not
accept a city opera house that the city did not operate.   Like the Auditorium and the city16
library, Rolph expected private organizations and donors to raise the funds necessary to
initiate public projects that would ultimately benefit the entire community.
In the spring of 1918, the San Francisco’s Musical Association decided to raise
funds for a symphony house.  By the end of the year they joined forces with the Art
Association to initiate a fund-raising drive to construct an opera house, symphony hall,
and art museum.  With the war over, the organizations believed that facilities for music
and art would “upbuild the city, contribute to its cultural life, make the city a more
interesting place to live in, and a better place to live in.”   Such statements reflected the17
middle and upper class desire to impose moral reform through cultural advancement
while utilizing public spaces to encourage civic loyalty.  To lead the movement toward
“civic idealism,” San Francisco’s artistic community chose eight elite businessmen to
organize fund raising for the cultural center.    Led by John Drum, president of San18
Francisco Savings Union Bank, the committee of eight included such notables as William
Crocker, Emanuel Heller, and Herbert Fleishhacker.  By the summer of 1919, the
committee had more than $1 million in pledges, despite a significant number of war-
related drives that channeled money away from the project.  However, those involved
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believed the project would require at least $2.5 million.    To raise enough funds and19
secure the support of San Franciscans for the project, Drum and his committee would
have to appeal to a wider audience. 
This desire for a cultural center that provided moral uplift coincided with a
movement at the end of the war to commemorate the sacrifices of the nation’s soldiers. 
Most veterans and the families of fallen soldiers wanted utilitarian memorials that
provided “some form of practical benefit for ex-serviceman, the bereaved or the
community as a whole.”   While several more traditional monuments were eventually20
erected in Golden Gate Park, many residents and returning veterans wanted something
more than a statue or plaque.  One of these returning veterans was Charles H. Kendrick, a
San Francisco businessman who had made his fortune selling his land options in the
Richmond and Sunset Districts after the fire.   Upon arriving back in San Francisco from
the battlefields of France, Charles Kendrick agreed to help his friend John Drum with the
project.   Kendrick suggested that a larger veteran’s complex could incorporate artistic
and patriotic elements.  Kendrick garnered support from the five newly created American
Legion posts in San Francisco.  Each passed a resolution approving the War Memorial
project and made Kendrick the chair of the Legion’s representatives to the Drum/Crocker
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committee.  
The new fund-raising event began with a mass meeting at the Civic Auditorium
on May 18, 1920.  Interspersed in the crowd were original donors for the project who
were asked to re-pledge publicly to stir others in the Auditorium to donate.   The21
pamphlet passed out at the Auditorium also heightened passions for donating to the War
Memorial complex.  It stated that primarily this project was a living memorial, not just a
static monument, to the sacrifices made by San Franciscans.  The authors of the pamphlet
believed that an opera house, art museum, and veteran’s center would serve as constant
reminders of the “sacrifices made in a war of ideals” and the future “development of
those ideals, for the perpetuation of a broader, better citizenship.”  For committee
members like Kendrick, Drum, and Crocker the construction of an opera house, art
museum and veteran’s center would provide opportunities for all citizens to partake in the
finer arts that would “strengthen the citizenship” and unify disparate segments of the
urban population through community participation in the arts.   To get the fine arts center22
they believed was necessary for the future of the city’s role as a preeminent cultural
center, civic leaders had to link citizens’ desire for personal improvement with patriotic
sentiments for honoring the dead.
Problems between the veterans and the elite overseeing the committee began
Charles Kendrick (David Warren Ryder, ed), Memoirs of Charles Kendrick (San Francisco:  The
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when William Crocker, a University of California regent, suggested that the War
Memorial project be made a legal affiliate with the school.  Then the project would be
exempt from property and subscription taxes.  The other committee members agreed and
the U.C. Regents approved.  This process created the War Memorial Trust Agreement
with the members of the original committee, along with U.C. Regents, becoming the War
Memorial Trustees.  This new legal agreement caused the first set of delays in the project. 
Attorneys for the Regents required all subscribers to sign new pledge forms that included
the information regarding the War Memorial Trust Agreement.  This requirement created
a loss of momentum for the project as people’s attention and money went elsewhere. 
Kendrick later insisted that this cost the project nearly two years and countless thousands
of dollars as not everyone returned the new pledge cards or their donations.  Another
problem might have been with the expansion of the project from a local memorial,
embodying the democratic principles of the veterans who believed they should play a
significant part in community decision-making, to a state project with input from
University of California regents.   23
While subscribers’ funds slowly trickled in, the Trustees contracted architects to
prepare plans for three buildings: an opera house, symphony hall, and art museum.  The
architects’ designs reflected the Trustees’ vision of an architecturally pleasing cultural
center and not the veterans’ desire for a functional meeting space.  However, the most
pressing problem with the architects’ plans was the realization that the proposed site of
For more on the conflicting goals between cultural leaders and veterans regarding memorials see
23
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the War Memorial was not sufficient for three buildings.  The Trustees then authorized a
location reassessment, further delaying the project.   In the spring of 1922 Supervisor24
Ralph McLeran approached the Board of Trustees about property to the west of City Hall
that a company had purchased to build a warehouse, a building city leaders through
inappropriate adjacent to the Civic Center Comples.  Mayor Rolph and the city’s Finance
Committee suggested that they Trustees buy the two blocks and that when the city had the
money they would pay the Trustees back for one of the lots.   The Trustees agreed, but25
the purchasing process took two years. 
Meanwhile, it became clear to the Trustees that $2 million would not be enough
money for the entire project.  Trustees determined that their goal of three separate
buildings was no longer feasible and pared down their project to an opera house and
veterans’ center/art museum.  The Board of Supervisors and Mayor Rolph stepped in with
support for a proposed $4 million city bond, which voters approved on June 14, 1927.  26
During the fund-raising and property acquisition, the Trustees claimed they continued to
be committed to providing veterans with facilities that reflected the importance of their
sacrifices.  However, the real focus appeared to have shifted to creating a civic center that
would promote the cultural progress of the entire community.  
The next obstacle to the construction of the War Memorial would pit these two
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sides against each other as each claimed their vision of the site to be more vital than the
other.  Even before the bond election, some veterans began to worry that the Trustees did
not have their best interests in mind.  They believed they were not receiving an equal
distribution of funds and space within the War Memorial complex.  According to Charles
Kendrick, a small group of “professional” veterans believed that the opera house’s design
would require more funds than the veterans’ buildings, thereby reducing the significance
of their part of the War Memorial.   As a result of their protests, the Board of27
Supervisors passed a resolution preventing the expenditure of any money unless the
veterans were “entirely satisfied as to the plans for their housing.”  According to Milton
Sapiro, a representative of the city’s American Legion posts, the veterans’ frustration
stemmed in part from the lack of progress made by the Trustees to provide veterans a
facility for their activities.  Sapiro argued that the Trustees had failed to do what Oakland
and Los Angeles had managed to do years earlier, the construction of a building with
“efficiency and expedition” that honored San Francisco veterans.  
This comparison to Los Angeles and Oakland reflects residents’ frustration with
their city’s inability to keep pace with its competitors.  For San Franciscans, the lack of a
public memorial epitomized their frustration.  While Los Angeles and Oakland grew
exponentially, San Francisco could not keep up with something as simple as constructive
a suitable monument to the sacrifices of the city’s enlisted and drafted men.  Sapiro
pointed to the fact that the veterans had already made progress in erecting a building for
their purposes in 1920 when they agreed to join their plans with those of the music and art
Kendrick, Memoirs of Charles Kendrick, 52.
27
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associations.  In trying to aid the city, Sapiro implied, the veterans had sacrificed their
opportunity to have the facilities they wanted and the memorial the city’s residents
demanded.28
Trustees who believed the project’s impact on the city’s cultural refinement
insisted that veterans did not need an entire building for their purposes.  John Drum
argued that when the American Legion first joined the fund-raising in 1920, their
representatives said the Legion would only need about 40,000 square feet within one of
the new buildings.  Six years later, they claimed they needed more than 100,000.  Drum
insisted that the veterans’ organizations refused to work with the Trustees, who had
already pared down the size of the opera house and the art museum.    The conflict29
between the two sides would have continued had it not been for the city’s elected leaders. 
Trying to unify the two sides and bring the project to completion, Mayor Rolph and the
Board of Supervisors proposed a November 1928 charter amendment that transferred
control of the War Memorial from the U.C. Regents to the city.   Under the charter30
amendment, the city’s mayor would appoint the eleven members of the War Memorial
Board of Trustees.  As “mayor of all the people” Rolph could ensure the veterans the
democratic voice in decision-making that was vital to their continued support for the
project.   San Franciscans approved the charter amendment.
Despite the amendment’s passage, the Trustees were reluctant to give up
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administration of the fund.  As a result, veterans began to accuse Trustees, particularly
William Crocker, of mismanaging the subscription.  The veterans believed a “cloud of
secrecy” surrounded the funds.  This suggested to them that the funds had “been
subjected to such mal-administration, inefficient and unbusiness-like use” that Trustees
did not want the city to assume responsibility for fear the truth would be revealed.    In31
response, John Drum argued that turning over the conflict to a new group of trustees
would not resolve the conflict.  Instead, it would delay construction and retard the city’s
cultural refinement.  Drum insisted that without the opera house and the museum, the city
was left with moving picture theaters that could be found in “any town of 500 in
population.”  Drum considered the project vital to San Francisco’s future development: 
“This is a cosmopolitan community; it is one of the few cosmopolitan communities of the
world.  But unless this community puts in those things. . . . you have not that opportunity
to give the . . . hundreds of thousands of our own people an opportunity to enjoy those
things that make this the greatest city on earth.”   32
By identifying San Francisco as a cosmopolitan city, Drum articulated the new
vision of the city and delineated the difference between it and the other West Coast
metropolitan centers.   The U.S. Census had already noted that San Francisco was no
longer at the heart of its own metropolitan district:  it would have to share that
designation with Oakland.  Meanwhile, Los Angeles, San Diego, Seattle and Portland
were independent metropolitan centers, consuming a growing number of suburbs.  Those
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suburbs allowed residents to scatter, creating segregated cultural enclaves.  San Francisco,
from its development in the 1850s, had been a city geographically confined.  Residents
were, therefore, unable to create neighborhoods exclusively based on class or ethnic
identity.   Drum was noting the possible role of San Francisco in the mid-twentieth
century Far West – a cosmopolitan city where diversity was accepted and cultural
refinement admired.  
The actual construction of the War Memorial complex began January 2, 1931 and
on Armistice Day that year veterans lay the cornerstones of both buildings.   Due to the33
depression, the city replaced the eight-hour work day with two separate five-hour a day
construction crews, which also sped up the completion of the buildings.  On October 15,
1932 the San Francisco Opera Company, which had performed its first nine seasons in the
Civic Auditorium, inaugurated the War Memorial Opera House with Tosca.  Five
hundred people stood in the auditorium during the performance as all 3,285 seats were
occupied.  Another four thousand deposits for seats had to be returned to patrons due to
the lack of seats.   The Veterans’ Building opened the next month on Armistice Day, but34
the Art Museum would not be ready for another two years due to limited funds.   Other
elements of the facility were also not completed immediately.  Charles Kendrick’s papers
show that landscaping, the instillation of acoustical tile, and the construction of stage
American Legion, War Memorial Commission, War Memorial of San Francisco (San Francisco: 
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platforms and the orchestra pit were not completed until 1935.   After more than ten35
years of planning what was most important was getting the facilities open.  The internal
and external adornments could be completed later.  By the time the San Francisco Art
Association was ready to establish their galleries in 1935, the veterans had taken over
most of their building.  This left only the fourth floor available for the museum and
required patrons to use a small side door on McAllister Street as an entrance.  36
Though more than a decade in the making, the city had its war memorial and
cultural center.  The War Memorial Opera House and Veterans’ Building represented the
desire of San Franciscans to commemorate the sacrifices of their war heroes.  At the same
time, it reflected the desire of civic leaders to construct edifices that served the greater
good by providing entertainment purported to improve the hearts and minds of all
residents.   With its completion, San Franciscans proved that, despite their differences,
they could pull together to promote the cultural advancement of the city.  Memorials
reflect the culture of their time and San Francisco’s Opera House and Veterans’ Building
was no exception.   By approving the 1927 bond issue and 1928 charter amendment, the37
majority of San Francisco voters showed their support for permanent structures meant to
honor the sacrifices of residents who served.   They also expressed how important these
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35
Kendrick, Memoirs of Charles Kendrick, 65.
36
For more on cultural memory and historical analysis of twentieth-century memorials  see Jay
37
Winter, Remember War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), William Kidd and Brian Murdoch, ed., Memory and Memorials: The
Commemorative Century (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), Jeanette Rodriquez and Ted
Fortier, Cultural Memory: Resistance, Faith and Identity (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007),
Nicholas J. Saunders, Matters of Conflict: Material culture, memory and the First World War (London:
Routledge, 2004).
304
buildings could be to the future progress of San Francisco and its identity as a city that
supported public spaces for the practice and appreciation of high culture.  
This cultural recognition not only appealed to the middle and upper class, who for
decades had considered opera, symphony, and art the tools necessary for social
advancement, but to other sectors of the populace.   Veterans, in honoring their fallen
comrade might have perceived the facilities as less about the future of the city and more
about constructing a monument to them and their comrades’ sacrifices.  However, even
they hoped the buildings would encourage veterans from across the country to visit San
Francisco and take advantage of the amenities at the Veterans’ Building.  For politicians,
like Rolph and the members of the Board of Supervisors, the buildings helped to
complete a dream for the civic center that had begun with the Burnham plan in 1905.  In
just a few square blocks municipal leaders had organized the planning, funding, and
construction of a series of buildings that incorporated the best San Francisco had to offer
– democratic access to the seats of municipal power aandthe seats of culture.  For the
Chamber of Commerce it was another site to advertise the attractiveness of San Francisco
to potential commercial investors and future residents.  The city’s laborers, union
members or not, found work constructing the grand edifices and, like the Chamber, hoped
it would attract new business ventures to the city.  The city’s ethnic groups, particularly
the Italians and Germans, saw the Opera House as an opportunity to produce music in
their native tongue, providing a means of celebrating their culture and impressing on
others an appreciation of those nations’ offerings to America.  
San Francisco residents could no longer boast of having the largest population on
305
the West Coast, or the greatest number of urban industries, or the headquarters of the
Pacific military defenses.   Nevertheless, in the “City That Knows How,” residents
constructed a community where Americans could experience a cultural education in a
cosmopolitan atmosphere.  Others around the world came to define the city in a similar
light.  The birthplace of the United Nations in 1945 was not in sunny Los Angeles, on a
naval vessel in San Diego Harbor, the Boeing plant in Seattle, or a warehouse in Oakland. 
Truman and other world leaders signed that international charter on the stage of the War
Memorial Opera House in San Francisco.
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